The 2014 Referendum on Scottish independence sparked debate on every dimension of modern statehood. Levels of public interest and engagement were unprecedented, as demonstrated by record-breaking voter turnout. Yet aside from Trident, the issue of security was relatively neglected in the campaigns, and there remains a lack of literature on the topic. In this volume Andrew Neal has collated a variety of interdisciplinary perspectives on security and constitutional change in Scotland and the UK, including writing from experts in foreign policy analysis, intelligence studies, parliamentary studies, and journalism. Security in a Small Nation provides an illuminating analysis of the politics of security. Its authors reflect on a number of related issues including international comparisons, alliances, regional cooperation, terrorism, intelligence sharing, democratic oversight, and media coverage. It has a particular focus on what security means for small states and democratic politics. The book draws on current debates about the extent of intelligence powers and their implications for accountability, privacy, and human rights. It examines the foreign and security policy of other small states through the prism of Scottish independence, providing unique insight into the bureaucratic and political processes associated with multi-level security governance. These contributions provide a detailed picture of the changing landscape of security, including the role of diverse and decentralised agencies, and new security interdependencies within and between states. The analysis presented in this book will inform ongoing constitutional debates in the UK and the study of other secessionist movements around the world. Security in a Small Nation is essential reading for any follower of UK and Scottish politics, and those with an interest in security and nationhood on a global scale.

Countering Cyber Sabotage: Introducing Consequence-Driven, Cyber-Informed Engineering (CCE) introduces a new methodology to help critical infrastructure owners, operators and their security practitioners make demonstrable improvements in securing their most important functions and processes. Current best practice approaches to cyber defense struggle to stop targeted attackers from creating potentially catastrophic results. From a national security perspective, it is not just the damage to the military, the economy, or essential critical infrastructure companies that is a concern. It is the cumulative, downstream effects from potential regional blackouts, military mission kills, transportation stoppages, water delivery or treatment issues, and so on. CCE is a validation that engineering first principles can be applied to the most important cybersecurity challenges and in so doing, protect organizations in ways current approaches do not. The most pressing threat is cyber-enabled sabotage, and CCE begins with the assumption that well-resourced, adaptive adversaries are already in and have been for some time, undetected and perhaps undetectable. Chapter 1 recaps the current and near-future states of digital technologies in critical infrastructure and the implications of our near-total dependence on them. Chapters 2 and 3 describe the origins of the methodology and set the stage for the more in-depth examination that follows. Chapter 4 describes how to prepare for an engagement, and chapters 5-8 address each of the four phases. The CCE phase chapters take the reader on a more granular walkthrough of the methodology with examples from the field, phase objectives, and the steps to take in each phase. Concluding chapter 9 covers training options and looks towards a future where these concepts are scaled more broadly.

The question is, how should small states behave under pressure? The analysis is of three cases: Czechoslavakia in 1938, Poland from 1939 to 1945, and Finland in 1940 and 41. The author is scrupulous in not drawing too many general lessons from these cases, but the imprudence of overreliance on great power protection and of ceding to justifications for surrender based on self-determination are made clear.

Too Small to Fail analyzes how several successful 'small' countries, with populations under twenty million, have made a virtue out of their physical limitations. The book seeks to understand what it is they do differently, and why. What is their recipe for achieving better-educated, more egalitarian and wealthier populations? The book looks first at the forest and then the trees. It examines the characteristics shared by small countries, such as Switzerland, Ireland, Singapore, and the Scandinavian states. It draws parallels and discovers patterns shared among them that are common to each of their success stories. The book then looks at the policies of selected countries that have paved the way for remarkable improvements; and considers the individuals, corporations and institutions that have made a positive and sustainable impact. It further goes on to explain how these small countries are reshaping the World in a never before manner.

As the twentieth century ended, Canada was completing its sixth term on the United Nations Security Council, more terms than all but three other non-permanent members. A decade later, Ottawa’s attempt to return to the council was dramatically rejected by its global peers, leaving Canadians – and international observers – shocked and disappointed. This book tells the story of that defeat and what it means for future campaigns, describing and analyzing Canada’s attempts since 1946, both successful and unsuccessful, to gain a seat as a non-permanent member. It also reveals that while the Canadian commitment to the United Nations itself has always been strong, Ottawa’s attitude towards the Security Council, and to service upon it, has been much less consistent. Impeccably researched and clearly written, Canada on the United Nations Security Council is the definitive history of the Canadian experience on the world’s most powerful stage.