Rethinking the Federal Reserve's many mandates on its 100-year anniversary : hearing before the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, first session, December 12, 2013.

This book discusses contemporary banking and monetary policy issues from the perspective of the Austrian School of Economics. Based on the heritage of the Austrian school, leading scholars and practitioners offer a coherent diagnosis and analysis of the factors leading to Europe’s current financial crisis. The first part of the book discusses Ludwig von Mises’s and Friedrich August von Hayek’s ideas on banking and monetary policy from both historical and economic standpoints. It includes contributions on Austrian monetary dynamics and micro-foundational business cycle theory, von Mises’s concepts of liquidity and solvency of fractional-reserve banks, and liberalism of Austrian economics. The second part analyzes the measures taken by the European Central Bank (ECB) in light of the ideas of von Mises and Hayek. It includes contributions on non-neutrality of money, ECB monetary policy, and the future of the ECB. The third and final part presents discussions on monetary reforms, including contributions on Bitcoins, Cryptocurrencies and anti-deflationist Paranoia.

There are many excellent, capable public servants at the Fed who have served our Nation well and are currently serving our Nation well. But, a critical examination of the last 100 years of the Fed's actions reveals a mixed bag at best. And, most recently, we have seen a radical departure from the historic norms of monetary policy conduct, from an unprecedented use of Section 13(3) exigent powers to select intervention in distinct credit markets, to the facilitation of our unsustainable national debt, to a blurring of the lines between fiscal and monetary policy, all of which presents large and unwarranted risk to the economy. Monetary policy is at its best in maintaining stable, healthy economic growth when it follows a clear, predictable rule or path free from political micromanagement, as it did in the Great Moderation of 1987 to 2002. Neither the Congress, much less the White House or Treasury, should conduct monetary policy operations, but the Federal Reserve's independence and discretion in monetary policy must be paired with appropriate transparency and accountability.