"The seventeenth-century Dutch-Jewish philosopher Baruch Spinoza has long been known - and vilified - for his heretical view of God and for the radical determinism he sees governing the cosmos and human freedom. Only recently, however, has he begun to be considered seriously as a moral philosopher. In his philosophical masterpiece, the Ethics, after establishing some metaphysical and epistemological foundations, he turns to the "big questions" that so often move one to reflect on, and even change, the values that inform their life: What is truly good? What is happiness? What is the relationship between being a good or virtuous person and enjoying happiness and human flourishing? The guiding thread of the book, and the source of its title, is a claim that comes late in the Ethics: "The free person thinks least of all of death, and his wisdom is a meditation not on death but on life." The life of the free person, according to Spinoza, is one of joy, not sadness. He does what is "most important" in life and is not troubled by such harmful passions as hate, greed and envy. He treats others with benevolence, justice and charity. And, with his attention focused on the rewards of goodness, he enjoys the pleasures of this world, but in moderation. Nadler makes clear that these ethical precepts are not unrelated to Spinoza's metaphysical views. Rather, as Nadler shows, Spinoza's views on how to live are intimately connected to and require an understanding of his conception of human nature and its place in the cosmos, his account of values, and his conception of human happiness and flourishing. Written in an engaging style this book makes Spinoza's often forbiddingly technical philosophy accessible to contemporary readers interested in knowing more about Spinoza's views on morality, and who may even be looking to this famous "atheist", who so scandalized his early modern contemporaries, as a guide to the right way of living today"--

This study chronicles Spinoza’s German-Jewish popularity during the years of the Weimar Republic (1918-1933), explaining it from the political moral and intellectual paradoxes with which Weimar Germany confronted its Jews.

This study chronicles Spinoza’s German-Jewish popularity during the years of the Weimar Republic (1918-1933), explaining it from the political moral and intellectual paradoxes with which Weimar Germany confronted its Jews.

My purpose in this book is to re-interpret the philosophy of Spinoza to a new generation. I make no attempt to compete with the historical scholar ship of A. H. Wolfson in tracing back Spinoza's ideas to his Ancient, Hebrew and Mediaeval forerunners, or the meticulous philosophical scrutiny of Harold Joachim, which I could wish to emulate but cannot hope to rival. I have simply relied upon the text of Spinoza's own writings in an effort to grasp and to make intelligible to others the precise meaning of his doctrine, and to decide whether, in spite of numerous apparent and serious internal conflicts, it can be understood as a consistent whole. In so doing I have found it necessary to correct what seem to me t0' be mis conceptions frequently entertained by commentators. Whether or not I am right in my re-interpretation, it will, I hope, contribute something fresh, if not to the knowledge of Spinoza, at least to the discussion of what he really meant to say. The limits within which I am constrained to write prevent me from drawing fully upon the great mass of scholarly writings on Spinoza, his life and times, his works and his philosophical ideas. I can only try to make amends for omissions by listing the most important works in the Spinoza bibliography, for reference by those who would seek to know more about his philosophy. This list I have added as an appendix.

The philosophy of Baruch Spinoza (1632-77) is an unusual,highly original, and influential reaction to the transition of Western cultureto the modern age. According to Spinoza, modern scientific thinking, if thoughtthrough, leads to a denial of humanity as the center of creation, willed by apersonal God. It is Spinoza who first formulated a philosophy which shows thatmodern scientific thinking, and the modern metaphysical view of humanity andthe world that it gives rise to, does not have to lead to despair. He understoodthat engaging seriously in detached philosophical thinking could lead to anunexpected form of intellectual salvation. De Dijn's comprehensive introduction to Spinoza's philosophyis based on two key texts. He first provides an in-depth analysis of Spinoza's Treatise on the Improvement of theUnderstanding, which De Dijn characterizes as his introduction tophilosophy. This notoriously difficult text is here made accessible, even inits details. This analysis is followed by a comprehensive survey of Spinoza'smetaphysics as presented in his famous Ethics. De Dijn demonstrates howSpinoza's central philosophical project as introduced in the Treatise - thelinkage of knowledge and salvation - is perfectly realized in the Ethics. In thisway the unity of Spinoza's thought is shown to consist in his preoccupationwith the ethical question of salvation. The book also containsintroductory chapters on Spinoza's life and work, the original Latin text ofthe Treatise and its new English translation by Edwin Curley, and an annotatedbibliography on the secondary literature.

Spinoza's thought is at the centre of an ever growing interest. Spinoza's moral philosophy, in particular, points to a radical way of understanding how human beings can become free and enjoy supreme happiness. And yet, there is still much disagreement about how exactly Spinoza's recipe is supposed to work. For long time, Spinoza has been presented as an arch rationalist who would identify in the purely intellectual cultivation of reason the key for ethical progress. Andrea Sangiacomo offers a new understanding of Spinoza's project, by showing how he himself struggled during his career to develop a moral philosophy that could speak to human beings as they actually are (imperfect, passionate, often not very rational). Spinoza's views significantly evolved over time. In his early writings, Spinoza's account of ethical progress towards the Supreme Good relies mostly on the idea that the mind can build on its innate knowledge to resist the power of the passions. Although appropriate social conditions may support the individual's pursuit of the Supreme Good, achieving it does not depend essentially on social factors. In Spinoza's later writings, however, the emphasis shifts towards the mind's need to rely on appropriate forms of social cooperation. Reason becomes the mental expression of the way the human body interacts with external causes on the basis of some degree of agreement in nature with them. The greater the agreement, the greater the power of reason to adequately understand universal features as well as more specific traits of the external causes. In the case of human beings, certain kinds of social cooperation are crucial for the development of reason. This view has crucial ramifications for Spinoza's account of how individuals can progress towards the Supreme Good and how a political science based on Spinoza's principles can contribute to this goal.

Election and grace are two key concepts that not only have shaped the relations between Judaism and Christianity, but also have formed a cornerstone of the Western philosophical discourse on the evolution and progress of humanity. Though Augustine and Spinoza can be shown to share a methodological approach to these concepts, their conclusions remain radically different. For the Church Father Augustine, grace defines human nature by the potential availability of divine intervention, thus setting the stage for the institutional and political legitimacy of the Church, the Christian state, and its justice. For Spinoza, on the other hand, election represents a unique but local form of divine intervention, marked by geography and historical context. Milad Doueihi maps out the consequences of such an encounter between these two thinkers in terms of their philosophical heritage and its continued relevance for contemporary discussions of religious diversity and autonomy. Augustine asserts a theological foundation for the political, whereas Spinoza radically separates philosophy, and thus authority, from theology in order to solicit a political democracy. In this sharply argued and deeply learned book, Milad Doueihi shows us how interconnections between the two thinkers have come to shape Western philosophy.