David Bostock presents a critical appraisal of Bertrand Russell's philosophy from 1900 to 1924—a period that is considered to be the most important in his career. Russell developed his theory of logic from 1900 to 1910, and over those years wrote the famous work Principia Mathematica with A. N. Whitehead. Bostock explores Russell's development of 'logical atomism', which applies this logic to problems in the theory of knowledge and in metaphysics, and was central to his philosophical work from 1910 to 1924. This book is the first to focus on this important period of Russell's development, examining the three key areas of logic and mathematics, knowledge, and metaphysics, and demonstrating the enduring value of his work in these areas.

This book offers a comprehensive critical survey of issues of historical interpretation and evaluation in Bertrand Russell's 1918 logical atomism lectures and logical atomism itself. These lectures record the culmination of Russell's thought in response to discussions with Wittgenstein on the nature of judgement and philosophy of logic and with Moore and other philosophical realists about epistemology and ontological atomism, and to Whitehead and Russell’s novel extension of revolutionary nineteenth-century work in mathematics and logic. Russell's logical atomism lectures have had a lasting impact on analytic philosophy and on Russell's contemporaries including Carnap, Ramsey, Stebbing, and Wittgenstein. Comprised of 14 original essays, this book will demonstrate how the direct and indirect influence of these lectures thus runs deep and wide.

Mathematics in and behind Russell's logicism, and its reception / I. Grattan-Guinness -- Russell's philosophical background / Nicholas Griffin -- Russell and Moore, 1898-1905 / Richard L. Cartwright -- Russell and Frege / Michael Beaney -- Bertrand Russell's logicism / Martin Godwyn and Andrew D. Irvine -- The theory of descriptions / Peter Hylton -- Russell's substitutional theory / Gregory Landini -- The theory of types / Alasdair Urquhart -- Russell's method of analysis / Paul Hager -- Russell's neutral monism / R.E. Tully -- The metaphysics of logical atomism / Bernard Linksy -- Russell's structuralism and the absolute description of the world / William Demopoulos -- From knowledge by acquaintance to knowledge by causation / Thomas Baldwin -- Russell, experience, and the roots of science / A.C. Grayling -- Bertrand Russell: moral philosopher or unphilosophical moralist? / Charles R. Pidgen.

Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) was renowned as one of the founding figures of "analytic" philosophy, and for his lasting contributions to the study of logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics and epistemology. He was also famous for his popular works, where his humanism, ethics and antipathy towards religion came through in books such as The Problems of Philosophy, Why I am Not A Christian, and The Conquest of Happiness. Beginning with an overview of Russell’s life and work, Gregory Landini carefully explains Russell’s philosophy, to show why he ranks as one of the giants of British and Twentieth century philosophy. He discusses Russell’s major early works in philosophy of mathematics, including The Principles of Mathematics, wherein Russell illuminated and developed the ideas of Gottlob Frege; and the monumental three volume work written with Alfred North Whitehead, Principia Mathematica, where the authors attempted to show that all mathematical theory is part of logic, understood as a science of structure. Landini discusses the second edition of Principia Mathematica, to show Russell’s intellectual relationship with Wittgenstein and Ramsey. He discusses Russell’s epistemology and neutral monism before concluding with a discussion on Russell’s ethics, and the relationship between science and religion. Featuring a chronology and a glossary of terms, as well as suggestions for further reading at the end of each chapter, Russell is essential reading for anyone studying philosophy, and is an ideal guidebook for those coming to Russell for the first time.

Thought, Fact, and Reference was first published in 1978.Against a background of criticism of alternative accounts, Professor Hochberg presents an analysis of thought, reference, and truth within the tradition of logical atomism. He analyzes G. E. Moore's early attack on idealism and examines the influence of Moore on the development of Bertrand Russell's and Ludwig Wittgenstein's logical atomism. He traces an early divergence between Russell and Wittgenstein, on the one side, and Moore and Gottlob Frege on the other, into variants recently advocated by Wilfrid Sellars, Gustav Bergmann, and others. The work will be of interest to professional philosophers, graduate students in philosophy, and linguists with interests in philosophy.