From June 1941, the Soviets were forced to undertake large-scale defensive operations in the face of the overwhelming German blitzkrieg assault, operations which ran counter to their preference for highly mobile, offensive warfare. Lessons were quickly learned across a wide variety of terrain and climates, including the open steppes, dense forests, wooded swamps, cities, and in snow and ice, where the availability of construction materials differed greatly. The first to cover this topic in the English language and containing detailed information about the trenches, bunkers, observation posts and weapon positions, this book examines field fortifications built from local materials by infantrymen, as well as their use of mines, field camouflage techniques, and construction tools. It provides a first fascinating insight into Russian defensive attempts against the overwhelming might of the German Army.

From June 1941, the Soviets were forced to undertake large-scale defensive operations in the face of the overwhelming German blitzkrieg assault, operations which ran counter to their preference for highly mobile, offensive warfare. Lessons were quickly learned across a wide variety of terrain and climates, including the open steppes, dense forests, wooded swamps, cities, and in snow and ice, where the availability of construction materials differed greatly. The first to cover this topic in the English language and containing detailed information about the trenches, bunkers, observation posts and weapon positions, this book examines field fortifications built from local materials by infantrymen, as well as their use of mines, field camouflage techniques, and construction tools. It provides a first fascinating insight into Russian defensive attempts against the overwhelming might of the German Army.

The German Army of World War II considered itself an offensive, mobile force. The experiences in the trenches in World War I had done much to shape its concept of field fortification, and its mobile warfare ethos was intended to prevent the previous war's stalemate. This book addresses frontline defensive field fortifications, built by infantrymen using local materials, and includes rifle platoon positions, trenches, crew-served weapon positions, bunkers, dugouts, shelters and more. It also covers anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles, as well as field camouflage methods and construction methods. The integration of these positions into permanent systems and theatre-specific defences are also discussed.

The US Army and Marine Corps in World War II considered themselves highly mobile, offensive forces. Their mobile-warfare doctrine envisioned field fortifications and obstacles as temporary in nature. As a result, their design was simple and made use of local materials, and they could be constructed comparatively quickly, whilst still providing adequate protection. By the time of the Korean War, only minor changes had been made to field fortification construction and layout, and to small-unit organization, weapons, and tactics. This title addresses field fortifications built by US infantrymen during World War II and in Korea, and covers rifle-platoon positions, trenches, crew-served weapon positions, bunkers, dugouts, shelters, observation posts and anti-tank obstacles.

The Mississippi River played a decisive role in the American Civil War. The Confederate fortifications that controlled the lower Mississippi valley were put to the test in the lengthy Federal campaign of 1862-63. Vicksburg was a fortress city, known as the 'Gibraltar of the Confederacy', whose capture was seen as the key to victory in the war. This book explores the fortifications of the river valley, focusing on Vicksburg and its defences which boasted a network of forts, rifle pits and cannon embrasures surrounding the city, a well as examining the strengths and weaknesses of the fortifications when under siege. Also examined are numerous other fortified strongholds, including New Orleans, Port Hudson, New Madrid, and forts Henry and Donelson, all lavishly illustrated with full-colour artwork and cutaways.

A fully illustrated survey of the Soviet infantryman on the Eastern Front in World War II. The Soviet Army was ill-prepared for its ally’s treacherous onslaught in 1941. Its officer corps decimated by Stalin’s purges and its men less well-trained than the Germans, the Red Army was poorly led, hampered by the power of the political officers and only partly mobilized. But, in spite of the huge German victories and the speed of the Nazi attack, the Soviets proved fantastically capable of rolling with the punches. The vast territory of the Soviet Union and huge population were significant, as was substantial assistance from the West—the United States and Britain in particular—which was in evidence when the German columns got to within a few miles short of Moscow and were held and then forced back. The tide turned thanks to help from outside and the efforts of the Soviet soldiers, who proved hardy and durable. And just like its soldiers, Russian infantry equipment was rugged and effective. While Soviet infantrymen may not have had the flexibility or tactical nous of the Germans, they did not lack cunning: deception, camouflage skills and endurance made Russian snipers, as an example, more than the equal of the Germans. Most of the views of the Soviet soldier and campaign are influenced by self-serving German postwar accounts designed to excuse their loss by suggesting that Adolf Hitler’s meddling and Soviet numbers were the main reasons for victory: this denigrates the Russian infantryman whose toughness and ingenuity helped destroy the Third Reich in spite of the faults of its own regime. Fully illustrated with over 150 contemporary photographs and illustrations, Soviet Infantryman on the Eastern Front in the Casemate Illustrated series provides an insight into the Soviets’ main theater of operations in World War II.

In the years following the Civil War, plans were drawn up to build a major set of fortifications along the Russian western border. Work began in 1926, leading to a front that stretched over 2,000km from the Baltic to the Black Sea. By the time of the outbreak of World War II, the defences of the Stalin Line, as it was known, were largely complete – but were also now too far behind the new Soviet border to be of any use in potential offensives. Stalin took steps to create a new defensive line inside Poland, which came to be known by the name of the Soviet Foreign Minister, Molotov. This book details the development of these lines, and the fighting that took place around them in 1941.