One might legitimately ask what reasons other than vanity could prompt an author to issue a collection of his previously published essays. The best reason, I think, is the belief that the essays hang together in such a way that, as a book, they produce a whole which is in a sense greater than the sum of its parts. When this happens, as I hope it does in the present case, it is because the essays pursue related themes in such a way that, together, they at least form a start toward the development of a systematic theory on the common foundations supporting the particular claims in the particular articles. With respect to this collection, the essays can all be read as particular ways of pursuing the following general pattern of thought: that a commitment to justice and a respect for rights (and not social utility) must be the foundation of any morally acceptable legal order; that a social contractarian model is the best way to illuminate this foundation; that a retributive theory of punish ment is the only theory of punishment resting on such a foundation and thus is the only morally acceptable theory of punishment; that the twentieth century's faddish movement toward a "scientific" or therapeutic response to crime runs grave risks of undermining the foundations of justice and rights on which the legal order ought to rest; and, finally, that the legitimate worry about the tendency of the behavioral sciences to undermine the values of

Jeffrie G. Murphy's second collection of essays further pursues the topics of punishment and retribution that were explored in his 1979 collection Retribution, Justice and Therapy. Murphy now explores these topics in the context of political philosophy as well as moral philosophy, and he now begins to develop some doubts about the version of the retributive theory with which his name has long been associated.

'Free will skepticism' refers to a family of views that all take seriously the possibility that human beings lack the control in action - i.e. the free will - required for an agent to be truly deserving of blame and praise, punishment and reward. Critics fear that adopting this view would have harmful consequences for our interpersonal relationships, society, morality, meaning, and laws. Optimistic free will skeptics, on the other hand, respond by arguing that life without free will and so-called basic desert moral responsibility would not be harmful in these ways, and might even be beneficial. This collection addresses the practical implications of free will skepticism for law and society. It contains eleven original essays that provide alternatives to retributive punishment, explore what (if any) changes are needed for the criminal justice system, and ask whether we should be optimistic or pessimistic about the real-world implications of free will skepticism.

Seminar paper from the year 2009 in the subject Psychology - Social Psychology, grade: 1,3, University of Cologne (Institut für Wirtschafts- und Sozialpsychologie), course: Psychologie der Gerechtigkeit, language: English, abstract: It might seem like putting the cart before the horse: Unlike distributional justice, retributive justice does not deal with how to set up justice, but how to smooth out injustice. But actually every stick has two ends. So does the "cart" justice. Justice is done, when everybody gets his just deserts. And while just deserts refer to rewards on the one end - the end of distributive justice, they refer to punishment at the other end - the end of retributive justice. The issue of retributive justice arises after a wrongdoing like a crime has occurred and addresses the task of imposing an adequate sanction to the wrongdoer. Thus retribution is rather linked to reconstitute justice than to constitute it. But how exactly should the horse push? To say, how should justice be reconstituted? Giving the offender his just deserts seems to be a facile task. But what are just deserts? What are just deserts for somebody evading taxes - thereby stealing money from the state - compared to somebody stealing the savings of an old woman? What are just deserts for somebody mali-ciously burning the house of his ex-wife compared to somebody setting a house on fire be-cause he has fallen asleep while smoking? What are just deserts for a killing soldier compared to a killing civilian? Or what are just deserts for a husband burgling a pharmacy to get some exorbitant expensive medicine for his wife? And even if we individually know the answers to those questions: Would our answers be the same as the answers of our neighbor, our wife, or our best friend? And would they be the same in Germany and in the USA, Russia or Somalia? Many scientists have looked upon the issue. But while philosophers and jurists focus on normative questions, psychologists focus on desc

It is often assumed that the law and religion address different spheres of human life. Religion and ethics articulate complex systems of moral reasoning that concern norms, deliberation of ends, cultivation of disposition, and transformation of moral agency. Law, in contrast, seeks to govern human conduct through procedural justice, rights, and public good. Doing Justice to Mercy challenges this assumption by presenting the reader with an urgent conversation between the law and religion that yields a constructive approach, both theoretically and practically, to the complex role of mercy in our legal process. Authored by legal practitioners, activists, and theorists in addition to theologians and ethicists, the essays collected here are informed by timeless principles, and yet they could not be timelier. The trend in sentencing moves toward an increased severity, and the number of incarcerated people in the United States is at an all-time high. In the half-decade since 9/11, moreover, homeland security has established itself as a permanent fixture in our lives. In this atmosphere, the current volume seeks initially to clarify how justice and mercy intertwine in relation to a number of issues, such as rehabilitation, the death penalty, domestic violence, and war crimes. Exploring the legal, philosophical, and theological grounds for mercy in our courts, the discussion then moves to the practical ways in which mercy may be implemented. Contributors:Marc Mauer, The Sentencing Project * Lois Gehr Livezey, McCormick Theological Seminary * Ernie Lewis, Public Advocate, Commonwealth of Kentucky * Jonathan Rothchild, Loyola Marymount University * Albert W. Alschuler, Northwestern University School of Law * David Scheffer, Northwestern University School of Law * David Little, Harvard Divinity School * Matthew Myer Boulton, Andover Newton Theological School * Mark Lewis Taylor, Princeton Theological Seminary * Sarah Coakley, Cambridge University * William Schweiker, University of Chicago Divinity School * Kevin Jung, College of William and Mary * Peter J. Paris, Princeton Theological Seminary * W. Clark Gilpin, University of Chicago Divinity School * William C. Placher, Wabash College