Recently there has been a revival of interest in structuralist approaches to science. Taking their lead from scientific structuralists such as Henri Poincaré, Ernst Cassirer, and Bertrand Russell, some contemporary philosophers and scientists have argued that the most fruitful approach to solving many problems in the philosophy of science lies in focusing on the structural features of our scientific theories. Much of the work in scientific structuralism to date has been focused on the problem of scientific realism, where it has been argued that even in cases of radical theory change the most important structural features of predecessor theories are preserved. These structural realists argue that what our most successful theories get right about the world is these abstract structural features, rather than any particular ontological claims. More recently, philosophers of science have adopted structuralist approaches to many other issues in the philosophy of science, such as scientific explanation and intertheory relations. The nine articles collected in this volume, written by the leading researchers in scientific structuralism, represent some of the most important directions of research in this field. This book will be of particular interest to those philosophers, scientists, and mathematicians who are interested in the foundations of science.

This collection of papers opposes what has been the dominant linguistic theory in Western academies for over fifty years. Deriving initially from the structuralist ideas of Ferdinand de Saussure, the theory was proposed by Noam Chomsky as transformational generative grammar. Though it proved hugely influential and has gone through many modifications and revisions, J. Paul N. Cant argues that it was based on a number of false assumptions and much misleading epistemological confusion. Further, in elaborating the theory, Chomsky and his followers often failed to observe the rigour and disciplines of science. “The most incisive critique of Chomsky I have read in my life — Prof. Willie van Peer, Formerly Chair of Intercultural Hermeneutics, Ludwig Maximillian University, Munich, Germany.

Philosophy in the middle of the 20th Century, between 1920 and 1968, responded to the cataclysmic events of the time. Thinkers on the Right turned to authoritarian forms of nationalism in search of stable forms of collective identity, will, and purpose. Thinkers on the Left promoted egalitarian forms of humanism under the banner of international communism. Others saw these opposed tendencies as converging in the extinction of the individual and sought to retrieve the ideals of the Enlightenment in ways that critically acknowledged the contradictions of a liberal democracy racked by class, cultural, and racial conflict. Key figures and movements discussed in this volume include Schmitt, Adorno and the Frankfurt School, Arendt, Benjamin, Bataille, French Marxism, Black Existentialism, Saussure and Structuralism, Levi Strauss, Lacan and Late Pragmatism. These individuals and schools of thought responded to this 'modernity crisis' in different ways, but largely focused on what they perceived to be liberal democracy's betrayal of its own rationalist ideals of freedom, equality, and fraternity.

This book is devoted to an analysis of the way that structures must enter into a serious study of any subject, and the term ?structuralism? refers to the general method of approaching a subject from the viewpoint of structure. A proper appreciation of this approach requires a deeper understanding of the concept of structure than is provided by the simple intuitive notion of structures that everyone posseses to some degree. Therefore, a large part of the discussion is devoted directly or indirectly to a study of the nature of structures themselves. A formal definition of a structure, plus some basic general properties and examples, is given early in the discussion. Also, in order to clarify the general notions and to see how they are used, the later chapters are devoted to an examination of how structures enter into some special fields, including linguistics, mental phenomena, mathematics (and its applications), and biology (especially in the theory of evolution). Because the author is a mathematician, certain mathematical ideas have influenced greatly the choice and approach to the material covered. In general, however, the mathematical influence is not on a technical level and is often only implicit. Even the chapter on mathematical structures is nontechnical and is about rather than on mathematics. Only in the last chapter and earlier in three short sections does one find any of the expected ?formal? mathematics. In other words, the great bulk of the material is accessible to someone without a mathematical background.

Principles of Scientific Sociology represents a major attempt to redirect the course of contemporary sociological thought. It is clear, well-organized, innovative, and original in its discussion of the context and methods of sociology conceived as a natural science. Wallace delineates the subject matter of sociology, classifies its variables, presents a logic of inquiry, and advocates the use of this logic for the acceptance or rejection of hypotheses or theories and for the solving of human problems. Social scientists, including political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, historians, economists, social psychologists, and students of social phenomena among nonhumans, will find this work indispensable reading. Principles of Scientifc Sociology emphasizes the relationship between pure and applied sociological analysis. The essential contributions of each to the other are specified. Relationships between the substantive concepts of the sociology of humans, on the one hand, and the sociology of nonhumans, on the other, are systematized. In an attempt to put sociological analysis on a firm scientific basis, the book contains a concluding chapter focusing on central premises of natural science and their applicability to sociology. Wallace identifies the simple elements and relationships that sociological analysis requires if it is to lead to an understanding of complex social phenomena. On this basis, he considers the substantive elements and relations that comprise structural functionalism, historical materialism, symbolic interactionism, and other approaches to social data. He develops groundwork for standardizing these elements so that the contexts of different analyses may become rigorously comparable. The result is a fine, one-volume synthesis of sociological theory.