There are many deep-seated reasons for the current financial turmoil but a key factor has undoubtedly been the serious failings within the corporate governance practices of financial institutions. There have been shortcomings in the risk management and incentive structures; the boards’ supervision was at times weak; disclosure and accounting standards were in some cases inadequate; the institutional investors’ engagement with management was at times insufficient and, last but not least, the remuneration policies of many large institutions appeared inappropriate. This book will provide a critical overview and analysis of key corporate governance weaknesses, focusing primarily on three main areas: directors’ failure to understand complex company transactions; the poor remuneration practices of financial institutions; and, finally, the failure of institutional investors to sufficiently engage with management. The book, while largely focused on the UK, will also consider EU and Australian developments as well as offering a comparative angle looking at the corporate governance of financial institutions in the US.

There are many deep-seated reasons for the current financial turmoil but a key factor has undoubtedly been the serious failings within the corporate governance practices of financial institutions. There have been shortcomings in the risk management and incentive structures; the boards’ supervision was at times weak; disclosure and accounting standards were in some cases inadequate; the institutional investors’ engagement with management was at times insufficient and, last but not least, the remuneration policies of many large institutions appeared inappropriate. This book will provide a critical overview and analysis of key corporate governance weaknesses, focusing primarily on three main areas: directors’ failure to understand complex company transactions; the poor remuneration practices of financial institutions; and, finally, the failure of institutional investors to sufficiently engage with management. The book, while largely focused on the UK, will also consider EU and Australian developments as well as offering a comparative angle looking at the corporate governance of financial institutions in the US.

This book takes a comparative law and economics approach to the study of corporate governance. It looks at the overall impact of corporate law on separation of ownership and control across different jurisdictions and in doing so reappraises the existing framework for economic analysis of corporate law.

The presence of sound corporate governance in a financial institution is important in maintaining the confidence of both the market and the public. The power that corporate governance holds over the success of some of the largest financial institutions in the world is not to be downplayed. This book methodically assesses the quality of corporate governance and mechanisms of accountability disclosures to various stakeholders. It is further intended to provide fresh insights into some specific corporate governance recommendations to help improve good governance in financial institutions, particularly in the United Kingdom and the EU but will also be applicable to other major economies. It explores what, when and how corporate governance has changed the financial institution functions and corporate executive behaviour by critically reviewing the pre- and post-financial crisis theoretical and empirical literature. Increasingly driven by the nature of complications, complexities and opacity in the operations of financial systems, corporate governance reporting plays an important role in the financial sector. It will provide insights into corporate governance disclosures over a long-term basis. This book should be a valuable asset to support the research of practitioners, students and all academics due to its stimulating and reflective insights into this fascinating topic.

Rethinking Corporate Governance's extensive and insightful empirical investigation offers a radically new approach to corporate governance. This ground-breaking volume describes and analyzes the key nature-based and actor-based forces that ultimately determine corporate governance processes and long-term corporate paths. Generally, such forces work in complex and intricate interplays that to a large extent vary among corporations. A theory of shareholder governance is developed and integrated into the established - and more comprehensive - theory of corporate governance to create a revised theory of the corporation (firm). The new possibilities that this creates for explaining how processes develop and ultimately influence corporate paths are presented in-depth. Featuring conclusions based on an empirical material that is both rich and exclusive, the book also contains extensive non-anonymized materials from authentic corporate governance processes. A general conclusion is that actions taken by individuals have a special status among those forces, as they not only generate impact in themselves, but also involve interpretations of the possible effects of all the other forces.Among those actions, the ones taken by the shareholders stand out as particularly decisive both for the governance processes as such and for how corporations develop over time. Offering a degree of openness, detail and realism that is hard to find in any other case-based study this innovative and enlightening volume is essential for both academics and practitioners involved in corporate governance, corporate strategy and the theory of the firm.

Most scholarship on corporate governance in the last two decades has focused on the relationships between shareholders and managers or directors. Neglected in this vast literature is the role of employees in corporate governance. Yet "human capital," embodied in the employees, is rapidly becoming the most important source of value for corporations, and outside the United States, employees often have a significant formal role in corporate governance. This volume turns the spotlight on the neglected role of employees by analyzing many of the formal and informal ways that employees are actually involved in the governance of corporations, in U.S. firms and in large corporations in Germany and Japan. Examining laws and contexts, the essays focus on the framework for understanding employees' role in the firm and the implications for corporate governance. They explore how and why the special legal institutions in German and Japanese firms by which employees are formally involved in corporate governance came into being, and the impact these institutions have on firms and on their ability to compete. They also consider theoretical and empirical questions about employee share ownership. The result of a conference at Columbia University, the volume includes essays by Theodor Baums, Margaret M. Blair, David Charny, Greg Dow, Bernd Frick, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Nobuhiro Hiwatari, Katharina Pistor, Louis Putterman, Edward B. Rock, Mark J. Roe, and Michael L. Wachter. Margaret M. Blair is a senior fellow in Economic Studies at the Brookings Institution and author of Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-first Century (Brookings, 1995). Mark J. Roe, professor of business regulation and director of the Sloan Project on Corporate Governance at Columbia Law School, is the author of Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance (Princeton, 1996).

Over the last two decades there has been a notable increase in the number of corporate governance codes and principles, as well as a range of improvements in structures and mechanisms. Despite this, corporate governance failed to prevent a widespread default of fiduciary duties of corporate boards and managerial responsibilities in the finance industry, which contributed to the 2007–10 global financial crisis. This book brings together leading scholars from North America, Europe, Asia-Pacific and the Middle East to provide fresh and critical analytical insights on the systemic failures of corporate governance linked to the global financial crisis. Contributors draw from a range of disciplines to demonstrate the severe limitations of the dominant corporate governance framework and its associated market-oriented approach. They provide suggestions on how the governance problems could be tackled to prevent or mitigate any future financial crisis and explore new directions for post-crisis corporate governance research and reforms.