This paper assesses proposals to redefine the scope of activities of systemically important financial institutions. Alongside reform of prudential regulation and oversight, these have been offered as solutions to the too-important-to-fail problem. It is argued that while the more radical of these proposals such as narrow utility banking do not adequately address key policy objectives, two concrete policy measures - the Volcker Rule in the United States and retail ring-fencing in the United Kingdom - are more promising while still entailing significant implementation challenges. A risk factor common to all the measures is the potential for activities identified as too risky for retail banks to migrate to the unregulated parts of the financial system. Since this could lead to accumulation of systemic risk if left unchecked, it appears unlikely that any structural engineering will lessen the policing burden on prudential authorities and on the banks.

The U.S., the U.K., and more recently, the E.U., have proposed policy measures directly targeting complexity and business structures of banks. Unlike other, price-based reforms (e.g., Basel 3 and G-SIFI surcharges), these proposals have been developed unilaterally with material differences in scope, design and implementation schedules. This may exacerbate cross-border regulatory arbitrage and put a further burden on consolidated supervision and cross-border resolution. This paper provides an analysis of the potential implications of implementing different structural policy measures. It proposes a pragmatic and coordinated approach to development of these policies to reduce risk of regulatory arbitrage and minimize unintended consequences. In doing so, it also aims to identify a set of common policy measures that countries could adopt to re-scope bank business models and corporate structures.

This paper presents a stylized analysis of the effects of ring-fencing (i.e., different restrictions on cross-border transfers of excess profits and/or capital between a parent bank and its subsidiaries located in different jurisdictions) on cross-border banks. Using a sample of 25 large European banking groups with subsidiaries in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe (CESE), we analyze the impact of a CESE credit shock on the capital buffers needed by the sample banking groups under different forms of ring-fencing. Our simulations show that under stricter forms of ring-fencing, sample banking groups have substantially larger needs for capital buffers at the parent and/or subsidiary level than under less strict (or in the absence of any) ring-fencing.

Developing an effective framework for cross-border resolution is a key priority in international regulatory reform. Large bank failures during the global financial crisis brought home the lack of adequate tools for resolving “too-big-to-fail” institutions. In cross-border cases, misaligned incentives and lack of robust mechanisms for resolution and cross-border cooperation left some country authorities with little choice but to take unilateral actions, which contributed to the high fiscal costs of the crisis and resulted in disorderly resolution in some cases

Pan-African banks are expanding rapidly across the continent, creating cross-border networks, and having a systemic presence in the banking sectors of many Sub-Saharan African countries. These banking groups are fostering financial development and economic integration, stimulating competition and efficiency, introducing product innovation and modern management and information systems, and bringing higher skills and expertise to host countries. At the same time, the rise of pan-African banks presents new challenges for regulators and supervisors. As networks expand, new channels for transmission of macro-financial risks and spillovers across home and host countries may emerge. To ensure that the gains from cross border banking are sustained and avoid raising financial stability risks, enhanced cross-border cooperation on regulatory and supervisory oversight is needed, in particular to support effective supervision on a consolidated basis. This paper takes stock of the development of pan-African banking groups; identifies regulatory, supervisory and resolution gaps; and suggests how the IMF can help the authorities address the related challenges.

This book explores the potential and problems of bank safety and efficiency arising from the rapidly growing area of cross-border banking in the form of branches or subsidiaries with primarily only national prudential regulation. There are likely to be differences in the treatment of the same bank operating in different countries or of different banks from different home countries operating in the same country with respect to deposit insurance provisions, declaration of insolvency, resolution of insolvencies, and lender of last resort protection. The book identifies these protection problems and discusses possible solutions, such as greater cross-border cooperation, harmonization and organizations. The contributors to this book include experts from different countries and from a wide range of affiliations, including academia, regulators, practitioners, and international organizations. Sample Chapter(s). Chapter 1: Cross-Border Banking Regulation OCo A WayForward: The European Case (68 KB). Contents: Special Addresses: Cross-Border Banking Regulation OCo A Way Forward: The European Case (Stefan Ingves); Remarks before the Conference on International Financial Instability (Sheila C Bair); Benign Financial Conditions, Asset Management, and Political Risks: Trying to Make Sense of Our Times (Raghuram G Rajan); International Financial Instability: Cross-Border Banking and National Regulation Chicago OCo Dinner Remarks (Jean Pierre Sabourin); Landscape of International Banking and Financial Crises: Current State of Cross-Border Banking (Dirk Schoenmaker & Christiaan van Laecke); Actual and Near-Miss Cross-Border Crises (Carl-Johan Lindgren); A Review of Financial Stability Reports (Sander Oosterloo, Jakob de Haan, & Richard Jong-A-Pin); Discussion of Landscape of International Banking and Financial Crises (Luc Laeven); Causes and Conditions for Cross-Border Instability Transmission and Threats to Stability: Cross-Border Contagion Links and Banking Problems in the Nordic Countries (Bent Vale); Currency Crises, (Hidden) Linkages, and Volume (Max Bruche, Jon Danielsson & Gabriele Galati); What Do We Know about the Performance and Risk of Hedge Funds? (Triphon Phumiwasana, Tong Li, James R Barth & Glenn Yago); Remarks on Causes and Conditions of Financial Instability Panel (Garry Schinasi); Prudential Supervision: Home Country versus Cross-Border Negative Externalities in Large Banking Organization Failures and How to Avoid Them (Robert A Eisenbeis); Conflicts between Home and Host Country Prudential Supervisors (Richard J Herring); Cross-Border Nonbank Risks and Regulatory Cooperation (Paul Wright); Challenges in Cross-Border Supervision and Regulation (Eric Rosengren); Government Safety Net: Bagehot and Coase Meet the Single European Market (V tor Gaspar); Banking in a Changing World: Issues and Questions in the Resolution of Cross-Border Banks (Michael Krimminger); International Banks, Cross-Border Guarantees, and Regulation (Andrew Powell & Giovanni Majnoni); Deposit Insurance, Bank Resolution, and Lender of Last Resort OCo Putting the Pieces Together (Thorsten Beck); Insolvency Resolution: Cross-Border Resolution of Banking Crises (Rosa Mar a Lastra); Bridge Banks and Too Big to Fail: Systemic Risk Exemption (David G Mayes); Prompt Corrective Action: Is There a Case for an International Banking Standard? (Mar a J Nieto & Larry D Wall); Insolvency Resolution: Key Issues Raised by the Papers (Peter G Brierley); Cross-Border Crisis Prevention: Public and Private Strategies: Supervisory Arrangements, LOLR, and Crisis Management in a Single European Banking Market (Arnoud W A Boot); Regulation and Crisis Prevention in the Evolving Global Market (David S Hoelscher & David C Parker); Derivatives Governance and Financial Stability (David Mengle); Cross-Border Crisis Prevention: Public and Private Strategies (Gerard Caprio, Jr.); Where to from Here: Policy Panel: Cross-Border Banking: Where to from Here? (Mutsuo Hatano); Remarks on Deposit Insurance Policy (Andrey Melnikov); The Importance of Planning for Large Bank Insolvencies (Arthur J Murton); Where to from Here: Policy Panel (Guy Saint-Pierre); Some Private-Sector Thoughts on Home/Host-Country Supervisory Issues (Lawrence R Uhlick). Readership: Academics and upper-level undergraduate or graduate students in the areas of financial institutions, banking, financial regulation, or international financial markets; financial regulators, policy-makers, and consultants."

Global governance of international banks is breaking down after the Great Financial Crisis, as national regulators are withdrawing on their home turf. New evidence presented illustrates that the global systemically important banks underpin the global financial system. This book offers solutions for the effective governance of global banks.