During the Soviet period the USSR conducted diplomatic relations with incumbent regimes while simultaneously cultivating and manipulating communist movements in those same countries. The Chinese case offers a particularly interesting example of this dual policy, for when the Chinese Communists came to power in 1949, their discovery of the nature of Moscow's imperial designs on Chinese territory sowed distrust between the two revolutionary powers and paved the way to the Sino-Soviet split.Drawing on newly available documents from archives in China, Taiwan, Russia, and Japan, this study examines secret agreements signed by Moscow and the Peking government in 1924 and confirmed by a Soviet-Japanese convention in 1925. These agreements essentially allowed the Bolsheviks to reclaim most of tsarist Russia's concessions and privileges in China, including not only Imperial properties but also Outer Mongolia, the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Boxer Indemnity, and the right of extraterritoriality. Each of these topics is analyzed in this volume, and translations of the secret protocols themselves are included in a documentary appendix. Additional chapters discuss Sino-Soviet diplomacy and the parallel history of Soviet relations with the Chinese Communist Party as well as the origins and purpose of the United Front policy.

This book provides a systematic history of Sino-Russian relations, a history which is invaluable in forming an understanding of relations between the two nations today. Becoming neighbours in the seventeenth century, their changing relations in peace and war, in isolation, cooperation and confrontation have steadily assumed a greater importance in world politics and become increasingly important to the stability of international relations.

Utilizes archival documents to argue against the perception that America turned its back on China during the Paris Peace Conference, a belief that convinced many Chinese to turn to Soviet Russia instead. The author contends that President Wilson did everything in his power to help China. Chapters focus on topics such as the origins of the United Front Policy, assertion of Soviet control over the Chinese Eastern Railway, the restoration of Russian territorial concessions, and Soviet Foreign policy and the Chinese Communist Party. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

First Published in 1981. Contrary to Chairman Mao's assertion that political power comes from the barrel of a gun, this study contends that political power in China in the early 1920s emanated from the boardrooms of foreign banks. The author's interest in the way financial concerns have shaped foreign policy began with the discovery that the Lloyd George government attempted to influence the American government's policy on the British war debts by offering concessions concerning the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This study should provide understanding concerning the causes of Chinese bitterness as well as suggest the conflicts experienced by diplomats in balancing public and private interests.