Germany's rise to power before World War I from a Chinese persective, and the geopolitical lessons for today. A series of solemn anniversary events have marked the centenary of World War I. Could history repeat itself in today's geopolitics? Now, as then, a land power with a growing economy and a maritime power with global commitments are the two leading states in the international system. Most ominously, the outbreak of war in 1914 is a stark reminder that nations cannot rely on economic interdependence and ongoing diplomacy to keep the peace. In Fragile Rise, Xu Qiyu offers a Chinese perspective on the course of German grand strategy in the decades before World War I. Xu shows how Germany's diplomatic blunders turned its growing power into a liability instead of an asset. Bismarck's successors provoked tension and conflict with the other European great powers. Germany's attempts to build a powerful navy alienated Britain. Fearing an assertive Germany, France and Russia formed an alliance, leaving the declining Austro-Hungarian Empire as Germany's only major ally. Xu's account demonstrates that better strategy and statesmanship could have made a difference—for Germany and Europe. His analysis offers important lessons for the leaders of China and other countries. Fragile Rise reminds us that the emergence of a new great power creates risks that can be managed only by adroit diplomats, including the leaders of the emerging power. In the twenty-first century, another great war may not be inevitable. Heeding the lessons of Fragile Rise could make it even less likely.

This book takes on a global perspective to unravel the complex relationship between Imperial Germany and its diaspora. Around 1900, German-speakers living abroad were tied into global power-political aspirations. They were represented as outposts of a "Greater German Empire" whose ethnic links had to be preserved for their own and the fatherland’s benefits. Did these ideas fall on fertile ground abroad? In the light of extreme social, political, and religious heterogeneity, diaspora construction did not redeem the all-encompassing fantasies of its engineers. But it certainly was at work, as nationalism "went global" in many German ethnic communities. Three thematic areas are taken as examples to illustrate the emergence of globally operating organizations and communication flows: Politics and the navy issue, Protestantism, and German schools abroad as "bulwarks of language preservation." The public negotiation of these issues is explored for localities as diverse as Shanghai, Cape Town, Blumenau in Brazil, Melbourne, Glasgow, the Upper Midwest in the United States, and the Volga Basin in Russia. The mobilisation of ethno-national diasporas is also a feature of modern-day globalization. The theoretical ramifications analysed in the book are as poignant today as they were for the nineteenth century.

The existence of the Schlieffen plan has been one of the basic assumptions of twentieth-century military history. It was the perfect example of the evils of German militarism: aggressive, mechanical, disdainful of politics and of public morality. The Great War began in August 1914 allegedly because the Schlieffen plan forced the German government to transform a Balkan quarrel into a World War by attacking France. And, in the end, the Schlieffen plan failed at the battle of the Marne. Yet it has always been recognized that the Schlieffen plan included inconsistencies which have never been satisfactorily explained. On the basis of newly discovered documents from German archives, Terence Zuber presents a radically different picture of German war planning between 1871 and 1914, and concludes that, in fact, there never really was a `Schlieffen plan'.

This Very Short Introduction provides a concise and insightful history of the Great War--from the state of Europe in 1914, to the role of the US, the collapse of Russia, and the eventual surrender of the Central Powers. Examining how and why the war was fought, as well as the historical controversies that still surround the war, Michael Howard also looks at how peace was ultimately made, and describes the potent legacy of resentment left to Germany.

Written to cover the AQA History A Level Unit 1 specification (HIS1K), our student book provides a focused look at key events in Russian and German history during 1871-1914 and enables students to gain a greater understanding of the period and evaluate the key issues.

In this investigation of the German foreign office from 1871 to 1914, Lamar Cecil focuses on the people who conceived and executed German diplomacy rather than on diplomatic policies and stratagems. The author analyzes the men and their careers, isolating the characteristics common to the diplomats, the reasons for their selection, and the effect on their careers of various considerations of background, personality, and circumstance. His findings are based in part on the papers of Prince Bismarck and his family. The first part of the book discusses the criteria employed in choosing applicants and promoting senior diplomats. The structure of the foreign office and the conditions of entry are examined in detail, as is the association of the novice and more experienced individuals with the military element, which after 1871 found increasing accommodation in all ranks of the diplomatic establishment. The second part considers the problems with sovereigns, chancellors, and other bureaucrats encountered by members of the diplomatic service. Originally published in 1976. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Instead, in a detailed study, denazification is pictured as a failure, which fell short of its goals and was eventually abandoned by the frustrated Soviet and German leadership.".