Vladimir Putin inherited a strong Russian-Iranian relationship from his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin. Russia made major arms agreements with Iran under Yeltsin, selling Tehran jet planes, tanks, and submarines, and also began building a nuclear reactor for Iran at Bushehr. The two countries also cooperated on regional issues such as Tajikistan and Afghanistan, and Yeltsin valued the low Iranian profile during the first Chechen war (1994-96). Putin strengthened the relationship further, beginning his rule by abrogating the Gore-Chenonymdin agreement under which Russia was to cease selling arms to Iran by 2000. While Putin and Iran were to have some problems over Chechnya and the optimal exit route for Caspian Sea oil and natural gas, these were overcome in 2005 when Iran emerged -- despite its clandestine nuclear program -- as Putin's most important ally in the Middle East, as Russia sought to reemerge as a major power there. Moscow increasingly became Iran's protector against the sanctions that first the United States and then the European Union sought to impose because of Iran's violation of international agreements. Putin's policy on Iran, however, contained some serious risks for Moscow, including a sharply deteriorating relationship with the United States and the possibility that newly-elected Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinezhad, an Islamic fundamentalist, might one day challenge Russia over its policy in Chechnya.

"Despite protests across Russia sparked by last December's fraud-filled Duma (parliament) elections, Vladimir Putin is preparing to return to the presidency this May. Will Putin replay his 2004-2008 approach to Iran, during which Russia negotiated the S-300 air defense system contract with Tehran? Or will he continue Russia's breakthrough in finding common ground with the United States on Iran seen under President Dmitriy Medvedev, who tore up the S-300 contract? While coordinating more closely with Washington on Iran during the Medvedev administration, Moscow did not and has not closed the door to engagement with Tehran. In 2010, Russia voted for new, enhanced sanctions against Iran at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Nevertheless, Moscow and Tehran have remained engaged diplomatically, and their relations have stabilized and begun to recover from their winter 2010-2011 low point. At the same time, Russia continues to insist that Iran comply with its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and cooperate fully with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. However, Russia is wary of pushing so hard on compliance lest Iran entirely abandon its treaty obligations and walk out of the NPT. Moscow's decision to toughen its approach to Iran on the nuclear issue is likely to remain the basis of Russian policy in the period ahead, so long as the U.S.-Russia "reset" does not totally collapse, especially if Iran does not move toward greater cooperation with the IAEA. Russia's looming domestic and external challenges will strengthen the inclination to continue some variant of reset, even if through Putin's clenched teeth."-- P. 1

Despite protests across Russia sparked by last December's fraud-filled Duma (parliament) elections, Vladimir Putin is preparing to return to the presidency this May. Will Putin replay his 2004-2008 approach to Iran, during which Russia negotiated the S-300 air defense system contract with Tehran? Or will he continue Russia's breakthrough in finding common ground with the United States on Iran seen under President Dmitriy Medvedev, who tore up the S-300 contract? While coordinating more closely with Washington on Iran during the Medvedev administration, Moscow did not and has not closed the door to engagement with Tehran. In 2010, Russia voted for new, enhanced sanctions against Iran at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Nevertheless, Moscow and Tehran have remained engaged diplomatically, and their relations have stabilized and begun to recover from their winter 2010-2011 low point. At the same time, Russia continues to insist that Iran comply with its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and cooperate fully with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. However, Russia is wary of pushing so hard on compliance lest Iran entirely abandon its treaty obligations and walk out of the NPT. In February 2011, Moscow began to oppose another round of UNSC sanctions, and in July 2011 put forward a "step-by-step" initiative coordinated with other Permanent Members of the Security Council and Germany (the so-called P5+1). The Moscow approach offered Tehran a gradual reduction in sanctions in return for improved cooperation with the IAEA in monitoring Iran's nuclear enrichment program. Putin's resentment of U.S. power and suspicion of American motives will make for frostier atmospherics between Moscow and Washington. Nonetheless, mistrust of Iran will continue to outweigh Putin's misgivings about the United States. Everything else being equal, the United States will always be more important to Russia than Iran. Most Russian experts now believe that Iran is advancing toward a military nuclear weapons program-though it has not made a final decision to go all the way-and a ballistic missile program to accompany it. Russia sees these programs as a threat to its interests. Moscow's decision to toughen its approach to Iran on the nuclear issue is likely to remain the basis of Russian policy in the period ahead, so long as the U.S.-Russia "reset" does not totally collapse, especially if Iran does not move toward greater cooperation with the IAEA. Russia's looming domestic and external challenges will strengthen the inclination to continue some variant of reset, even if through Putin's clenched teeth. Russian experts warn that a serious fraying in U.S.-Russia relations might cause Moscow to tilt back toward Tehran. The record on the S-300 contract, however, suggests that any rollback in Russian support for sanctions will depend mostly on whether Iran decides to cooperate more fully with the IAEA in clarifying Iran's nuclear enrichment program and moving toward verifiable restraints on its enrichment activities. On regional issues, however, Russia and Iran will continue at least to appear to pursue neighborly engagement with each other. The Arab Spring has pushed forward overlapping but not identical challenges and opportunities to the positions of both countries in the Middle East, including how to deal with Syria. The impending American withdrawal from Afghanistan has raised the prospect that Russia and Iran may once again have to partner closely in resisting Taliban threats to their regional equities, as they did before 9/11. Engagement has historically been Moscow's default setting for dealing with Tehran. Russia's current step-by-step initiative appears designed to continue engagement, while underscoring Russia's potential role as a mediator between Iran and the international community. the future of Russian-Iranian relations.

Russian-Iranian relations over the centuries and in recent decades have been complex and elastic. They have been simultaneously good in some areas while bad in others. Even at their worst, they have been able to stretch without breaking. A visitor to the Kremlin Armory can admire the 89-carat diamond that the Shah of Persia sent to Nicholas I to assuage the murder by a Tehran mob in 1829 of Russian Ambassador Alexander Griboyedov and his staff. The spectacular gift was part of a package deal to which both sides contributed to put the ugly incident behind them. More recently, Moscow greatly angered Tehran in 2010 when it broke the contract for the S–300 (U.S./North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]–designated SA–20) long-range air defense missile system, yet the two countries have subsequently worked hard for a semblance of continued engagement.

Iran's nuclear program is one of this century's principal foreign policy challenges. Despite U.S., Israeli, and allied efforts, Iran has an extensive enrichment program and likely has the technical capacity to produce at least one nuclear bomb if it so chose. This study assesses U.S. policy options, identifies a way forward, and considers how the United States might best mitigate the negative international effects of a nuclear-armed Iran.