This paper examines some of the major interrelationships between air and ground forces on the modern battlefield. The examination is conducted at a conceptual level. The paper structures the air-land battle, looks at some possible problems in the Air Ground Operations System, proposes a scheme of target prioritization, and suggests a reorientation of our target planning approach. Subjects addressed include airstrike control, the Corps Direct Air Support Center, target selection, limited breakthroughs, and the requisite conditions for battlefield success. The conclusion stresses the value of reexamining our target selection process, and recommends that the Army institutionalize a tactical air support staff element, manned by Army officers, at various headquarters involved in combat development and training. (Author).

What is grand strategy ? What does it aim to achieve? And what differentiates it from normal strategic thought--what, in other words, makes it "grand"? In answering these questions, most scholars have focused on diplomacy and warfare, so much so that "grand"? In answering these questions, most scholars have focused on diplomacy and warfare, so much so that "grand strategy" has become almost an equivalent of "military history." The traditional attention paid to military affairs is understandable, but in today's world it leaves out much else that could be considered political, and therefore strategic. Just as contemporary world politics is driven by a wide range of non-military issues, the most thorough considerations of grand strategy must consider the bases of peace and security--including gender, race, the environment, and a wide range of cultural, social, political, and economic issues. Rethinking American Grand Strategy assembles a roster of leading historians to examine America's place in the world. Its innovative chapters re-examine familiar figures, such as John Quincy Adams, George Kennan, and Henry Kissinger, while also revealing the forgotten episodes and hidden voices of American grand strategy. They expand the scope of diplomatic and military history by placing the grand strategies of public health, race, gender, humanitarianism, and the law alongside military and diplomatic affairs to reveal hidden strategists as well as strategies. --

A comment from the commander of Tactical Air Command (TAC) that the air operations center (AOC) did not work and that it needed to be fixed stimulated this research project. Having long been associated with the theater air control system (TACS), I have been aware of concerns about the AOC and other elements of the system. Periodically, the Air Force has tried to implement improvements, particularly in hardware, but these efforts sometimes fell short. Some of the expressed concerns included statements that the air tasking order (ATO) was not effective means of controlling the force, that centralized control will break down and leave us unable to perform our task, and that the system is too physically cumbersome and airlift intensive to be useful. Certainty, there is some truth in these comments.