From a Western perspective, the Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991 largely fulfilled the first President Bush's objective: "In, out, do it, do it right, get gone. That's the message." But in the Arab world, the causes and consequences of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and his subsequent defeat by a U.S.-led coalition were never so clear-cut. The potent blend of Islam and Arab nationalism that Saddam forged to justify the unjustifiable—his invasion of a Muslim state—gained remarkable support among both Muslims and Arabs and continued to resonate in the Middle East long after the fighting ended. Indeed, as this study argues in passing, it became a significant strand in the tangled web of ideologies and actions that led to the attacks of 9/11. This landmark book offers the first in-depth investigation of how Saddam Hussein used Islam and Arab nationalism to legitimate his invasion of Kuwait in the eyes of fellow Muslims and Arabs, while delegitimating the actions of the U.S.-led coalition and its Arab members. Jerry M. Long addresses three fundamental issues: how extensively and in what specific ways Iraq appealed to Islam during the Kuwait crisis; how elites, Islamists, and the elusive Arab "street," both in and out of the coalition, responded to that appeal and why they responded as they did; and the longer-term effects that resulted from Saddam's strategy.

From a Western perspective, the Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991 largely fulfilled the first President Bush's objective: "In, out, do it, do it right, get gone. That's the message." But in the Arab world, the causes and consequences of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and his subsequent defeat by a U.S.-led coalition were never so clear-cut. The potent blend of Islam and Arab nationalism that Saddam forged to justify the unjustifiable—his invasion of a Muslim state—gained remarkable support among both Muslims and Arabs and continued to resonate in the Middle East long after the fighting ended. Indeed, as this study argues in passing, it became a significant strand in the tangled web of ideologies and actions that led to the attacks of 9/11. This landmark book offers the first in-depth investigation of how Saddam Hussein used Islam and Arab nationalism to legitimate his invasion of Kuwait in the eyes of fellow Muslims and Arabs, while delegitimating the actions of the U.S.-led coalition and its Arab members. Jerry M. Long addresses three fundamental issues: how extensively and in what specific ways Iraq appealed to Islam during the Kuwait crisis; how elites, Islamists, and the elusive Arab "street," both in and out of the coalition, responded to that appeal and why they responded as they did; and the longer-term effects that resulted from Saddam's strategy.

The shooting war is over in the Persian Gulf. However, the war of words about it is only now beginning. Elaine Sciolino, who has covered the Middle East during the past decade for ``The New York Times'', fires the opening salvo in an effort to explain and analyze how the war came about. She first warned us about Saddam Hussein in 1985 in an article for The New York Times Magazine. Now she tells us how Saddam came to power; why he invaded Kuwait, what effects the war's outcome will have; and what happens to the region's balance of power with Saddam's army destroyed.

The first man to conduct a prolonged interrogation of Saddam Hussein after his capture explains why preconceived ideas about the dictator led Washington policymakers and the Bush White House astray.

In these original essays, widely respected experts analyze the personal psychologies and public belief systems of the individuals and nations involved in the Gulf War - from George Bush and Saddam Hussein to the peoples of the United States, Israel, and Arab countries. Approaching the events of 1990-1991 from the perspectives of psychology, history, mass communications, and political science, these scholars examine the dynamic relationship of events, behavior, and perceptions.Part I deals with the psychological and political origins of the war; part II focuses on George Bush, Saddam Hussein, and the nature of their leadership and judgement; part III discusses the battle for public perceptions and beliefs waged by both sides; part IV analyzes the results of that battle as revealed by the understanding of the U.S., Israeli, and Arab publics; and part V deals with the war's consequences. A postscript by Stanley Renshon covers military actions in the Gulf in late 1992 and early 1993.

One of our most respected and controversial liberal thinkers makes the case for war in Iraq. Written in his trademark contrarian voice, Untitled on Iraq is comprised of Hitchens' essays on the justification for war in Iraq and other related issues written for Slate.com, The Wall Street Journal, The Nation, and more, as well as 25% new material on the war

Presents a description by a lieutenant colonel in the 1st Battalion, 22nd infantry regiment of the strategies and resources used in the hunt for Saddam Hussein, which resulted in his capture in December of 2003 in Operation Red Dawn.