Previous studies have shown that the Department of Defense (DoD) and the military departments have historically underestimated the cost of new weapon systems. Quantifying cost growth is important, but the larger issue is why cost growth occurs. To address that issue, this analysis uses data from Selected Acquisition Reports to examine 35 mature, but not necessarily complete, major defense acquisition programs similar to the type and complexity of those typically managed by the Air Force. The programs are first examined as a complete set, then Air Force and non-Air Force programs are analyzed separately to determine whether the causes of cost growth in the two groups differ. Four major sources of cost growth were identified: (1) errors in estimation and scheduling, (2) decisions made by the government, (3) financial matters, and (4) miscellaneous sources. Total (development plus procurement) cost growth, when measured as simple averages among the program set, is dominated by decisions, which account for more than two-thirds of the growth. Most decisions-related cost growth involves quantity changes (22 percent), requirements growth (13 percent), and schedule changes (9 percent). Cost estimation (10 percent) is the only large contributor in the errors category. Less than 4 percent of the overall cost growth is due to financial and miscellaneous causes. Because decisions involving changes in requirements, quantities, and production schedules dominate cost growth, program managers, service leadership, and Congress should look for ways to reduce changes in these areas.

This analysis uses data from Selected Acquisition Reports to determine the causes of cost growth in 35 mature major defense acquisition programs. Four major sources of growth are identified: (1) errors in estimation and scheduling, (2) decisions by the government, (3) financial matters, and (4) miscellaneous. The analysis shows that more than two-thirds of cost growth (measured as simple averages) is caused by decisions, most of which involve quantity changes, requirements growth, and schedule changes.

Why have the costs of acquiring space systems been so high? What are the sources of the problems? To answer these questions, RAND undertook an extensive study of two space systems--the Space Based Infrared System-High (SBIRS) and the Global Positioning System (GPS).

Joint Vision 2020 is the conceptual template for how we will channel the vitality of our people and leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting.

This report is one of a series from a RAND Project AIR FORCE project, "The Cost of Future Military Aircraft: Historical Cost Estimating Relationships and Cost Reduction Initiatives." The purpose of the project is to improve the tools used to estimate the costs of future weapon systems. It focuses on how recent technical, management, and government policy changes affect cost. This report focuses on the accuracy of cost estimates. For our analysis, we used a very specific sample of Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) data, namely only programs that are complete or are nearly so. The analysis indicates a systematic bias toward underestimating the costs and substantial uncertainty in estimating the final cost of a weapon system. In contrast to the previous literature, the cost growth was higher than previously observed. We also found few correlations with cost growth, but observed that programs with longer duration had greater cost growth and electronics programs tended to have lower cost growth. Although there were some differences in the mean cost growth factors among the military departments, the differences were not statistically significant. While newer programs appear to have lower cost growth, this trend appears to be due to factors other than acquisition policies.

Field manual 3-90.6 provides the commander and staff of the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and subordinate units with doctrine relevant to Army and joint operations. It applies to the Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT), the Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), and the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT). The doctrine described in this manual applies across the full spectrum of military operations - offense, defense, stability or civil support. This publication: Provides BCTs with a framework in which they can operate as part of a division or independently as part of a joint task force; Provides doctrine for BCT commanders, staffs, and their subordinate commanders and leaders responsible for conducting major activities performed during operations; Serves as an authoritative reference for personnel who: Develop doctrine (fundamental principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures), materiel, and force structure; Develop institution and unit training; Develop unit tactical standard operating procedures for BCT operations.