This thesis presents an investigation of the reasons for Russia's desire to have an ocean-going nuclear-powered navy, including in its most remote maritime theater, the Pacific. My dissertation argues that the conceptual framework of strategic geography, combined with analysis of modem naval technologies, provides the most appropriate analytical tool for examining Russian perceptions of the development of naval power in the Pacific. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, no major work was published either on the transition of Russian naval power or on the reform of its Pacific fleet. Analysis and research on the Russian Navy in the Pacific in the past fifteen years has often lacked accuracy due to inability of its authors to employ Russian-language unclassified sources, and has resulted in prematurely elaborated conclusions. As during the Cold War years, the research was largely driven by threat-assessment analysis. The thesis argues that Russia's geographic position and a whole spectrum of maritime interests, ranging from economic and scientific to military-strategic, dictate the need for a navy. By critically examining historical patterns of the development of Russian naval power in the Pacific since 1731, carefully assessing current doctrines of force application and present-day capabilities and trends in their employment, I will argue that the nation needs a strong blue-water navy, and trends in the evolution of Russian naval power in the Pacific illustrate the country's determination to achieve this goal.

This thesis contends that the current attempts by the Russian Federation to assert its influence in the Western Pacific region through naval power are destined to fail. President Vladimir Putin appears determined to make the Russian Federation a prominent actor in the region through the assertion of Russian naval power, and by forming an alliance of convenience with the PRC to minimize U.S. influence in the region. Four reasons provide an explanation for what will be Moscow's ultimate failure to influence events in the Western Pacific region. First, historically Russia has proven unable to sustain a naval build-up. Second, Russia's major interests lie in the Europe. Third, the Russian Federation has limited common interests with the countries of the Western Pacific region beyond residual anti-Americanism. Finally, arms sales provide only short-term leverage in the projection of international influence.

This publication is intended to provide the reader with a basic introduction to the Russian Navy and an appreciation of current developments that will shape Russia’s navy and its operations in the 21st century. In this book, you will also find historical and contemporary information about the Russian Military Planning operations; its strategic nuclear deterrent forces; the organization, including Russian Naval officer career paths, naval ships and aircraft fleets; and more. Related products: Russia & the Soviet Union resources collection can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/international-foreign-affairs/russia-soviet-union Developing Emerging Leaders: The Bush School and the Legacy of the 41st President is available here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-000-01195-8 Other products produced by the U.S. Navy can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/agency/890

This is the first study in Russian or Western literature of the rise and fall of Russian naval influence in the North Pacific Ocean from the time of Peter the Great to Tsar Nicholas I. The author deals with a neglected area: inherent tension between Russian naval and mercantile interests and the origins of international rivalry in the North Pacific at large. Barratt shows that Russia's motives for early expeditions to the Pacific were to promote science, exploration, and trade. But when imperialist powers vied for territory and resources in the area, military confrontation became a possibility. .