The standard approach to the legal foundations of corporate governance is based on the view that corporate law promotes separation of ownership and control by protecting non-controlling shareholders from expropriation. This book takes a broader perspective by showing that investor protection is a necessary, but not sufficient, legal condition for the efficient separation of ownership and control. Supporting the control powers of managers or controlling shareholders is as important as protecting investors from the abuse of these powers. Rethinking Corporate Governance reappraises the existing framework for the economic analysis of corporate law based on three categories of private benefits of control. Some of these benefits are not necessarily bad for corporate governance. The areas of law mainly affecting private benefits of control – including the distribution of corporate powers, self-dealing, and takeover regulation – are analyzed in five jurisdictions, namely the US, the UK, Italy, Sweden, and the Netherlands. Not only does this approach to corporate law explain separation of ownership and control better than just investor protection; it also suggests that the law can improve the efficiency of corporate governance by allowing non-controlling shareholders to be less powerful.

Who should be allowed to call the shots in the boardrooms of U. S. Corporations? And what difference does it make for their growth and profitability? In the last decade, these issues have moved to the center of policy debates about the time horizons and competitiveness of U.S. companies. This book is an indispensable guide through the historical, legal, and institutional background for these corporate governance debates. It explains three broad views on the relationship among the governance, performance, and competitiveness of corporations, and examines the intellectual history, politics, and empirical evidence behind each argument. It also considers the effect that two trends will have on corporate governance: the growth and power of public employees' pension funds and the increase in the economic activity that comes from specialized services and customized production. Blair asserts that companies need to experiment with different governance arrangements, such as choosing directors to represent particular constituencies, or making more radical arrangements like leveraged buyouts or worker-owned companies. Public policy should encourage, or at least not impede, such experimentation.

Corporate laws are based on the idea that the interests of shareholders should be the primary concern of company directors. However, some argue that the proper role for shareholders is to sit back and let the corporation's managers do their job, or that the pursuit of shareholders' interests detracts from the concerns of employees or victims of corporate wrongdoing or other stakeholders. Stephen Bottomley argues that instead of consigning shareholders to this passive role, they should be given opportunities to be active members of corporations. Corporations are constitutional arrangements rather than mere contractual agreements. They are decision-making organizations in which questions of process and structure are important. Thus, instead of using economic criteria such as efficiency as the sole measure for deciding what constitutes 'good' corporate governance, this book examines whether ideas of accountability, deliberation and contestability provide a valuable framework for assessing corporate structures and process and for encouraging greater shareholder participation.

Rethinking Corporate Governance's extensive and insightful empirical investigation offers a radically new approach to corporate governance. This ground-breaking volume describes and analyzes the key nature-based and actor-based forces that ultimately determine corporate governance processes and long-term corporate paths. Generally, such forces work in complex and intricate interplays that to a large extent vary among corporations. A theory of shareholder governance is developed and integrated into the established - and more comprehensive - theory of corporate governance to create a revised theory of the corporation (firm). The new possibilities that this creates for explaining how processes develop and ultimately influence corporate paths are presented in-depth. Featuring conclusions based on an empirical material that is both rich and exclusive, the book also contains extensive non-anonymized materials from authentic corporate governance processes. A general conclusion is that actions taken by individuals have a special status among those forces, as they not only generate impact in themselves, but also involve interpretations of the possible effects of all the other forces.Among those actions, the ones taken by the shareholders stand out as particularly decisive both for the governance processes as such and for how corporations develop over time. Offering a degree of openness, detail and realism that is hard to find in any other case-based study this innovative and enlightening volume is essential for both academics and practitioners involved in corporate governance, corporate strategy and the theory of the firm.

There are many deep-seated reasons for the current financial turmoil but a key factor has undoubtedly been the serious failings within the corporate governance practices of financial institutions. There have been shortcomings in the risk management and incentive structures; the boards’ supervision was at times weak; disclosure and accounting standards were in some cases inadequate; the institutional investors’ engagement with management was at times insufficient and, last but not least, the remuneration policies of many large institutions appeared inappropriate. This book will provide a critical overview and analysis of key corporate governance weaknesses, focusing primarily on three main areas: directors’ failure to understand complex company transactions; the poor remuneration practices of financial institutions; and, finally, the failure of institutional investors to sufficiently engage with management. The book, while largely focused on the UK, will also consider EU and Australian developments as well as offering a comparative angle looking at the corporate governance of financial institutions in the US.

Now that the economic orthodoxy of 'light-touch' regulation has been widely discredited by recent events in the financial markets, and shareholder-oriented management has come under intense scrutiny, it is time to seriously consider the merits of stakeholder-oriented economies. In this far-reaching symposium on this aspect of comparative labour relations, 35 scholars examine case studies and evolving scenarios in a wide variety of countries, from leading economic powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany to post-socialist states such as Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria to the formidable global economic presences of Brazil, Russia, and India. With contributions from leading experts from all around the world in the fields of labour law, industrial relations, labour economics, labour statistics, human resources management, organization theory and other related subjects, the papers focus on the impact of the global economic crisis and its implications for the future of employment. Specific contexts covered include: ; adversarial versus strategic collective bargaining; transnational collective bargaining; long-term employees as the most valuable corporate stakeholders; workers' voice and participation in the restructuring of undertakings; privatization of state-owned companies; executive pay; investment in vocational training in times of economic crisis; the impact of the EU's Cross-Border Merger Directive; inherent dangers in the EMU one-size-fits-all monetary policy; and cases of large-scale corporate fraud. Of particular interest is the treatment of important developments in Singapore and Nigeria, as well as lessons to be learned from pitfalls encountered in South Africa and other countries. With its theoretical arguments and empirical data, this volume is certainly a major contribution to the debate over whether shareholder or stakeholder approaches to management yield the best results in terms of employment outcomes. As the world economic crisis continues to take its toll on employment, pension funds, public services, and living standards, the book is sure to find a wide audience among policymakers and lawyers worldwide concerned with the future of employment relations and their effect on both productivity and social stability. This volume includes a selection of papers from the Eighth International Conference in commemoration of Marco Biagi held at the Marco Biagi Foundation in Modena, Italy in March 2010.