The Institutional View (IV) on the Liberalization and Management of Capital Flows, adopted in 2012, provides the basis for consistent advice, and where relevant, assessments on policies related to capital flows. This paper reviews the IV, informed by advances in research, notably the work on an Integrated Policy Framework (IPF), the findings of the 2020 evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) on IMF Advice on Capital Flows, and staff’s experience with the implementation of the IV. The core premises and objectives of the IV remain unchanged. The IV rests on the premises that capital flows are desirable as they can bring substantial benefits for countries, and that capital flow management measures (CFMs) can be useful in certain circumstances but should not substitute for warranted macroeconomic adjustment. With those premises in mind, the IV aims to help countries reap the benefits of capital flows, while managing the associated risks in a way that preserves macroeconomic and financial stability and does not generate significant negative outward spillovers.

The Fund’s Institutional View (IV) recognizes the benefits of and risks associated with capital flows. Since the IV was adopted, a growing literature has provided additional insights into the benefits and risks from capital flows. This note summarizes the insights from the recent literature and the experiences of staff since the adoption of the IV that have informed this review.

This paper focuses on the coordination problem among borrowing countries imposing controls on capital infl ows. In a simple model of capital flows and controls, we show that inflow restrictions distort international capital flows to other countries and that, in turn, such capital flow deflection may lead to a policy response. We then test the theory using data on inflow restrictions and gross capital inflows for a large sample of developing countries between 1995 and 2009. Our estimation yields strong evidence that capital controls deflect capital flows to other borrowing countries with similar economic characteristics. Notwithstanding these strong cross-border spillover effects, we do not find evidence of a policy response.

This note outlines the approach of the proposed revision to the Institutional View (IV) when assessing whether systemic financial stability risks are elevated due to foreign currency (FX) mismatches. The approach builds on the staff guidance regarding risk assessments in bilateral surveillance, while allowing for flexibility to draw on future advances in best practice. This note proposes a two-step approach to assess systemic risks from FX mismatches. This note is organized as follows. Section II outlines the sources of systemic risks stemming from FX debt and potential amplification channels. Section III outlines the risk assessment approach in practice and Section IV concludes.

This note describes the key principles for the design and implementation of preemptive CFM/MPMs. These measures should be designed to be effective—so they achieve their intended goal and are not easily circumvented—and efficient—so they minimize distortions and costs. Preemptive CFM/MPMs should be targeted, calibrated to risks, transparent, and as temporary as possible. The appropriate design depends on country circumstances, such as institutional and legal constraints, as well as the precise source of the vulnerability. Where measures that do not discriminate by residency are available and effective, they should be preferred.

Insights from the IPF workstream can help guide the appropriate policy mix during an inflow surge, based on the shock and country characteristics. Inflow surges may be caused by a range of shocks and can take different forms in different countries. The IPF models suggest that warranted macroeconomic policy adjustments depend on the nature of the shock and country characteristics. The IPF models point to shocks and country characteristics that make it difficult to effectively respond to surges using only macroeconomic policy and exchange rate adjustment. The IPF models also suggest that, in the presence of overheating and overvaluation, the use of FXI and CFMs can enhance monetary autonomy in certain circumstances without generating other distortions. The relative costs and benefits of FXI and CFMs depend on country-specific factors. The IPF models also illustrate how surges can lead to a build-up of systemic financial risks. The IPF workstream connects the appropriate mix of MPMs and CFM/MPMs to the structure of the country's financial system.

Capital flows are an important aspect of the international monetary system. They provide significant benefits, both direct and indirect. At the same time, they also carry risks, and a key challenge for countries is how to harness the benefits while managing the risks. The institutional view on the liberalization and management of capital flows provides the Fund with a basis for consistent advice on policies related to capital flows. This paper reviews countries’ experiences with handling capital flows in the period since the adoption of the IMF’s institutional view in 2012. Based on the experience, it identifies a few areas in which the view would benefit from further clarification or elaboration.