An account of the nation's unpreparedness for war and the efforts of General Marshall and his staff to correct it with maximum dispatch. The powers of the Chief of Staff and their origins are described.

Includes the Aerial Warfare In Europe During World War II illustrations pack with over 180 maps, plans, and photos. Gen Henry H. “Hap.” Arnold, US Army Air Forces (AAF) Chief of Staff during World War II, maintained diaries for his several journeys to various meetings and conferences throughout the conflict. Volume 1 introduces Hap Arnold, the setting for five of his journeys, the diaries he kept, and evaluations of those journeys and their consequences. General Arnold’s travels brought him into strategy meetings and personal conversations with virtually all leaders of Allied forces as well as many AAF troops around the world. He recorded his impressions, feelings, and expectations in his diaries. Maj Gen John W. Huston, USAF, retired, has captured the essence of Henry H. Hap Arnold—the man, the officer, the AAF chief, and his mission. Volume 2 encompasses General Arnold’s final seven journeys and the diaries he kept therein.

In this first of a two-volume study, Dr. Futrell presents a chronological survey of the development of Air Force doctrine and thinking from the beginnings of powered flight to the onset of the space age. He outlines the struggle of early aviation enthusiasts to gain acceptance of the airplane as a weapon and win combat-arm status for the Army Air Service (later the Army Air Corps and Army Air Force). He surveys the development of airpower doctrine during the 1930s and World War II and outlines the emergence of the autonomous US Air Force in the postwar period. Futrell brings this first volume to a close with discussions of the changes in Air Force thinking and doctrine necessitated by the emergence of the intercontinental missile, the beginnings of space exploration and weapon systems, and the growing threat of limited conflicts resulting from the Communist challenge of wars of liberation. In volume two, the author traces the new directions that Air Force strategy, policies, and thinking took during the Kennedy administration, the Vietnam War, and the post-Vietnam period. Futrell outlines how the Air Force struggled with President Kennedy's redefinition of national security policy and Robert S. McNamara's managerial style as secretary of defense. He describes how the Air Force argued that airpower should be used during the war in Southeast Asia. He chronicles the evolution of doctrine and organization regarding strategic, tactical, and airlift capabilities and the impact that the aerospace environment and technology had on Air Force thinking and doctrine.