Excerpt from Science and Technology Integration in Europe and Influences U. S. European Cooperation: A Report of the National Science Board; Committee on Europe in 1992 The Committee on Europe in 1992 have completed their work on a final report, reflecting the charge to the Committee to consider the issues associated with Europe in 1992: Implications for us. Science and Technology, given in your memorandum of May 10, 1989. I ask that you present the report to the Board at its November meeting, with a request that it be adopted by the Board. I and the rest of the Committee will be pleased to discuss any questions or concerns of Board members. The report has been mailed to all nse members for their review prior to the November Board meeting. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.

This title is about the most important concept underpinning current European Union research policy. It focuses on the notion of the European Research Area, a European 'internal market' for research, whose achievement will become the main objective of EU research policy once the Lisbon Treaty enters into force.

The successful conclusion of the US-EU Agreement on Science and Technology Cooperation offers the prospect of a new chapter in transatlantic cooperation. As with any international agreement in science and technology, the accord's full potential will be realized only if it can encourage mutually beneficial cooperation. With this in mind, responsible officials of the European Union (EU) and the U.S. government contacted the National Research Council's Board on Science, Technology, and Economic Policy (STEP) to discuss how this negotiating success might be publicized and productively exploited. It was agreed that the STEP Board should organize a conference to celebrate the accord, inform the U.S. and European research communities of the agreement, and explore specific opportunities for enhanced cooperation. At the same time, the conference would provide the occasion to review existing and evolving areas of transatlantic cooperation in science and technology from the perception of the United States, the European Commission, and the member states of the European Union.

How America used its technological leadership in the 1950s and the 1960s to foster European collaboration and curb nuclear proliferation, with varying degrees of success. In the 1950s and the 1960s, U.S. administrations were determined to prevent Western European countries from developing independent national nuclear weapons programs. To do so, the United States attempted to use its technological pre-eminence as a tool of “soft power” to steer Western European technological choices toward the peaceful uses of the atom and of space, encouraging options that fostered collaboration, promoted nonproliferation, and defused challenges to U.S. technological superiority. In Sharing Knowledge, Shaping Europe, John Krige describes these efforts and the varying degrees of success they achieved. Krige explains that the pursuit of scientific and technological leadership, galvanized by America's Cold War competition with the Soviet Union, was also used for techno-political collaboration with major allies. He examines a series of multinational arrangements involving shared technological platforms and aimed at curbing nuclear proliferation, and he describes the roles of the Department of State, the Atomic Energy Commission, and NASA. To their dismay, these agencies discovered that the use of technology as an instrument of soft power was seriously circumscribed, by internal divisions within successive administrations and by external opposition from European countries. It was successful, Krige argues, only when technological leadership was embedded in a web of supportive “harder” power structures.