Soldiers and Diplomacy addresses the key question of the ongoing role of the military in BurmaÍs foreign policy. The authors, a political scientist and a former top Asia editor for the BBC, provide a fresh perspective on BurmaÍs foreign and security policies, which have shifted between pro-active diplomacies of neutralism and non-alignment, and autarkical policies of isolation and xenophobic nationalism. They argue that important elements of continuity underlie BurmaÍs striking postcolonial policy changes and contrasting diplomatic practices. Among the defining factors here are the formidable dominance of the Burmese armed forces over state structure, the enduring domestic political conundrum and the peculiar geography of a country located at the crossroads of India, China and Southeast Asia. Egreteau and Jagan argue that the Burmese military still has the tools needed to retain their praetorian influence over the countryÍs foreign policy in the post-junta context of the 2010s. For international policymakers, potential foreign investors and BurmaÍs immediate neighbors, this will have strong implications in terms of the countryÍs foreign policy approach.

United Nations peacekeeping troops, or 'Blue Helmets,' were first deployed in 1956 to oversee the withdrawal of French, British, and Israeli forces from the Suez Canal. Canadian Lester B. Pearson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize the following year for proposing this solution to the Suez crisis. Now forty years later, United Nations peacekeepers play a very different role from that of Pearson's lightly armed 'soldier-diplomats.' In June 1997, there were only seven UN missions in which the Blue Helmets were acting as true peacekeepers; another ten missions placed the Blue Helmets in civil conflicts where their roles ranged from evacuating threatened groups to organizing elections, and their tasks were much more dangerous. Jocelyn Coulon draws his experiences visiting nine peacekeeping missions, including Cambodia, Bosnia, and Somalia, at a pivotal point in UN history, when the UN troops were increasingly acting as warriors of a new world order. He raises important questions: How can the UN distinguish its objectives from the interests of the great powers? Could - and should - the UN maintain an independent army? How can the pitfalls encountered by the peacekeepers in Somalia and Bosnia be avoided? Finally, Coulon urges a return to the original, though less spectacular, role of the UN soldiers: keeping the peace where peace is really the goal of the parties involved. Soldiers of Diplomacy was first published in French in 1994; this new English edition has been updated to reflect recent events. The result of interviews with dozens of soldiers, officers, and officials involved in peacekeeping activities, it is a unique and thought-provoking investigation of UN peacekeeping.

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the United States Army became the principal agent of American foreign policy. The army designed, implemented, and administered the occupations of the defeated Axis powers Germany and Japan, as well as many other nations. Generals such as Lucius Clay in Germany, Douglas MacArthur in Japan, Mark Clark in Austria, and John Hodge in Korea presided over these territories as proconsuls. At the beginning of the Cold War, more than 300 million people lived under some form of U.S. military authority. The army's influence on nation-building at the time was profound, but most scholarship on foreign policy during this period concentrates on diplomacy at the highest levels of civilian government rather than the armed forces' governance at the local level. In Army Diplomacy, Hudson explains how U.S. Army policies in the occupied nations represented the culmination of more than a century of military doctrine. Focusing on Germany, Austria, and Korea, Hudson's analysis reveals that while the post–World War II American occupations are often remembered as overwhelming successes, the actual results were mixed. His study draws on military sociology and institutional analysis as well as international relations theory to demonstrate how "bottom-up" decisions not only inform but also create higher-level policy. As the debate over post-conflict occupations continues, this fascinating work offers a valuable perspective on an important yet underexplored facet of Cold War history.

The founder -- Shadow diplomacy -- War by other means -- Chasing respectability -- Between truth and lies -- Diplomacy in retreat -- Selective integration -- Rethinking capitalism -- The fightback -- Ambition realized -- Overreach.

The increasing capacity of states to muster violence, the concomitant rise of military power as a meaningful instrument of foreign policy, and the frequent episodic collapse of that power are considered in this examination of force, order, and diplomacy. Nathan points to periods of relative order and stability in international relations-the time immediately prior to the rise of Frederick the Great, for example, or the half century after the Napoleonic Wars-as times when states have been most vulnerable to spoilers and rogues. Only the power of the Cold War blocs fostered durable order. Now, notwithstanding novel elements of globalization, international relations appear as dependent as ever on the prudent management of force. Students, scholars, and soldiers are frequently exposed to Clausewitz, Westphalia, Napoleon, World War I, and the like. But what makes these events and individuals so important? This book is Clausewitz's successor, insisting that soldiers and statesmen know and master the integrative potential of force. Nathan provides a narrative account of the people and events that have shaped international relations since the onset of the state system. He asserts that an understanding of the limits and utility of persuasion, as well as the corresponding limits and utility of force, will help assure national security in a world filled with more uncertainties than ever in the last 50 years.