For MBA students and graduates embarking on careers in investment banking, corporate finance, strategy consulting, money management, or venture capital Through integration with traditional MBA topics, Taxes and Business Strategy, Fifth Edition provides a framework for understanding how taxes affect decision-making, asset prices, equilibrium returns, and the financial and operational structure of firms. Teaching and Learning Experience This program presents a better teaching and learning experience-for you and your students: *Use a text from an active author team: All 5 authors actively teach the tax and business strategy course and provide students with relevant examples from both classroom and real-world consulting experience. *Teach students the practical uses for business strategy: Students learn important concepts that can be applied to their own lives. *Reinforce learning by using in-depth analysis: Analysis and explanatory material help students understand, think about, and retain information.

A Review of Taxes and Corporate Finance investigates the consequences of taxation on corporate finance focusing on how taxes affect corporate policies and firm value. A common theme is that tax rules affect corporate incentives and decisions. A second emphasis is on research that describes how taxes affect costs and benefits. A Review of Taxes and Corporate Finance explores the multiple avenues for taxes to affect corporate decisions including capital structure decisions, organizational form and restructurings, payout policy, compensation policy, risk management, and the use of tax shelters. The author provides a theoretical framework, empirical predictions, and empirical evidence for each of these areas. Each section concludes with a discussion of unanswered questions and possible avenues for future research. A Review of Taxes and Corporate Finance is valuable reading for researchers and professionals in corporate finance, corporate governance, public finance and tax policy.

Managerial decisions are considerably influenced by taxes: e.g. the choice of location, buying or leasing decisions, or the proper mix of debt and equity in the company's capital structure increasingly demand qualified employees in an economic environment that is becoming more and more complex. Due to the worldwide economic integration and constant changes in tax legislation, companies are faced with new challenges – and the need for information and advice is growing accordingly. This book's goal is to identify and quantify possible tax effects on companies' investment strategies and financing policies. It does not focus on details of tax law, but instead seeks to address students and practitioners focusing on corporate finance, accounting, investment banking and strategy consulting.

The Derivatives Sourcebook is a citation study and classification system that organizes the many strands of the derivatives literature and assigns each citation to a category. Over 1800 research articles are collected and organized into a simple web-based searchable database. We have also included the 1997 Nobel lectures of Robert Merton and Myron Scholes as a backdrop to this literature.

Academic research shows that well-known principal-agent and capital market problems are strongly influenced by tax considerations. Against this background, this volume is the first to present a fully-fledged overview of the interdependence of tax and corporate governance. Not only the basic political, legal and economic questions but also major topics like income measurement, shareholding structures, corporate social responsibility and tax shelter disclosure are covered.

The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.