"This handbook was prepared by members of the Antitrust Section's Criminal Practice and Procedure Committee to provide the practitioner with a general overview and explanation of the Sentencing Guidelines, promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission, applicable in criminal antitrust cases involving both corporate and individual defendants. It is intended as a practice aid that would prove helpful in counseling clients, assessing exposure, determining and advocating sentence ranges and fines, and evaluating and negotiating leniency and plea agreements." -- from the Foreword, p. iii.

Criminal Antitrust Litigation Handbook, Second Edition outlines the law that governs each phase of the criminal litigation process. The Handbook reflects the combined knowledge, experience, and judgment of a significant group of prominent and successful government prosecutors and defense counsel in addressing procedure and strategy as well as all relevant legal requirements. The book imparts many practical insights that have been gained after lengthy personal experience in the trenches.

The Federal Sentencing Guidelines provide for special treatment of hard-core cartel activity to ensure that penalties for antitrust crimes effectively deter and punish criminals. The U.S. Supreme Court's transformational sentencing cases, however, have returned significant discretion to sentencing judges, including the discretion to vary from the Guidelines on policy grounds. Yet, judicial discretion in sentencing is not unlimited. Judges are required by statute to impose sentences that are “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to achieve the goals of sentencing, subject to appellate review for reasonableness. This Note analyzes whether there is a sustainable basis for judicial policy disagreement with the Antitrust Guideline's use of a proxy to measure economic harm. It proposes that appeals courts apply a sliding scale framework when reviewing policy-based variances, and argues that judicial discretion may, in some instances, promote the goals of white-collar sentencing, including moral condemnation. Finally, this Note concludes that judicial discretion to vary from the Antitrust Guideline's harm proxy, appropriately cabined by appellate review, would not undermine antitrust sentencing policy.