Despite the prevalence of irregular wars, the U.S. Army must also be prepared for the possibility of a high-intensity conventional war. The training required for this war must simulate the expected conditions, those of high-intensity conflict, as closely as possible. As U.S. strategic leaders look to the future and prepare the U.S. Army for the next conflict, they prepare for a war with a level of violence that resembles that of the Korean War. While conditions that simulate combat are dangerous and present inherent risks, the mitigation of that risk prevents the adequate simulation of a high-intensity combat situation. Therefore, this thesis studied how risk mitigation practices in U.S. Army tactical infantry training affect Soldiers' preparedness for high-intensity combat operations. By examining U.S. Army infantry training at the tactical level, U.S. Army safety and risk mitigation doctrine, cognitive and perceptual biases, and historical case studies, this thesis suggests that U.S. Army risk management practices neither hinder nor help combat preparedness. Instead, the abdication of a commander's authority to execute risk mitigation in the training environment affects combat readiness.Executive Summary * I. IS THE U.S. ARMY PREPARED FOR THE NEXT WAR? * A. INTRODUCTION * B. THE PROBLEM * C. RESEARCH QUESTION * D. EXISTING ARGUMENTS: THE DICHOTOMY OF RISK IN TRAINING * II. TRAINING A U.S. ARMY INFANTRY COMPANY FOR COMBAT * A. LEADERSHIP, PERSONNEL, AND TRAINING TASK DEVELOPMENT * 1. The Role of the Company Commander * 2. Company Organization and Information Flow * 3. Mission Essential Task List Development * 4. The Army Force Generation Model * 5. Training--Creating "Pre-Battle Veterans" * B. TECHNOLOGY--"THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF WAR" BALANCING LETHALITY, MOBILITY, AND PROTECTION * 1. Ground Delivery Platforms * 2. Optics and Night Vision * 3. Personal Protective Equipment * C. OBSTACLES TO EFFECTIVE TRAINING * 1. Time and Task Saturation--"The Deluge of Requirements" * 2. Peacetime Control Mechanisms / Range Regulations * 3. Organizational Complacency--"This Is the Way We've Always Done it" * 4. Conclusion--The Effect of Training Obstacles * III. RISK MITIGATION, MISSION COMMAND, AND ERODING COMBAT READINESS * A. RISK AND SAFETY DOCTRINE * 1. Risk Management Doctrine * 2. Safety Doctrine and Regulation * B. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RISK PERCEPTION * C. MISSION COMMAND AND RISK IN THE COMBAT ENVIRONMENT * 1. Training Misalignment with Mission Command * 2. A Degradation in Readiness through the Lens of Live Fire Surface Danger Zones (SDZs). * 3. Lack of Preparation-- "Training Scar Tissue" * D. CONCLUSION * IV. HISTORICAL CASES OF TACTICAL U.S. ARMY INFANTRY UNITS IN HIGH-INTENSITY CONFLICT * A. 1-21 INFANTRY (TASK FORCE SMITH) AT THE START OF THE KOREAN WAR * 1. Leadership * 2. Training * 3. Technology * 4. Conclusion * B. 1st BATTALION, 7th CAVALRY REGIMENT IN THE BATTLE OF IA DRANG * 1. Leadership * 2. Technology * 3. Training * 4. Conclusion * C. 75th RANGER REGIMENT DURING THE SEIZURE OF RIO HATO AIRFIELD * 1. Leadership * 2. Training * 3. Technology * 4. Conclusion * D. CONCLUSION-- LEADERSHIP IS THE LINCHPIN FOR COMBAT PREPARATION * V. CONCLUSION-- THE OUTSOURCING OF RISK MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY UNDERMINES MISSION COMMAND * A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES TO CURRENT PRACTICES AND U.S. ARMY DOCTRINE * 1. U.S. Army Safety Doctrine Must Clarify the Role of Range Control * 2. U.S. Army Installations and Training Commands Should Streamline the Safety Waiver Process * 3. Educate Leaders on the Effects of Cognitive and Perceptual Bias When Managing Risk * 4. Senior Leaders Must Commit to Mission Command in the Training Environment * B. QUESTIONS UNANSWERED AND REQUIRING ADDITIONAL EXAMINATION

This paper focuses on the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before. Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army's doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development.

Lethal and Non-Lethal Fires: Historical Case Studies of Converging Cross-Domain Fires in Large Scale Combat Operations, provides a collection of ten historical case studies from World War I through Desert Storm. The case studies detail the use of lethal and non-lethal fires conducted by US, British, Canadian, and Israeli forces against peer or near-peer threats. The case studies span the major wars of the twentieth-century and present the doctrine the various organizations used, together with the challenges the leaders encountered with the doctrine and the operational environment, as well as the leaders' actions and decisions during the conduct of operations. Most importantly, each chapter highlights the lessons learned from those large scale combat operations, how they were applied or ignored and how they remain relevant today and in the future.

Eyes Behind the Lines: US Army Long-Range Reconnaissance and Surveillance Units is the 10th study in the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) Occasional Paper series. This work is an outgrowth of concerns identified by the authors of On Point: The United States Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Specifically, these authors called into question the use of long-range surveillance (LRS) assets by commanders during that campaign and suggested an assessment ought to be made about their continuing utility and means of employment. This revision contains some important additional information the author received after this book was originally published Major (Retired) James Gebhardt, of CSI, researched and wrote this Occasional Paper with that end in view. In this study, Gebhardt surveys the US Army s historical experience with LRRP and LRS units from the 1960s Cold War and Vietnam War, through their resurgence in the 1980s and use in Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM, to the advent of the GWOT. The paper's analytical framework examines each era of LRS units in terms of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, and personnel. In doing so, the author makes a strong case for continuing the LRS capability in the Army s force structure. The variety of environments and enemies likely to be faced by the military in the GWOT continues to demand the unique human intelligence abilities of trained and organized LRS units. As the Army leads the Armed Forces of the United States in combating terrorists where they live, the lessons found in this survey remain timely and relevant.

Volume 5, Deep Maneuver: Historical Case Studies of Maneuver in Large-Scale Combat Operations, presents eleven case studies from World War II through Operation Iraqi Freedom focusing on deep maneuver in terms of time, space and purpose. Deep operations require boldness and audacity, and yet carry an element of risk of overextension - especially in light of the independent factors of geography and weather that are ever-present. As a result, the case studies address not only successes, but also failure and shortfalls that result when conducting deep operations. The final two chapters address these considerations for future Deep Maneuver.

Low-intensity conflict (LIC) often has been viewed as the wrong kind of warfare for the American military, dating back to the war in Vietnam and extending to the present conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. From the American perspective, LIC occurs when the U.S. military must seek limited aims with a relatively modest number of available regular forces, as opposed to the larger commitments that bring into play the full panoply of advanced technology and massive commitments of troops. Yet despite the conventional view, U.S. forces have achieved success in LIC, albeit "under the radar" and with credit largely assigned to allied forces, in a number of counterguerrilla wars in the 1960s."Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-1969" focuses on what the author calls the Second Korean conflict, which flared up in November 1966 and sputtered to an ill-defined halt more than three years later. During that time, North Korean special operations teams had challenged the U.S. and its South Korean allies in every category of low-intensity conflict - small-scale skirmishes along the Demilitarized Zone between the two Koreas, spectacular terrorist strikes, attempts to foment a viable insurgency in the South, and even the seizure of the USS Pueblo - and failed. This book offers a case study in how an operational-level commander, General Charles H. Bonesteel III, met the challenge of LIC. He and his Korean subordinates crafted a series of shrewd, pragmatic measures that defanged North Korea's aggressive campaign. According to the convincing argument made by "Scenes from an Unfinished War," because the U.S. successfully fought the "wrong kind" of war, it likely blocked another kind of wrong war - a land war in Asia. The Second Korean Conflict serves as a corrective to assumptions about the American military's abilities to formulate and execute a winning counterinsurgency strategy. Originally published in 1991. 180 pages. maps. ill.