This volume discusses the evolution of the British-protected Gulf states during the 1960s and explains how these small Shaikhdoms moved towards independence. Based on extensive research using British documents from the Public Records Office and selected American documents from the National Archives, this book investigates the relationship between British officials and Arab Gulf Shaikhs. At the beginning of what was to be their final years as guardians of the Gulf, British officials pressed for political progress, co-operation among the Shaikhdoms and improvements in education and health care. At the same time, Foreign Office officials continued to safeguard specific British economic interests and the political interests of the Western Alliance.

The reform movements and attempts to establish parliamentary institutions in the Persian Gulf states of Kuwait, Bahrain and Dubai between the First World War and the independent era of the 1970s were not inspired by western example or by any tradition of civil representation. The move to a parliamentary system not only represented a milestone in the history of the region, creating a legacy for future generations, but was a unique transition in the Arab world. The transformation of these states from loose chiefdoms of minimal coherence and centralization, into centralizing and institutionalized monarchies, involved the setting up of primary institutions of government, the demarcation of borders, and establishment of a monarchical order. As this new political and social order evolved, ideas of national struggle and national rights penetrated Gulf societies. Gulf citizens who had spent time in Arab states, mostly in Egypt and Iraq, took part in the genesis of a public Arab-Gulf national discourse, enabling the Gulf population to become acquainted with national struggles for independence. As a result merchants of notable families, newly educated elements, and even workers, began to oppose the dominance of the rulers. Both the rulers and the commercial elites (including members of the ruling families) tried to formulate a new and different social contract with the rulers seeking to entrench their political power by using new administrative means and financial power. Opposition against this current crystallized in 1938 among the ranks of the commercial oligarchy as well as within the ruling families. In spite of its failure to create its own political institutions, the oligarchy remained the foremost social and economic class. But the ruling families could no longer treat national oil revenues as their private income, and they began to channel part of these funds to public needs. The most important consequence of the '1938' movement was the formation of a new social contract between the two traditional power centers: the governing structures were fitted into the political and economic reality brought about by the oil wealth, but remained essentially tribal and committed to the power division between the major Gulf families.

An in-depth analysis of Great Britain's policy in the oil-rich Persian Gulf region during the last years of British imperialism in the area, covering the period from the independence of Kuwait to the decision of the Wilson Government to withdraw from the Gulf.

From Abraham Lincoln's stance on international slavery to George W. Bush's incursions on the world stage, American presidents and other leaders have taken decisive actions to shape our country's foreign policy. This new collection of essays provides analytical narratives of how and why policies were devised and implemented that would determine the place of the United States in the international arena from the 1860s to the present. Showing what individuals do-or choose not to do-is central to understanding diplomacy in peace and war. These writings-by such prominent historians as Terry H. Anderson and Eugene P. Trani-examine presidents and other diplomats at their best and worst in the practice of statecraft. They take on issues ranging from America's economic expansion abroad to the relations of democracies with authoritarian leaders and rogue nations to advocacy of such concepts as internationalism, unilateralism, nation building, and regime change. In so doing, they take readers on a virtual tour of American diplomatic history, tracing the ideas and actions of individuals in shaping our foreign policy, whether George F. Kennan as author of Soviet containment or Ronald Reagan as progenitor of "Star Wars." The essays range over a variety of scenarios to depict leaders coming to grips with real-world situations. They offer original views on such topics as American diplomacy toward Nicaragua, origins of U.S. attitudes toward Russia and the Soviet Union, FDR's idiosyncratic approach to statecraft, and food diplomacy as practiced by LBJ and Richard Nixon. And in considering post-Cold War crises, they address Bill Clinton's military interventions, George W. Bush's war against Iraq, and the half-century background to the current nuclear standoff with Iran. Additional articles pay tribute to the outstanding career of Robert H. Ferrell as a scholar and teacher. Throughout the volume, the authors seek to exemplify the scholarly standards of narrative diplomatic history espoused by Robert Ferrell-especially the notion that historians should attempt to explain fully the circumstances, opportunities, and pressures that influence foreign policy decisions while remembering that historical actors cannot with certainty predict the outcomes of their actions. Presidents, Diplomats, and Other Mortals is both a collection of compelling historical studies and an overarching case study of the role of individuals in foreign policy making and an insightful review of some of history's most important moments. Taken together, these essays provide a fitting tribute to Ferrell, the trailblazing scholar in whose honor the book was written.

This book marks the first comprehensive examination of contemporary British influence in Oman and Bahrain, analysing Britain’s legacy since the official withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971. Using theories of power as a framework, the book examines the development of British economic, strategic, and political influence in the two countries post-withdrawal, a topic overlooked by academics and political observers. The author argues that a divergence has developed between Britain’s influence in Oman (a site of strategic power) and Bahrain (a site of economic power). Focusing on the British Government, private corporations, and individuals, topics range from the development of British Foreign Direct Investments and the presence of British oil and gas companies in the region to joint defence training exercises and the presence of Omani and Bahraini military cadets in British military academies. The book also crucially assesses the increasing influence that the Gulf states are gaining over Britain as the legacy of the Residency gradually fades. British Diplomacy in Oman and Bahrain will be useful to students and scholars studying politics and economics in the Gulf and Britain, as well as policy analysts, international relations experts, and historians interested in the legacy of colonialism.

This book examines Britain's decision to leave the Gulf and considers the interaction between British decision-making, and local responses and initiatives, in shaping the modern Gulf.

In the depths of the Cold War and in the wake of Britain's announcement of its intention to withdraw 'East of Suez' by the end of 1971, Britain was faced with the stark reality of a Marxist rebellion in the Dhofar province of Oman. This rebellion, whose explicit aim was to 'liberate' the oil-rich Gulf region, confronted the British with the challenge of securing a political order in Oman conducive to protecting Britain's remaining interests in the midst of its military withdrawal from the region. 'State Building and Counter Insurgency in Oman' offers a nuanced picture of Britain's response to the challenges posed by this withdrawal, through an examination the complex Anglo-Omani relationship at this vital juncture in Middle East and Imperial History. James Worrall offers an examination of how officials in London and the Gulf defined British interests in Oman, and the debates that raged throughout Whitehall, under the successive governments led by Wilson and Heath, about how to best tackle the growing insurgency in Oman. The means by which this challenge was to be met (including the extent of both overt and covert support for the Sultan) in the post-Suez era, posed a number of challenges for decision-makers in Whitehall. The military, economic and diplomatic assistance given to the Omani government to re-establish Sultanate control and crush the rebellion in Dhofar is thus analysed within the context of a complex balancing act, as British politicians and officials tried to reconcile their attempts to create effective and centralised Omani administration and security bodies whilst maintaining the image of strategic withdrawal and the sovereign independence of Oman. Drawing extensively from newly released archival records and interviews with former officials and high-ranking officers, this book provides a systematic re-examination of the Anglo-Omani relationship during the critical years of Oman's transformation into a modern state. It will therefore provide vital information and analysis for students and researchers of Middle East History and Politics, the decline and end of empire and the policymaking processes at the heart of an imperial and military withdrawal.