For many years at LLNL, we have been developing time-correlated neutron detection techniques and algorithms for applications such as Arms Control, Threat Detection and Nuclear Material Assay. Many of our techniques have been developed specifically for the relatively low efficiency (a few percent) attainable by detector systems limited to man-portability. Historically, we used thermal neutron detectors (mainly 3He), taking advantage of the high thermal neutron interaction cross-sections. More recently, we have been investigating the use of fast neutron detection with liquid scintillators, inorganic crystals, and in the near future, pulse-shape discriminating plastics which respond over 1000 times faster (nanoseconds versus tens of microseconds) than thermal neutron detectors. Fast neutron detection offers considerable advantages, since the inherent nanosecond production time-scales of spontaneous fission and neutron-induced fission are preserved and measured instead of being lost by thermalization required for thermal neutron detectors. We are now applying fast neutron technology to the safeguards regime in the form of fast portable digital electronics as well as faster and less hazardous scintillator formulations. Faster detector response times and sensitivity to neutron momentum show promise for measuring, differentiating, and assaying samples that have modest to very high count rates, as well as mixed fission sources like Cm and Pu. We report on measured results with our existing liquid scintillator array, and progress on the design of a nuclear material assay system that incorporates fast neutron detection, including the surprising result that fast liquid scintillator detectors become competitive and even surpass the precision of 3He-based counters measuring correlated pairs in modest (kg) samples of plutonium.

The 1990s saw significant developments in the global non-proliferation landscape, resulting in a new period of safeguards development. The current publication, which is the second revision and update of IAEA/NVS/1, is intended to give a full and balanced description of the safeguards techniques and equipment used for nuclear material accountancy, containment and surveillance measures, environmental sampling, and data security. New features include a section on new and novel technologies. As new verification measures continue to be developed, the material in this book will be reviewed periodically and updated versions issued.

For many years at LLNL we have been developing time-correlated neutron detection techniques and algorithms for many applications including Arms Control, Threat Detection and Nuclear Material Assaying. Many of our techniques have been developed specifically for relatively low efficiency (a few %) inherent in the man-portable systems. Historically we used thermal neutron detectors (mainly 3He) taking advantage of the high thermal neutron interaction cross-sections but more recently we have been investigating fast neutron detection with liquid scintillators and inorganic crystals. We have discovered considerable detection advantages with fast neutron detection as the inherent nano-second production time-scales of fission and neutron induced fission are preserved instead of being lost in neutron thermalization required for thermal neutron detectors. We are now applying fast neutron technology (new fast and portable digital electronics as well as new faster and less hazardous scintillator formulations) to the safeguards regime and faster detector response times and neutron momentum sensitivity show promise in measuring, differentiating and assaying samples that have very high count rates as well as mixed fission sources (e.g. Cm and Pu). We report on measured results with our existing liquid scintillator array and progress on design of nuclear material assaying system that incorporates fast neutron detection.

New algorithms for data analysis were coupled with new techniques for event-by-event data handling. These were tested using data collected with an AmBe fast neutron source and compared to simulated data. Using the measured fast neutron background and estimates of the measurement uncertainties from stationary data runs, simulations involving relative motion between source and detector show promising results for this technology.