Based on the Executive Board’s guidance during the first stage of the Review of Low Income Countries (LIC) Facilities, this paper suggests a number of refinements to the facilities and instruments that are consistent with the self-sustainability of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT). The proposals seek to improve the tailoring and flexibility of Fund support. Taken together with those advanced in the parallel paper on PRGT eligibility, they are projected to keep the average annual demand for PRGT resources within a range consistent with the Board’s approved strategy to make the PRGT self-sustaining over the period 2013–35. The proposals are as follows.

2018-19 Review of Facilities for Low-Income Countries---Reform Proposals: Review Of The Financing Of The Fund’s Concessional Assistance And Debt Relief To Low-Income Member Countries

This Handbook provides guidance to staff on the IMF’s concessional financial facilities and non-financial instruments for low-income countries (LICs), defined here as all countries eligible to obtain concessional financing from the Fund. It updates the previous version of the Handbook that was published in December 2017 (IMF, 2017e) by incorporating modifications resulting from the 2018–19 Review of Facilities for Low-Income Countries and Review of the Financing of the Fund’s Concessional Assistance and Debt Relief to Low-Income Member Countries (IMF, 2019a, b), approved by the Board in May 2019; the reforms introduced in 2021 on the basis of the Board paper Fund Concessional Financial Support for Low-Income Countries—Responding to the Pandemic (IMF, 2021a), approved in July 2021; and a number of other recent Board papers. Designed as a comprehensive reference tool for program work on LICs, the Handbook also refers, in summary form, to a range of relevant policies that apply more generally to IMF members. As with all guidance notes, the relevant IMF Executive Board decisions including the terms of the various LIC Trust Instruments that have been adopted by the Board, remain the primary legal authority on the matters covered in the Handbook.

This Handbook provides guidance to staff on the financial facilities and non-financial instruments for low-income countries (LICs), defined here as all countries eligible to obtain concessional financing from the Fund. It updates the previous version of the Handbook that was published in February 2016 (IMF, 2016d) by incorporating modifications resulting from Board papers and related decisions since that time, including Financing for Development—Enhancing the Financial Safety Net for Developing Countries—Further Considerations (IMF, 2016c), Review of Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust – Review of Interest Rate Structure (IMF, 2016b), Eligibility to Use the Fund’s Facilities for Concessional Financing (IMF, 2017a), Large Natural Disasters—Enhancing the Financial Safety Net for Developing Countries (IMF, 2017b) and Adequacy of the Global Financial Safety Net – Proposal for a New Policy Coordination Instrument (IMF, 2017c). Designed as a comprehensive reference tool for program work on LICs, the Handbook also refers, in summary form, to a range of relevant policies that apply more generally to IMF members. As with all guidance notes, the relevant IMF Executive Board decisions, including the terms of the various LIC Trust Instruments that have been adopted by the Board, remain the sole legal authority on the matters covered in the Handbook

This paper studies the short and longer-term impact of IMF engagement in Low-Income Countries (LICs) over nearly three decades. In contrast to earlier studies, we focus on a sample composed exclusively of LICs and disentangle the different effects of IMF longer-term engagement and short-term financing using a propensity score matching approach to control for selection bias. Our results indicate that longer-term IMF support (at least five years of program engagement per decade) helped LICs sustain economic growth and boost resilience by building fiscal buffers. Interestingly, the size of IMF financing has no significant impact on economic growth, possibly pointing to the prominent role of IMF policy advice and institutional capacity building in the context of longer-term engagement. We also present evidence that the short-term IMF engagement through augmentations of existing programs or short-term and emergency facilities is positively associated with a wide range of macroeconomic outcomes. Notably, the IMF financial support has the greatest impact on short-term growth when LICs are faced with substantial macroeconomic imbalances or exogenous shocks.

This paper aims to assess the economic impact of the IMF’s support through its facilities for low-income countries. It relies on two complementary econometric analyses: the first investigates the longer-term impact of IMF engagement—primarily through successive medium-term programs under the Extended Credit Facility and its predecessors (and more recently the Policy Support Instrument)—on economic growth and a range of other indicators and socioeconomic outcomes; the second focuses on the role of IMF shock-related financing—through augmentations of Extended Credit Facility arrangements and short-term and emergency financing instruments—on short-term macroeconomic performance.

This note provides operational advice and information to help staff implement the IMF Strategy for Fragile and Conflict-Affected States (FCS) approved by the Executive Board on March 9, 2022. Topics covered include (i) the new IMF FCS classification methodology, which is aligned with that of the World Bank; (ii) the preparation of Country Engagement Strategies (CES) that will be rolled out across FCS to ensure that Fund engagement is appropriately tailored to country-specific manifestations of fragility and/or conflict; (iii) advice on tailoring the thematic focus of Article IV consultations and Fund analytics to FCS, as well as on the prioritization, design, and implementation of capacity development (CD) projects in fragile contexts; (iv) guidance on making full use of the flexibilities of the lending toolkit; (v) guidance on engaging in specific FCS situations, including building accountable institutions to exit fragility, cases of rising fragility risks, active conflict, post-conflict, and addressing the impact of external shocks and spillovers; and (v) strengthening partnerships with humanitarian, development, and peace actors, in accordance with the Fund's mandate. Dedicated annexes provide additional information on the CES process, addressing good governance in FCS, program design, and country examples of Fund engagement in FCS.