This book provides a complete framework for contemporary shareholder activism and its implications for US corporate governance, which is based on director primacy theory. Under director primacy theory, shareholders do not wish to be involved in the management of the company; in the rare event that they wish to be involved, it is considered a transfer of power from the board of directors to shareholders, which in turn reduces the efficiency of centralised decision-making in public companies. However, this book demonstrates that shareholders do not use their power to transfer corporate control from the board to themselves, and that some form of shareholder activism is even collaborative, which is a new paradigm for US corporate governance. This book shows that while monitoring remains a key contribution of shareholders, they also bring new informational inputs to corporate decision-making that could not be obtained under the traditional board model. Accordingly, contemporary shareholder activism enhances the board’s decision-making and monitoring capacity, without undermining the economic value of the board's authority. Therefore, this book argues that the complete approach of contemporary shareholder activism should be accommodated into US corporate governance. In doing so, this book considers not only legal and regulatory developments in the wake of the 2007–2008 financial crisis, but also the governance developments through by-law amendments. Furthermore, the author makes several recommendations to soften the current director primacy model: establishing a level playing field for private ordering, adopting the proxy access default regime, the majority voting rule, the universal proxy rules, and enhancing the disclosure requirements of shareholders. The book will be of interest to academics and students of corporate governance, both in the US and internationally.

Shareholder Activism Handbook is the single most comprehensive guide on all matters relating to enforcing shareholders' rights. As shareholder activism becomes a more integral part of investing, the law continues to respond accordingly. Legislators

This book offers a succinct, practical guide for understanding what some have referred to as shareholder democracy--efforts to facilitate and increase shareholder voting power within the corporation. In the past few years there has been a surge in shareholder activism that has had a profound impact on the corporation. Shareholders and other activists have sought to increase shareholders' voting power within the corporation based largely on the belief that increasing shareholder power will increase director and officer accountability, thereby helping to curb corporate misconduct and improve corporate performance. However, there is intense debate regarding whether increased shareholder power can achieve such objectives and whether increased shareholder power will negatively impact the corporation. This book is the first to provide a concise, but comprehensive look at the various ways in which shareholders have sought to enhance their voting power and influence within the corporation. In addition to examining shareholder activism, this book highlights and analyzes the debate regarding the propriety of increased shareholder power. This book also analyzes the impact of recent developments aimed at facilitating shareholder power such as majority voting, say on pay, and proxy access. This book will serve as a useful tool not only for those who desire a straight-forward analysis of shareholder rights and activism, but also for those seeking a reference guide on an issue of growing importance to corporate law and corporate governance.

Hedge Fund Activism begins with a brief outline of the research literature and describes datasets on hedge fund activism.

Corporate law and governance are at the forefront of regulatory activities worldwide, and subject to increasing public attention in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis. Comprehensively referencing the key debates, the Handbook provides a much-needed framework for understanding the aims and methods of legal research in the field.

The Foundations and Anatomy of Shareholder Activism examines the landscape of contemporary shareholder activism in the UK. The book focuses on minority shareholder activism in publicly listed companies. It argues that contemporary shareholder activism in the UK is dominated by two groups; one, the institutional shareholders whose shareholder activism is largely seen as a driving force for good corporate governance, and two, the hedge funds whose shareholder activism is based on value extraction and exit. The book provides a detailed examination of both types of shareholder activism, and discusses critically the nature of, motivations for and consequences following both types of shareholder activism. The book then locates both types of shareholder activism in the theory of the company and the fabric of company law, and argues that institutional shareholder activism based on exercising a voice at general meetings is well supported in theory and law. The call for institutions to engage in more informal forms of activism in the name of 'stewardship' may bring about challenges to the current patterns of activism that institutions engage in. The book argues, however, that a more cautious view of hedge fund activism and the pattern of value extraction and exit should be taken. More empirical evidence is likely to be necessary, however, to weigh up the long terms benefits and costs of hedge fund activism.

Should companies be run for profit or purpose? This book shows how they can deliver both-based on rigorous evidence and an actionable framework. This edition, updated to include the pandemic and latest research, explains how managers, investors and citizens can put purpose into practice-and overcome the difficult trade-offs that hold them back.