This book explores how power-sharing between the president and the prime minister works in semi-presidential regimes. In contrast to much of the existing comparative work on semi-presidentialism, the book emphasizes the role of institutional coordination at the most concrete level of executive policy-making, and asks how institutional coordination between the president and prime minister influences presidential activism and the balance of power within the executive. The authors develop a tentative framework embedded in institutionalism and based on four strands of research – semi-presidentialism, public administration, political leadership, and foreign policy analysis – which is subsequently applied to the cases of Lithuania, Romania and Finland. Given the political challenges facing many semi-presidential countries, the study ultimately seeks to identify institutional solutions that facilitate power-sharing and successful policy-making.

Contributed articles on executive power.

Semi-Presidentialism is the term used to describe the constitutional arrangement where there is a directly elected president and a prime-minister who is responsible to parliament. Examples of semi-presidential regimes include Finland, France, Portugal, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine. These countries share certain constitutional features, but the exercise of presidential and prime-ministerial power varies greatly from one to another. Semi-Presidentialism in Europe examines the politics of semi-presidentialism and explores why it is that seemingly similar political systems operate in such different ways. Furthermore, the book examines the constitutional powers of political leaders, the role of political parties and the importance of past precedent.

The book analyzes the presidencies of three neighboring Central European countries – Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia – in the context of their interactions with cabinets (and prime ministers), parliaments and the constitutional courts, all which have proved crucial actors in the region’s political and constitutional battles. Using both institutional and behavioral perspectives along with an innovative definition of semi-presidentialism, the book argues that presidential powers – rather than the mode of the election of the president – are crucial to the functioning of the regimes and their classification into distinctive regime types. Focusing on intra-executive conflicts and the interaction of the president with other constitutional players it argues that, regardless of the mode of the election of the president, regimes have traditionally been very similar not only in their institutional settings, but also in the way they function. Finally, it shows that Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia should be classified as parliamentary regimes. This text will be of key interest to scholars and students of Central and East Europe studies/politics, post-Communist studies, presidential studies and more broadly to political elites and institutions, comparative politics and legislative studies.

Explores the effect of semi-presidentialism on newly-democratising countries. In recent years semi-presidentialism - the situation where a constitution makes provision for both a directly elected president and a prime minister who is responsible to the legislature - has become the regime type of choice for many countries.

There is little consensus about the nature of the political system that has emerged during the Putin presidency. This collection considers the issues arising in this connection, focusing more closely on institutions such as the presidency and the security police, and on the socioeconomic dimensions of political power.

The book explores how weak presidents directly or indirectly elected can still play a crucial role in the political arena. Weak presidents have been distinguished from strong ones by relying on the evaluation of the powers they display according to the constitution. Six Western European countries are analysed: Germany and Italy which present a consistent constitutional design (as weak presidents are elected indirectly), and Austria, Ireland, Finland and Portugal that present inconsistent constitutional design (as weak presidents are elected directly). In contrast to much of the existing comparative works on presidential powers and activism, the book emphasises the role and the use of informal powers beyond that of formal ones. In particular, a definition and a typology of informal powers are provided as well as an empirical investigation on informal presidential activism. The positive outcome of presidential informal interventions are studied by relying on an interactionist approach which combines presidency-centred as well as president centred-explanations. The book argues that when dealing with informal presidential activism the opportunity structure matters but presidential public support matters even more.