American foreign policy is a dynamic and often controversial field, and is currently a topic of deep interest given recent developments in the Middle East, North Korea and China. In order to understand where US foreign policy is headed, it is important to first examine where it came from. This book provides an analysis of the political, economic and military history of American foreign policy, with the aim of divulging important details that most people have either never learned or forgotten OCo hence the phrase OC open secretsOCO. Covering events such as the attack on Pearl Harbor and the American Revolution, as well as American involvement in the Korean War and the collapse of Nationalist China, this fascinating book debunks a number of myths held by most people regarding US foreign policy, revealing some surprising conclusions."

Based on access to secret documents and interviews with many of the participants, Subversion as Foreign Policy is an extraordinary account of civil war in Indonesia provoked by President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and resulting in the killing of thousands of Indonesians and the destruction of much of the country's air force and navy. "This startling new book reveals a covert intervention by the United States in Indonesia in the late 1950s involving, among other things, the supply of thousands of weapons, the creation and deployment of a secret CIA air force and logistical support from the Seventh Fleet. The intervention occurred on such a massive scale that it is difficult to believe it has been kept almost totally secret from the American public for nearly 40 years. And this CIA operation proved to be even more disastrous than the Bay of Pigs". -- San Francisco Chronicle "An exemplary study of an ignominious chapter of the Cold War in Southeast Asia". -- Journal of Asian Studies "Subversion as Foreign Policy is a remarkable book.... The Kahins have provided a rare insight into the workings of U.S. policy towards Indonesia, both clandestine and official". -- London Times Literary Supplement

Scholars have long argued that transparency makes international rule violations more visible and improves outcomes. Secrets in Global Governance revises this claim to show how equipping international organizations (IOs) with secrecy can be a critical tool for eliciting sensitive information and increasing cooperation. States are often deterred from disclosing information about violations of international rules by concerns of revealing commercially sensitive economic information or the sources and methods used to collect intelligence. IOs equipped with effective confidentiality systems can analyze and act on sensitive information while preventing its wide release. Carnegie and Carson use statistical analyses of new data, elite interviews, and archival research to test this argument in domains across international relations, including nuclear proliferation, international trade, justice for war crimes, and foreign direct investment. Secrets in Global Governance brings a groundbreaking new perspective to the literature of international relations.

Secrecy in US Foreign Policy examines the pursuit of strict secrecy by President Nixon and his National Security Advisor Kissinger in foreign policy decision making in relation to the US rapprochement with China. Moreover it sheds new light on the complexity and dynamism of the evolution of China initiatives and demonstrates the many policy options and perspectives among US officials. Dr Komine focuses on three major elements of the rapprochement: "

Every president has had a unique and complicated relationship with the intelligence community. While some have been coolly distant, even adversarial, others have found their intelligence agencies to be among the most valuable instruments of policy and power. Since John F. Kennedy's presidency, this relationship has been distilled into a personalized daily report: a short summary of what the intelligence apparatus considers the most crucial information for the president to know that day about global threats and opportunities. This top-secret document is known as the President's Daily Brief, or, within national security circles, simply "the Book." Presidents have spent anywhere from a few moments (Richard Nixon) to a healthy part of their day (George W. Bush) consumed by its contents; some (Bill Clinton and George H. W. Bush) consider it far and away the most important document they saw on a regular basis while commander in chief. The details of most PDBs are highly classified, and will remain so for many years. But the process by which the intelligence community develops and presents the Book is a fascinating look into the operation of power at the highest levels. David Priess, a former intelligence officer and daily briefer, has interviewed every living president and vice president as well as more than one hundred others intimately involved with the production and delivery of the president's book of secrets. He offers an unprecedented window into the decision making of every president from Kennedy to Obama, with many character-rich stories revealed here for the first time.

A career of nearly three decades with the CIA and the National Intelligence Council showed Paul R. Pillar that intelligence reforms, especially measures enacted since 9/11, can be deeply misguided. They often miss the sources that underwrite failed policy and misperceive our ability to read outside influences. They also misconceive the intelligence-policy relationship and promote changes that weaken intelligence-gathering operations. In this book, Pillar confronts the intelligence myths Americans have come to rely on to explain national tragedies, including the belief that intelligence drives major national security decisions and can be fixed to avoid future failures. Pillar believes these assumptions waste critical resources and create harmful policies, diverting attention away from smarter reform, and they keep Americans from recognizing the limits of obtainable knowledge. Pillar revisits U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War and highlights the small role intelligence played in those decisions, and he demonstrates the negligible effect that America's most notorious intelligence failures had on U.S. policy and interests. He then reviews in detail the events of 9/11 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, condemning the 9/11 commission and the George W. Bush administration for their portrayals of the role of intelligence. Pillar offers an original approach to better informing U.S. policy, which involves insulating intelligence management from politicization and reducing the politically appointed layer in the executive branch to combat slanted perceptions of foreign threats. Pillar concludes with principles for adapting foreign policy to inevitable uncertainties.

Traces the development of secrecy as a government policy over the twentieth century and its adverse effects on Cold War policy making