We present a model in which shadow banking arises endogenously and undermines market discipline on traditional banks. Depositors' ability to re-optimize in response to crises imposes market discipline on traditional banks: these banks optimally commit to a safe portfolio strategy to prevent early withdrawals. With costly commitment, shadow banking emerges as an alternative banking strategy that combines high risk-taking with early liquidation in times of crisis. We bring the model to bear on the 2008 financial crisis in the United States, during which shadow banks experienced a sudden dry-up of funding and liquidated their assets. We derive an equilibrium in which the shadow banking sector expands to a size where its liquidation causes a fire-sale and exposes traditional banks to liquidity risk. Higher deposit rates in compensation for liquidity risk also weaken threats of early withdrawal and traditional banks pursue risky portfolios that may leave them in default. Policy interventions aimed at making traditional banks safer such as liquidity support, bank regulation and deposit insurance fuel further expansion of shadow banking but have a net positive impact on financial stability. Financial stability can also be achieved with a tax on shadow bank profits.

There is much confusion about what shadow banking is. Some equate it with securitization, others with non-traditional bank activities, and yet others with non-bank lending. Regardless, most think of shadow banking as activities that can create systemic risk. This paper proposes to describe shadow banking as “all financial activities, except traditional banking, which require a private or public backstop to operate”. Backstops can come in the form of franchise value of a bank or insurance company, or in the form of a government guarantee. The need for a backstop is in our view a crucial feature of shadow banking, which distinguishes it from the “usual” intermediated capital market activities, such as custodians, hedge funds, leasing companies, etc.

The book shows the fundaments of the shadow banking system and its entities, operations and risks. Focusing on the regulatory aspects, it provides an original view that is able to demonstrate that the lack of supervision is a market failure.

Why did the shadow banking sectors in the US and the euro area expand in the decade before the financial crisis and what are the implications for systemic risk and macro-prudential policy? This paper examines these issues with a model of the financial sector where the size of the shadow banking sector is endogenous. In the model, shadow banking is an alternative banking strategy which involves greater risk-taking at the expense of being exposed to “fundamental runs” on the funding side. When such runs occur, shadow banks liquidate their assets in a secondary market. Entry into shadow banking is profitable when traditional banks provide sufficient secondary market demand to prevent these liquidations from causing a fire-sale. During periods of stability, the shadow banking sector expands to an excessively large size that ferments systemic risk. Its collapse then triggers a fire-sale that renders traditional banks vulnerable to “liquidity runs”. The prospect of liquidity runs undermines market discipline and increases the risk-taking incentives of traditional banks. Policy interventions aimed at alleviating the fire-sale fuel further expansion of the shadow banking sector. Financial stability is achieved with a Pigouvian tax on shadow bank profits.

Shadow banking – a system of credit creation outside traditional banks – lies at the very heart of the global economy. It accounts for over half of global banking assets, and represents a third of the global financial system. Although the term ‘shadow banking’ only entered public discourse in 2007, the importance and scope of this system is now widely recognised by the international policy-makers. There is, however, much less consensus on the origins of the shadow banking system, what role it plays in global political economy and the optimal approach to regulating this complex segment of finance. This volume addresses these questions. Shadow Banking is the first study to bring together the insights from financial regulators, practitioners and academics from across the social sciences. The first part traces the evolution and ongoing confusion about the meaning of ‘shadow banking’. The second section draws major lessons about shadow banking as posed by the financial crisis of 2007–09, providing comparative analyses in the US and Europe, and attempts to establish why shadow banking has emerged and matured to the level of a de facto parallel financial system. Finally, the third part goes beyond current regulatory concerns about shadow banking and explains why it is ‘here to stay’. This volume is of great importance to political economy, banking and international political economy.

This note outlines the basic economics of the shadow banking system, highlights (systemic) risks related to it, and suggests implications for measurement and regulatory approaches.

This comparative study explores how shadow banking differs from the traditional banking system. It discusses the origins, history, purposes, risks, regulatory constraints, and projected future evolution of both financial sectors of the world economy. This thorough examination of non-bank financial intermediaries follows the migration of services from traditional banks to less-regulated alternative banking products, as well as the evolution of regulations and the Financial Stability Oversight Council to monitor these new entities. Three chapters explore in depth the major financial structures newly designated as systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), with particular attention to insurance companies such as MetLife, which seek exemption from the designation. Finally, the focus shifts to international financial institutions' efforts to protect consumers and curtail irresponsible shadow banks, with an eye toward the effects of these actions on future banking practices.