In the political-economy debate people express the idea that immigrants are good because they can help pay for the old, thus help sustaining the social security system. In addition, the median voter whose income derives from wages will wish to keep out the immigrants who will depress his/her wage. Therefore the decisive voter will keep migrants out. The paper addresses these two accepted propositions. For this purpose we develop an OLG political economy model of social security and migration to explore how migration policy and a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security system are jointly determined. The sub-game perfect Markov , depends on the different patterns of fertility rates among native born and migrants. Our analysis demonstrates that a social security system may change the first proposition significantly because the median voter may opt to bring in migrants to help him/her during retirement. As for the second proposition we get a significantly nuanced version. Not always immigration helps sustain the social security.

Since 1965 the foreign-born population of the United States has swelled from 9.6 million or 5 percent of the population to 45 million or 14 percent in 2015. Today, about one-quarter of the U.S. population consists of immigrants or the children of immigrants. Given the sizable representation of immigrants in the U.S. population, their health is a major influence on the health of the population as a whole. On average, immigrants are healthier than native-born Americans. Yet, immigrants also are subject to the systematic marginalization and discrimination that often lead to the creation of health disparities. To explore the link between immigration and health disparities, the Roundtable on the Promotion of Health Equity held a workshop in Oakland, California, on November 28, 2017. This summary of that workshop highlights the presentations and discussions of the workshop.

This third and last open access volume in the series takes the perspective of non-EU countries on immigrant social protection. By focusing on 12 of the largest sending countries to the EU, the book tackles the issue of the multiple areas of sending state intervention towards migrant populations. Two “mirroring” chapters are dedicated to each of the 12 non-EU states analysed (Argentina, China, Ecuador, India, Lebanon, Morocco, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey). One chapter focuses on access to social benefits across five core policy areas (health care, unemployment, old-age pensions, family benefits, guaranteed minimum resources) by discussing the social protection policies that non-EU countries offer to national residents, non-national residents, and non-resident nationals. The second chapter examines the role of key actors (consulates, diaspora institutions and home country ministries and agencies) through which non-EU sending countries respond to the needs of nationals abroad. The volume additionally includes two chapters focusing on the peculiar case of the United Kingdom after the Brexit referendum. Overall, this volume contributes to ongoing debates on migration and the welfare state in Europe by showing how non-EU sending states continue to play a role in third country nationals’ ability to deal with social risks. As such this book is a valuable read to researchers, policy makers, government employees and NGO’s.

Abstract: For each year of work under the Social Security System, immigrants realize higher benefits than U.S. born, even when their earnings are identical in all years the immigrant has been in the U.S. Two features of the social security benefit calculation are responsible: the social security benefit formula transfers benefits toward those with low lifetime covered earnings, and all years an immigrant spends outside the US are treated as years of zero income. Immigrants with high earnings who have worked in the U.S. for only a 10-20 years benefit most from these procedures. If instead earnings were averaged only over the years an immigrant resides in the U.S., and benefits prorated immigrants would receive the same return on their social security taxes as US born who have the same earnings in each year. It is difficult to justify the current procedures determining benefits for immigrants on the basis of income or wealth differences between US and foreign born. Among HHRS respondents, mean total wealth of immigrants is 92% of the mean total wealth of US born, while the mean income of immigrants exceeds the mean income of US born by 3%. But income and wealth are less evenly distributed among foreign born than US born. Depending on whether the appropriate period for calculating benefits is taken to be 35 or 40 years, prorating would reduce the present value of benefit payments to the cohort of immigrants born from 1932-1941 (91% of the HRS cohort) by $7.5 billion or $15 billion respectively. The 1932-1941 cohort represents 1/7 of all foreign born who are now 25-64. We also ask whether, from a selfish financial viewpoint, US born participants would have preferred to have immigrants from the HRS cohort included in social security. The answer is yes. Despite their better deal, most immigrants in the HRS cohort will pay more in taxes than they will receive in benefits, although just barely.

Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO: (1) explored ways to reduce the potential for fraud in obtaining and using social security number (SSN) cards; and (2) identified technological alternatives for making the card more resistant to counterfeiting. GAO found that: (1) the SSN application process was vulnerable to fraud, since there were thousands of different documents applicants could use to support their applications; (2) support documents, such as birth certificates, were easy to obtain, counterfeit, or alter, with no practical way for the Social Security Administration (SSA) to verify them; and (3) employers were untrained in document verification. GAO also found that: (1) designating the SSN card as the only acceptable document aliens could use for employment eligibility verification under the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) would simplify employment eligibility; (2) Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) certification of alien employment eligibility could improve SSA procedures; (3) although magnetic strips, integrated circuitry, and lasers would make SSN cards more resistant to counterfeiting, they would not preclude persons from using fraudulent documents to obtain valid cards; (4) the introduction of color copiers has posed a significant threat to SSN card integrity; and (5) although IRCA provided that general revenues finance changes to the SSN card, the Social Security Trust Funds paid for the replacement of 1.6 million cards at a cost of $11.6 million.