This study analyzes the feasibility of guerrilla warfare as the basis for a strategy of airpower employment for a weak air force confronting an opponent with a stronger air force. The analysis begins with a distillation of the theory of guerrilla warfare into five elements essential to its success: superior intelligence, security, mobility advantage, surprise, and sustainment. The author then compares the ground combat environment of the traditional guerrilla with the airpower environment of the potential air guerrilla and concludes that these five elements can be met in the airpower environment provided the weak force has sufficient ingenuity and the necessary resources. An investigation of recent trends in technology and the prevailing strategic environment indicates that it increasingly possible for a weak force to obtain these resources. The author assesses that air guerrilla warfare is a viable warfighting strategy, but points out that the likelihood of a weak force actually adopting air guerrilla warfare will depend on its regional security needs and its resolve to protract a conflict. The study concludes that air guerrilla warfare is a credible threat to a stronger opponent. To meet this threat, the author recommends that the United States re-examine its intervention strategy, reinforce its policy of strategic engagement, and research both airpower and non-airpower means to neutralize an elusive guerrilla air force.

"This study analyzes the feasibility of guerrilla warfare as the basis for a strategy of airpower employment for a weak air force confronting an opponent with a stronger air force. The analysis begins with a distillation of the theory of guerrilla warfare into five elements essential to its success: superior intelligence, security, mobility advantage, surprise, and sustainment. The author then compares the ground combat environment of the traditional guerrilla with the airpower environment of the potential air guerrilla and concludes that these five elements can be met in the airpower environment provided the weak force has sufficient ingenuity and the necessary resources. An investigation of recent trends in technology and the prevailing strategic environment indicates that it increasingly possible for a weak force to obtain these resources. The author assesses that air guerrilla warfare is a viable warfighting strategy, but points out that the likelihood of a weak force actually adopting air guerrilla warfare will depend on its regional security needs and its resolve to protract a conflict. The study concludes that air guerrilla warfare is a credible threat to a stronger opponent. To meet this threat, the author recommends that the United States re-examine its intervention strategy, reinforce its policy of strategic engagement, and research both airpower and non-airpower means to neutralize an elusive guerrilla air force."--DTIC.

After the devastating murder of her family, and her nightmarish captivity in a dark cell for four long months, Alex is determined to escape from a world that contains only reminders, and faces that seem unfamiliar to her now. Her recent experience seems to have drained the emotion from her every encounter, which is compensated for by the fact that she can feel the emotions of any stranger—all she has to do is make eye contact. The moment she does, every emotion they are experiencing and every thought they have comes pouring into Alex’s mind, and there is nothing she can do about it. Her escape from her old life, and from the knowledge of certain minds that she never wanted, proves difficult when she arrives at her new school only to meet Jason, a boy who is far too perceptive, and seems to be everywhere she turns. But there is more to Jason than meets the eye, which is emphasized by the fact that she can’t read his mind, and Alex can’t help but wonder what he is hiding. The truth will shock her, and destroy any preconceptions she may have had of starting a new life. Jason is a part of a dangerous and unbelievable mission, and unbeknownst to her, Alex is caught in the center of it.

This book evaluates the development of the Rhodesian Air Force during the Second Chimurenga or Bush War (1966-1980). Airpower in irregular conflict is effective at the tactical level because guerrilla warfare is not a purely military conflict. The Rhodesian Air Force was deployed in a war-winning versus a supporting role as a result of the shortage of manpower to deal with insurgency, and almost all units of the Rhodesian Security Forces depended on its tactical effectiveness. Technical challenges faced by the Air Force, combined with the rate of guerrilla infiltration and the misuse of airpower to bomb guerrilla bases in neighboring countries largely negated the success of airpower.