Three surveys of exchange rate expectations allow us to measure directly the expected rates of return on yen versus dollars. Expectations of yen appreciation against the dollar have been (1) consistently large, (2) variable, and (3) greater than the forward premium, implying that investors were willing to accept a lower expected return on dollar assets. At short-term horizons expectations exhibit bandwagon effects, while at longer-term horizons they show the reverse. A 10 percent yen appreciation generates the expectation of a further appreciation of 2.4 percent over the following week, for example, but a depreciation of 3.4 percent over the following year. At any horizon, investors would do better to reduce the absolute magnitude of expected depreciation. The true spot rate process behaves more like a random walk.

The survey data on the yen/dollar exchange rate, collected twice a month for eight years from 1985 to 1993, shows the following features. First, the expected exchange rate changes in the short horizon (one month) are of the band-wagon type while the expected changes in the long horizon (three to six months) are of the mean- reversion type. That is, foreign exchange traders infer from recent appreciations or depreciation that the recent change in the exchange rate will continue for a while, but the direction of changes will reverse, eventually. Second, this result is robust for the entire sample period, which includes sub-periods of sharp yen appreciations and of relative calm, and with respect to different specifications. Third, the deviation from an equilibrium exchange rate does not yield a robust estimate in the regression of expectation formation. Although the history of the yen/dollar exchange rate fluctuations in the past two decades shows mean reversion over several years, they are not captured in the six-month expectations in the survey data.

Abstract: Three surveys of exchange rate expectations allow us to measure directly the expected rates of return on yen versus dollars. Expectations of yen appreciation against the dollar have been (1) consistently large, (2) variable, and (3) greater than the forward premium, implying that investors were willing to accept a lower expected return on dollar assets. At short-term horizons expectations exhibit bandwagon effects, while at longer-term horizons they show the reverse. A 10 percent yen appreciation generates the expectation of a further appreciation of 2.4 percent over the following week, for example, but a depreciation of 3.4 percent over the following year. At any horizon, investors would do better to reduce the absolute magnitude of expected depreciation. The true spot rate process behaves more like a random walk

Dollar and Yen analyzes the friction between the United States and Japan from the viewpoint of exchange rate economics. From the mid-1950s to the early 1990s, Japan grew faster than any other major industrial economy, displacing the United States in dominance of worldwide manufacturing markets. In the 1970s and 1980s, many books appeared linking the apparent decline of the United States in the world economy to unfair Japanese practices that closed the Japanese market to a wide range of foreign goods. Dollar and Yen analyzes the friction between the United States and Japan from the viewpoint of exchange rate economics. The authors argue against the prevailing view that the trade imbalance should be corrected by dollar depreciation, saying that adjustment through the exchange rate is both ineffective and costly. Stepping outside the traditional dichotomy between international trade and international finance, they link the yen's tremendous appreciation from 1971 to mid-1995 to mercantile pressure from the United States arising from trade tensions between the two countries. Although sometimes resisted by the Bank of Japan, this yen appreciation nevertheless forced unwanted deflation on the Japanese economy after 1985--resulting in two major recessions (endaka fukyos). The authors argue for relaxing commercial tensions between the two countries, and for limiting future economic downturns, by combining a commercial compact for mutual trade liberalization with a monetary accord for stabilizing the yen-dollar exchange rate.