The semblance hypothesis explains how associative memory can result from the multidimensional semblance of activity from a specific set of presynaptic terminals at different orders of neurons. The hypothesized basic units are then examined for their feasibility to explain various physiological and pathological conditions of the nervous system, ranging from physiological time-scales of memory retrieval to plausible explanation for long term potentiation (LTP).

Research on natural and artificial brains is proceeding at a rapid pace. However, the understanding of the essence of consciousness has changed slightly over the millennia, and only the last decade has brought some progress to the area. Scientific ideas emerged that the soul could be a product of the material body and that calculating machines could imitate brain processes. However, the authors of this book reject the previously common dualism—the view that the material and spiritual-psychic processes are separate and require a completely different substance as their foundation. Reductive Model of the Conscious Mind is a forward-thinking book wherein the authors identify processes that are the essence of conscious thinking and place them in the imagined, simplified structure of cells able to memorize and transmit information in the form of impulses, which they call neurons. The purpose of the study is to explain the essence of consciousness to the degree of development of natural sciences, because only the latter can find a way to embed the concept of the conscious mind in material brains. The book is divided into three parts. Part 1 works to convince readers that the emergence of consciousness does not require detailed knowledge of the structure and morphology of the brain, with the exception of some specific properties of the neural network structure that the authors attempt to point out. Part 2 proves that the biological structure of many natural brains fulfills the necessary conditions for consciousness and intelligent thinking. Similarly, Part 3 shows the ways in which artificial creatures imitating natural brains can meet these conditions, which gives great hopes for building artificially intelligent beings endowed with consciousness. Covering topics that include cognitive architecture, the embodied mind, and machine learning, this book is ideal for cognitive scientists, philosophers of mind, neuroscientists, psychologists, researchers, academicians, and advanced-level students. The book can also help to focus the research of linguists, neurologists, and biophysicists on the biophysical basis of postulated information processing into knowledge structures.

In contemporary consciousness studies the phenomenon of neural plasticity has received little attention despite the fact that neural plasticity is of still increased interest in neuroscience. We will, however, argue that neural plasticity could be of great importance to consciousness studies. If consciousness is related to neural processes it seems, at least prima facie, that the ability of the neural structures to change should be reflected in a theory of this relationship "Neural plasticity" refers to the fact that the brain can change due to its own activity. The brain is not static but rather a dynamic entity, which physical structure changes according to its use and environment. This change may take the form of growth of new neurons, the creation of new networks and structures, and change within network structures, that is, changes in synaptic strengths. Plasticity raises questions about the relation between consciousness and brain functions. If consciousness is connected to specific brain structures (as a function or in identity) what happens to consciousness when those specific underlying structures change? It is therefore possible that the understanding and theories of neural plasticity can have direct consequences for a theory about consciousness. For instance, theories of strict identity between consciousness and structure may face the serious dilemma to either accept that, say, the experience of the colour red is fundamentally different in one individual over time due to cortical changes or to abandon the strong identity thesis altogether. Were one to pursue a theory according to which consciousness is not an epiphenomenon to brain processes, consciousness may in fact affect its own neural basis. The neural correlate of consciousness is often seen as a stable structure, that is, something that is stable over time. Considering neural plasticity, this is not necessarily so. The NCC might change and hence literally change the way a person is conscious. What it is about the NCC that can and might change is, even though it can be relevant for the relation between the brain and consciousness is, still an unanswered question. There are, hence, a lot of questions that might shed light upon the relevant but unknown relations between consciousness and the brain. Therefore, We hereby propose to do a Research Topic on consciousness and neural plasticity to shed light on these underestimated issues.In contemporary consciousness studies the phenomenon of neural plasticity has received little attention despite the fact that neural plasticity is of still increased interest in neuroscience. We will, however, argue that neural plasticity could be of great importance to consciousness studies. If consciousness is related to neural processes it seems, at least prima facie, that the ability of the neural structures to change should be reflected in a theory of this relationship "Neural plasticity" refers to the fact that the brain can change due to its own activity. The brain is not static but rather a dynamic entity, which physical structure changes according to its use and environment. This change may take the form of growth of new neurons, the creation of new networks and structures, and change within network structures, that is, changes in synaptic strengths. Plasticity raises questions about the relation between consciousness and brain functions. If consciousness is connected to specific brain structures (as a function or in identity) what happens to consciousness when those specific underlying structures change? It is therefore possible that the understanding and theories of neural plasticity can have direct consequences for a theory about consciousness. For instance, theories of strict identity between consciousness and structure may face the serious dilemma to either accept that, say, the experience of the colour red is fundamentally different in one individual over time due to cortical changes or to abandon the strong identity thesis altogether. Were one to pursue a theory according to which consciousness is not an epiphenomenon to brain processes, consciousness may in fact affect its own neural basis. The neural correlate of consciousness is often seen as a stable structure, that is, something that is stable over time. Considering neural plasticity, this is not necessarily so. The NCC might change and hence literally change the way a person is conscious. What it is about the NCC that can and might change is, even though it can be relevant for the relation between the brain and consciousness is, still an unanswered question. There are, hence, a lot of questions that might shed light upon the relevant but unknown relations between consciousness and the brain. Therefore, We hereby propose to do a Research Topic on consciousness and neural plasticity to shed light on these underestimated issues.

The Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning brings together the contributions of many of the leading researchers in thinking and reasoning to create the most comprehensive overview of research on thinking and reasoning that has ever been available.

The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning is the first comprehensive and authoritative handbook covering all the core topics of the field of thinking and reasoning. Written by the foremost experts from cognitive psychology, cognitive science, and cognitive neuroscience, individual chapters summarize basic concepts and findings for a major topic, sketch its history, and give a sense of the directions in which research is currently heading. The volume also includes work related to developmental, social and clinical psychology, philosophy, economics, artificial intelligence, linguistics, education, law, and medicine. Scholars and students in all these fields and others will find this to be a valuable collection.

Addressing the question of the individual's fate at death, this work provides a critique of the reductionist case against post-mortem personhood. Claims of near-death and out-of-body experiences are considered, as are proposals that offer artificial intelligence as a model of human consciousness.

Semblance Hypothesis is a structure-function hypothesis that explains a possible way of brain function. Based on a definition of memory, the author hypothesize certain structural patterns of the dendritic spines, shows evidence for these structures from the literature and use inductive reasoning for their role in explaining memory and other brain functions.