The Sovnarkhoz Reform of 1957 was designed by Khrushchev to improve efficiency in the Soviet economic system by decentralising economic decision making from all-Union branch ministries in Moscow to the governments of the individual republics and regional economic councils. Based on extensive original research, including unpublished archival material, this book examines the reform, discussing the motivations for it, which included Khrushchev's attempt to strengthen his own power base. The book explores how the process of reform was implemented, especially its impact on the republics, and analyses why the reform, which was reversed in 1959, failed. Overall, the book reveals a great deal about the workings, and the shortcomings, of the Soviet economic system at its height.

Monograph on the role of the communist political party in the application of the 1965 economic reform in the USSR, with particular reference to the reform of the industrial planning and industrial management systems - assesses political aspects and economic implications, analyses present and potential trends from centrally planned economy toward decentralization, and covers the extent of political leadership support and managerial support of the reform, implications for industrial growth, etc. Bibliography pp. 205 to 230 and references.

This book presents a new picture of the politics, economics and process of government in the Soviet Union under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev. Based in large part on original research in recently declassified archive collections, the book examines the full complexity of government, including formal and informal political relationships; economic reforms and nationality relations in the national republics of the USSR; the treatment of political dissent; economic progress through technological innovation; relations with the Eastern bloc; corruption and deceit in the economy; and the reform of the railways and construction sectors. The book re-evaluates the Khrushchev era as one which represented a significant departure from the Stalin years, introducing a number of policy changes that only came to fruition later, whilst still suffering from many of the limitations imposed by the Stalinist system. Unlike many other studies which consider the subject from the perspective of the Cold War and superpower relations, this book provides an overview of the internal development of the Soviet Union in this period, locating it in the broader context of Soviet history. This is the companion volume to the Jeremy Smith and Melanie Ilic’s previous edited collection, Soviet State and Society under Nikita Khrushchev (Routledge, 2009).

On its publication in 1985, this book offered a fresh analysis of the problems faced by the Soviet economy by focussing on the key issues in the economic planning system. David Dyker considers the available options for reform during the 1980s and the most likely developments. Discussing the origins of the Soviet economic planning system and the theories which founded it, previous attempts to reform the organisational structure and the particular problem of agriculture, Dyker presents a picture of an increasingly bleak future for the Soviet economy. This is a comprehensive title written by a renowned expert on the Soviet economy, which will be of particular value to students and academics researching the political and economic development and history of the Soviet Union.

This title was first published in 1966

A masterful account of the global Cold War’s decisive influence on Soviet economic reform, and the national decay that followed. What brought down the Soviet Union? From some perspectives the answers seem obvious, even teleological—communism was simply destined to fail. When Yakov Feygin studied the question, he came to another conclusion: at least one crucial factor was a deep contradiction within the Soviet political economy brought about by the country’s attempt to transition from Stalinist mass mobilization to a consumer society. Building a Ruin explores what happened in the Soviet Union as institutions designed for warfighting capacity and maximum heavy industrial output were reimagined by a new breed of reformers focused on “peaceful socioeconomic competition.” From Khrushchev on, influential schools of Soviet planning measured Cold War success in the same terms as their Western rivals: productivity, growth, and the availability of abundant and varied consumer goods. The shift was both material and intellectual, with reformers taking a novel approach to economics. Instead of trumpeting their ideological bona fides and leveraging their connections with party leaders, the new economists stressed technical expertise. The result was a long and taxing struggle for the meaning of communism itself, as old-guard management cadres clashed with reformers over the future of central planning and the state’s relationship to the global economic order. Feygin argues that Soviet policymakers never resolved these tensions, leading to stagnation, instability, and eventually collapse. Yet the legacy of reform lingers, its factional dynamics haunting contemporary Russian politics.

The Sovnarkhoz Reform of 1957 was designed by Khrushchev to improve efficiency in the Soviet economic system by decentralising economic decision making from all-Union branch ministries in Moscow to the governments of the individual republics and regional economic councils. Based on extensive original research, including unpublished archival material, this book examines the reform, discussing the motivations for it, which included Khrushchev's attempt to strengthen his own power base. The book explores how the process of reform was implemented, especially its impact on the republics, and analyses why the reform, which was reversed in 1959, failed. Overall, the book reveals a great deal about the workings, and the shortcomings, of the Soviet economic system at its height.