We develop a heterogeneous agent, overlapping generations model with nonhomothetic preferences that nests several explanations for the decline in the natural rate of interest (r∗) suggested in the literature: demographic change, a slowdown in productivity growth, a rise in income inequality, and public policy. The model can account for a 2.2 percentage point (pp) decline in r∗ between 1975 and 2015, which is within the range of empirical estimates. Rising income inequality is an important driver (-0.70 pp), and together with demographic change (-0.71 pp) and the slowdown in productivity growth (-1.0 pp) explains most of the decline. Growing public debt is the major counteracting force (+0.31 pp). Permanent income inequality is of greater importance than inequality due to uninsurable income risk, and matching the degree of nonhomotheticity in consumption and savings behavior to empirical estimates is essential for this result. We predict that r∗ will reach a low of 0.38% by 2030, after which a slow reversal will begin. The natural rate will stabilize at 1% in the long run, a low level when compared with the postwar path of r∗ implied by the model. This remains true even if we take into account soaring public debt levels due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Policy can have considerable impact on the level of r∗ through the tax and transfer system.

"The authors study long-run correlations between safe real interest rates in the United States and over 30 variables that have been hypothesized to influence real rates. The list of variables is motivated by an intertermporal IS equation, by models of aggregate savings and investment, and by reduced-form studies. They use annual data, mostly from 1890 to 2016. They find that safe real interest rates are correlated as expected with demographic measures. For example, the long-run correlation with labor force hours growth is positive, which is consistent with overlapping generations models. For another example, the long-run correlation with the proportion of 40 to 64 year-olds in the population is negative. This is consistent with standard theory where middle-aged workers are high savers who drive down real interest rates. In contrast to standard theory, we do not find productivity to be positively correlated with real rates. Most other variables have a mixed relationship with the real rate, with long-run correlations that are statistically or economically large in some samples and by some measures but not in others."--Abstract

Recognising the regained importance of fiscal policy over the last two decades, this timely book provides much-needed insight into the changing practice of fiscal policy and how it is adapting to the unpredictable nature of the 21st century. Expert academic and practitioner contributors consider the resources which underpin current fiscal policy, assessing its overall effectiveness before outlining the changing priorities –ageing, inequality, climate change- and the financial tools available, and considering the future of fiscal policy in uncertain times.

Japan’s aging and shrinking population could lower the natural rate of interest and, together with low inflation expectations, challenge the Bank of Japan’s efforts to reflate the economy. This paper uses a semi-structural model to estimate the impact of demographics on the natural rate in Japan. We find that demographic change has a significantly negative impact on the natural rate by lowering trend potential growth. We also find that the negative impact has been increasing over time amid stronger demographic headwinds. These findings highlight the importance of boosting potential growth to offset the negative demographic impact and lift the natural rate in Japan.

The fourth book in the ‘European Public Investment Outlook’ series focuses on the urgent issue of how to finance needed investment in critical tangible and intangible infrastructure given high levels of public debt, a thorny problem facing many governments across Europe. Drawing on expertise from academics, researchers at public policy institutes and international governance bodies, the contributors analyse the current situation and prospects and propose feasible solutions. Financing Investment in Times of High Public Debt offers a powerful combination of high-level analysis of cross-continental policies and trends, with close examination of specific contexts in France, Italy, Germany and Spain. The chapters in Part II explore challenges including how to finance climate investments, the extent to which national promotional banks can offer solutions, EU budget reform and recent trends in tax progressivity. This book is essential reading for economists, policymakers, and anyone interested in implementing and financing public policy in Europe and wanting to better understand the intricacies of EU governance and institutions.

Traditionally, economic growth and business cycles have been treated independently. However, the dependence of GDP levels on its history of shocks, what economists refer to as “hysteresis,” argues for unifying the analysis of growth and cycles. In this paper, we review the recent empirical and theoretical literature that motivate this paradigm shift. The renewed interest in hysteresis has been sparked by the persistence of the Global Financial Crisis and fears of a slow recovery from the Covid-19 crisis. The findings of the recent literature have far-reaching conceptual and policy implications. In recessions, monetary and fiscal policies need to be more active to avoid the permanent scars of a downturn. And in good times, running a high-pressure economy could have permanent positive effects.

Since the Global Financial Crisis, fiscal policy in advanced economies has become more “active” – that is, increasingly unresponsive to rising debt levels. This paper explores tensions between active fiscal and monetary policies by introducing the concept of “fiscal r-star,” which is the real interest rate required to stabilize debt levels when the primary balance is set exogenously, output is growing at potential, and inflation is at target. It is proposed that the difference between monetary r-star and fiscal r-star—referred to as the “fiscal monetary gap”—is a proxy for fiscal-monetary policy tensions. An analysis of over 140 years of data from 16 advanced economies shows that larger fiscal-monetary gaps are associated with rising debt levels, higher inflation, financial repression, lower real returns on bonds and cash, with elevated risks of future debt, inflation, currency, housing, and systemic crises. Current estimates indicate that fiscal-monetary tensions are at historic highs. Given the tepid growth outlook, growth-enhancing reforms and fiscal consolidation, among other policy adjustments, may be needed to attenuate fiscal-monetary tensions over time.