Socially Extended Epistemology explores the epistemological ramifications of one of the most important research programmes in contemporary cognitive science: distributed cognition. In certain conditions, according to this programme, groups of people can generate distributed cognitive systems that consist of all participating members. This volume brings together a range of distinguished and early career academics, from a variety of different perspectives, to investigate the very idea of socially extended epistemology. They ask, for example: can distributed cognitive systems generate knowledge in a similar way to individuals? And if so, how, if at all, does this kind of knowledge differ from normal, individual knowledge? The first part of the volume examines foundational issues, including from a critical perspective. The second part of the volume turns to applications of this idea, and the new theoretical directions that it might take us. These include the ethical ramifications of socially extended epistemology, its societal impact, and its import for emerging digital technologies.

Extended Cognition examines the way in which features of a subject's cognitive environment can become constituent parts of the cognitive process itself. This volume explores the epistemological ramifications of this idea, bringing together academics from a variety of different areas, to investigate the very idea of an extended epistemology

One of the most important research programmes in contemporary cognitive science is that of extended cognition, whereby features of a subject's cognitive environment can in certain conditions become constituent parts of the cognitive process itself. This volume explores the epistemological ramifications of this idea.

Socially Extended Epistemology explores the epistemological ramifications of one of the most important research programmes in contemporary cognitive science: distributed cognition. In certain conditions, according to this programme, groups of people can generate distributed cognitive systems that consist of all participating members. This volume brings together a range of distinguished and early career academics, from a variety of different perspectives, to investigate the very idea of socially extended epistemology. They ask, for example: can distributed cognitive systems generate knowledge in a similar way to individuals? And if so, how, if at all, does this kind of knowledge differ from normal, individual knowledge? The first part of the volume examines foundational issues, including from a critical perspective. The second part of the volume turns to applications of this idea, and the new theoretical directions that it might take us. These include the ethical ramifications of socially extended epistemology, its societal impact, and its import for emerging digital technologies.

Offers a vital, unique and agenda-setting perspective for the field of social epistemology – the philosophical basis for prescribing the social means and ends for pursuing knowledge.

When historian Charles Weiner found pages of Nobel Prize-winning physicist Richard Feynman's notes, he saw it as a "record" of Feynman's work. Feynman himself, however, insisted that the notes were not a record but the work itself. In Supersizing the Mind, Andy Clark argues that our thinking doesn't happen only in our heads but that "certain forms of human cognizing include inextricable tangles of feedback, feed-forward and feed-around loops: loops that promiscuously criss-cross the boundaries of brain, body and world." The pen and paper of Feynman's thought are just such feedback loops, physical machinery that shape the flow of thought and enlarge the boundaries of mind. Drawing upon recent work in psychology, linguistics, neuroscience, artificial intelligence, robotics, human-computer systems, and beyond, Supersizing the Mind offers both a tour of the emerging cognitive landscape and a sustained argument in favor of a conception of mind that is extended rather than "brain-bound." The importance of this new perspective is profound. If our minds themselves can include aspects of our social and physical environments, then the kinds of social and physical environments we create can reconfigure our minds and our capacity for thought and reason.

Jennifer Lackey presents a ground-breaking exploration of the epistemology of groups, and its implications for group agency and responsibility. She argues that group belief and knowledge depend on what individual group members do or are capable of doing, while being subject to group-level normative requirements.