This book investigates self-organizing institutions that resolve institutional collective action dilemmas in federalism, urban governance, and regional management of natural resources.

Considers the social requirements for a thriving democracy

This book investigates the self-organizing responses of governments and interests to the institutional collective action (ICA) dilemmas of particular concern to students of federalism, urban governance, and regional management of natural resources. ICA dilemmas arise in fragmented systems whenever decisions by one independent formal authority do not consider costs or benefits imposed on others. The ICA framework analyzes networks, joint projects, partnerships, and other mechanisms developed by affected parties to mitigate ICA decision externalities. These mechanisms play a widespread role in federalist systems by reshaping incentives to encourage coordination/cooperation. The empirical studies of urban service delivery and regional integration of regional resource management address three questions: How does a given mechanism mitigate costs of uncoordinated decisions? What incentives do potential members have to create the mechanism? How do incentives induced by the mitigating mechanism affect its sustainability in a changing environment and its adaptability to other ICA dilemmas?

Classic Books Library presents this brand new edition of “The Federalist Papers”, a collection of separate essays and articles compiled in 1788 by Alexander Hamilton. Following the United States Declaration of Independence in 1776, the governing doctrines and policies of the States lacked cohesion. “The Federalist”, as it was previously known, was constructed by American statesman Alexander Hamilton, and was intended to catalyse the ratification of the United States Constitution. Hamilton recruited fellow statesmen James Madison Jr., and John Jay to write papers for the compendium, and the three are known as some of the Founding Fathers of the United States. Alexander Hamilton (c. 1755–1804) was an American lawyer, journalist and highly influential government official. He also served as a Senior Officer in the Army between 1799-1800 and founded the Federalist Party, the system that governed the nation’s finances. His contributions to the Constitution and leadership made a significant and lasting impact on the early development of the nation of the United States.

Beyond Autonomy forces readers to rethink the purpose of autonomy as a central organising pillar of federalism asking how modern federalism can be reimagined in the 21st Century.

The Second Edition of Canadian Federalism: Performance, Effectiveness, and Legitimacy is a collection of eighteen original essays casting a critical eye on the institutions, processes, and policy outcomes of Canadian federalism. Divided into three parts--The Institutions and Processes ofCanadian Federalism; The Social and Economic Union; and Persistent and New Challenges to the Federation--the book documents how Canadian intergovernmental relations have evolved in response to such issues as fiscal deficits; the chronic questioning of the legitimacy of the Canadian state by asignificant minority of Quebec voters and many Aboriginal groups, among others; health care; environmental policies; and international trade. Herman Bakvis and Grace Skogstad have gathered together some of the most prominent Canadian political scientists to evaluate the capacity of the federalsystem to meet these and other challenges, and to offer prescriptions on the institutional changes that are likely to be required.

The Robust Federation offers a comprehensive approach to the study of federalism. Jenna Bednar demonstrates how complementary institutions maintain and adjust the distribution of authority between national and state governments. These authority boundaries matter - for defense, economic growth, and adequate political representation - and must be defended from opportunistic transgression. From Montesquieu to Madison, the legacy of early institutional analysis focuses attention on the value of competition between institutions, such as the policy moderation produced through separated powers. Bednar offers a reciprocal theory: in an effective constitutional system, institutions complement one another; each makes the others more powerful. Diverse but complementary safeguards - including the courts, political parties, and the people - cover different transgressions, punish to different extents, and fail under different circumstances. The analysis moves beyond equilibrium conceptions and explains how the rules that allocate authority are not fixed but shift gradually. Bednar's rich theoretical characterization of complementary institutions provides the first holistic account of federal robustness.