First Published in 1983. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First Published in 1983. Social problems have assumed a growing importance in France, as in all developed countries, especially since the end of the last century. While traditional early nineteenth century liberalism denied the existence of social problems as such, believing the greatest possible economic freedom to be the sole solution to all evils, the emphasis is still placed more and more insistently on the need for a definite and concerted welfare effort, to increase the material well-being of individuals and families. Since the second edition of this book was published in 1962, legislation and welfare services, and social reality itself have changed as much through circumstances as through political and economic evolution. It follows that the present edition of this book is, in fact, an almost wholly new book. It attempts to present a comprehensive view of French social life, drawing attention especially to welfare services and legislation as they are at the beginning of 1979.

Political and administrative institutions cannot be understood unless one knows who is operating them and for whose benefit they function. In the first volume of this history, Mousnier analyzes such institutions in light of the prevailing social, economic, and ideological structures and shows how they shaped life in 17th- and 18th-century France. He traces the changing role of monarchical government, showing how it emerged over two centuries and why it failed. In a society divided by hierarchical social groups, conflicts among lineages, communities, and districts became inevitable. Aristocratic disdain, ancestral attachment to privileges, and autonomous powers looked upon as rights, made civil unrest, dislocation, and anarchy endemic. Mousnier examines this contention between classes as they faced each other across the institutional barriers of education, religion, economic resources, technology, means of defense and communication, and territorial and family ties. He shows why a monarchical state was necessary to preserve order within this fragmented society. Though it was intent on ensuring the survival of French society and the public good, the Absolute Monarchy was unable to maintain security, equilibrium, and cooperation among rival social groups. Discussing the feeble technology at its disposal and its weak means of governing, Mousnier points to the causes that brought the state to the limits of its resources. His comprehensive analysis will greatly interest students of the ancien régime and comparativists in political science and sociology as well.

This second volume continues the story told in the first by focusing on the writings of a selection of seminal thinkers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in England, the German speaking world and in France, ending with the debate around the French Revolution of 1789. Tony Burns discusses the work of Thomas Hobbes, John Selden, Sir Matthew Hale, John Locke, Samuel Clarke, Johannes Althusius, Samuel Pufendorf, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Jean Barbeyrac, the anonymous author of Militaire philosophe, Claude Buffier, l’abbé de Saint-Pierre, Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, Montesquieu, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, l’abbé de Sieyès, Jeremy Bentham, Immanuel Kant, Mary Wollstonecraft and Claude-Henri de Saint-Simon. The author concludes with an analysis of the concept of administration in the writings of Saint-Simon, as a point of transition to the discussion of the themes of bureaucracy, technocracy and managerialism in the third volume.

This book uses game theory to analyse the creation, evolution and function of economic and social institutions. The author illustrates his analysis by describing the organic or unplanned evolution of institutions such as the conventions of war, the use of money, property rights and oligopolistic pricing conventions. Professor Schotter begins by linking his work with the ideas of the philosophers Rawls, Nozick and Lewis. Institutions are regarded as regularities in the behaviour of social agents, which the agents themselves tacitly create to solve a wide variety of recurrent problems. The repetitive nature of the problems permits them to be described as a recurrent game or 'supergame.' The agents use these regularities as informational devices to supplement the information contained in competitive prices. The final chapter explores the applicability of this theory, first by relating it to previous work on the theory of teams, hierarchies, and non-maximizing decision theory, and then by using it to provide a new approach to a variety of questions both within and outside economics.