This paper documents the two debt restructurings that Grenada undertook in 2004–06 and 2013–15.Both restructurings emerged as a consequence of weak fiscal and debt situations, whichbecame unsustainable soon after external shocks hit the island economy. The two restructurings provided liquidity relief, with the second one involving a principal haircut. However, the first restructuring was not able to secure long-term debt sustainability. Grenada’s restructuring experience shows the importance of (1) establishing appropriate debt restructuring objectives; (2) committing to policy reforms and maintaining ownership of the restructuring goals; and (3) engaging closely and having clear communications with creditors.

This paper documents the two debt restructurings that Grenada undertook in 2004–06 and 2013–15.Both restructurings emerged as a consequence of weak fiscal and debt situations, whichbecame unsustainable soon after external shocks hit the island economy. The two restructurings provided liquidity relief, with the second one involving a principal haircut. However, the first restructuring was not able to secure long-term debt sustainability. Grenada’s restructuring experience shows the importance of (1) establishing appropriate debt restructuring objectives; (2) committing to policy reforms and maintaining ownership of the restructuring goals; and (3) engaging closely and having clear communications with creditors.

This paper provides a comprehensive survey of pertinent issues on sovereign debt restructurings, based on a newly constructed database. This is the first complete dataset of sovereign restructuring cases, covering the six decades from 1950–2010; it includes 186 debt exchanges with foreign banks and bondholders, and 447 bilateral debt agreements with the Paris Club. We present new stylized facts on the outcome and process of debt restructurings, including on the size of haircuts, creditor participation, and legal aspects. In addition, the paper summarizes the relevant empirical literature, analyzes recent restructuring episodes, and discusses ongoing debates on crisis resolution mechanisms, credit default swaps, and the role of collective action clauses.

The current approach to resolving sovereign debt crises does not work: sovereign debt restructurings come too late and address too little. Though unresolved debt crises impose enormous costs on societies, many recent restructurings have not been deep enough to provide the conditions for economic recovery (as illustrated by the Greek debt restructuring of 2012). And if the debtor decides not to accept the terms demanded by the creditors, finalizing a restructuring can be slowed by legal challenges (as illustrated by the recent case of Argentina, deemed as "the trial of the century"). A fresh start for distressed debtors is a basic principle of a well-functioning market economy, yet there is no international bankruptcy framework for sovereign debts. While this problem is not new, the United Nations and the global community are now willing to do something about it. Providing guidance for those who intend to take up reform, this book assesses the relative merits of various debt-restructuring proposals, especially in relation to the main deficiencies of the current nonsystem. With contributions by leading academics and practitioners, Too Little, Too Late reflects the overwhelming consensus among specialists on the need to find workable solutions.

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This paper presents background on Caribbean small states as context for the main paper, “Macroeconomic Issues in Small States and Implications for Fund Engagement.” It draws on recent analytical work presented at a conference for policy makers in September 2012, in Trinidad and Tobago. Caribbean small states, while sharing many features of other small states (size-related macroeconomic vulnerabilities, lack of economies of scale, and capacity constraints) have specific characteristics which merit attention

In discussing the June 2014 paper, Executive Directors broadly supported staff’s proposal to introduce more flexibility into the Fund’s exceptional access framework to reduce unnecessary costs for the member, its creditors, and the overall system. Directors’ views varied on staff’s proposal to eliminate the systemic exemption introduced in 2010. Many Directors favored removing the exemption but some others preferred to retain it and requested staff to consult further with relevant stakeholders on possible approaches to managing contagion. This paper offers specific proposals on how the Fund’s policy framework could be changed, presents staff’s analysis on the specific issue of managing contagion, and addresses some implementation issues. No Board decision is proposed at this stage. The paper is consistent with the Executive Board’s May 2013 endorsement of a work program focused on strengthening market-based approaches to resolving sovereign debt crises.