Former Federal Reserve chair Greenspan recently said that the risk management paradigm is broken; thus our understanding of financial regulation no longer makes sense. More generally, the current financial crisis obliges us to rethink the relationships among "financial markets" and "governments." In Out of Crisis financial analyst David Westbrook illuminates the intellectual, business, and policy errors that have led us into the present morass. Through a vivid legal and political analysis he shows how the ideologies of the right and left have distorted financial thinking and policy. Learning from these errors, the book sketches the emergence of a new understanding of risk management and bureaucratic regulation. Out of Crisis begins the tasks of rethinking the structures that constitute financial markets and exploring how such structures may be strengthened. Taking responsibility for the markets we build to do so much of our society's work, we may yet become mature capitalists.

An “intriguing plan” addressing shadow banking, regulation, and the continuing quest for financial stability (Financial Times). Years have passed since the world experienced one of the worst financial crises in history, and while countless experts have analyzed it, many central questions remain unanswered. Should money creation be considered a “public” or “private” activity—or both? What do we mean by, and want from, financial stability? What role should regulation play? How would we design our monetary institutions if we could start from scratch? In The Money Problem, Morgan Ricks addresses these questions and more, offering a practical yet elegant blueprint for a modernized system of money and banking—one that, crucially, can be accomplished through incremental changes to the United States’ current system. He brings a critical, missing dimension to the ongoing debates over financial stability policy, arguing that the issue is primarily one of monetary system design. The Money Problem offers a way to mitigate the risk of catastrophic panic in the future, and it will expand the financial reform conversation in the United States and abroad. “Highly recommended.” —Choice

The system of securities regulation that prevails today in the United States is one that has been formed through piecemeal federal legislation, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) invocation of its administrative authority, and self-regulatory episodic action. As a consequence, the presence of consistent and logical regulation all too often is lacking. In both transactional and litigation settings, with frequency, mandates apply that are erratic and antithetical to sound public policy. This book focuses on "rethinking" the securities laws, with particular emphasis on the Securities Act and Securities Exchange Act. In 1978, the American Law Institute (ALI) adopted the ALI Federal Securities Code. The Code has not been enacted by Congress and its prospects are dim. Since that time, no treatise, monograph, or other source comprehensively has focused on this meritorious subject. The objective of this book is to identify the deficiencies that exist under the current regimen, address their failings, provide recommendations for rectifying these deficiencies, and set forth a thorough analysis for remediation in order to prescribe a consistent and sound securities law framework. By undertaking this challenge, the book provides an original and valuable resource for effectuating necessary law reform that should prove beneficial to the integrity of the U.S. capital markets, effective and fair government and private enforcement, and the enhancement of investor protection.

Financial crises are traditionally analyzed as purely economic phenomena. The political economy of financial booms and busts remains both under-emphasized and limited to isolated episodes. This paper examines the political economy of financial policy during ten of the most infamous financial booms and busts since the 18th century, and presents consistent evidence of pro-cyclical regulatory policies by governments. Financial booms, and risk-taking during these episodes, were often amplified by political regulatory stimuli, credit subsidies, and an increasing light-touch approach to financial supervision. The regulatory backlash that ensues from financial crises can only be understood in the context of the deep political ramifications of these crises. Post-crisis regulations do not always survive the following boom. The interplay between politics and financial policy over these cycles deserves further attention. History suggests that politics can be the undoing of macro-prudential regulations.

This thought-provoking book challenges the way we think about regulating cryptoassets. Bringing a timely new perspective, Syren Johnstone critiques the application of a financial regulation narrative to cryptoassets, questioning the assumptions on which it is based and whether regulations developed in the 20th century remain fit to apply to a technology emerging in the 21st.

This book builds on a year-long discussion with a group of academics, policy-makers and industry experts to provide a long-term contribution to the Capital Markets Union project, launched by the European Commission in 2015. It identifies 36 cross-border barriers to capital mar...

We identify current challenges for creating stable, yet efficient financial systems using lessons from recent and past crises. Reforms need to start from three tenets: adopting a system-wide perspective explicitly aimed at addressing market failures; understanding and incorporating into regulations agents’ incentives so as to align them better with societies’ goals; and acknowledging that risks of crises will always remain, in part due to (unknown) unknowns – be they tipping points, fault lines, or spillovers. Corresponding to these three tenets, specific areas for further reforms are identified. Policy makers need to resist, however, fine-tuning regulations: a “do not harm” approach is often preferable. And as risks will remain, crisis management needs to be made an integral part of system design, not relegated to improvisation after the fact.