For several years U.S. policymakers, officials, and writers on defense have employed the terms "asymmetric" or "asymmetry" to characterize everything from the nature of the threats we face to the nature of war and beyond. The author challenges the utility of using those terms to characterize the threats we face, one element of the broader debate over the nature of war, U.S. strategy, and the threats confronting us. As a work of critique, it aims to make an important contribution to the threat debate. A correct assessment of the nature of the threat environment is essential to any sound defense doctrine for the U.S. Army and the military as a whole. That correct assessment can only be reached through a process of critique and debate.

For several years U.S. policymakers, officials, and writers on defense have employed the terms "asymmetric" or "asymmetry" to characterize everything from the nature of the threats we face to the nature of war and beyond. The author challenges the utility of using those terms to characterize the threats we face, one element of the broader debate over the nature of war, U.S. strategy, and the threats confronting us. As a work of critique, it aims to make an important contribution to the threat debate. A correct assessment of the nature of the threat environment is essential to any sound defense doctrine for the U.S. Army and the military as a whole. That correct assessment can only be reached through a process of critique and debate.

Assessment of the threat environment is a critical element in the formulation of any state's strategy and defense doctrine. It also should be an inherently critical process that seeks to free policymakers from incorrect, antiquated, or misconceived perceptions about the threat. Consequently, the nature of the threat(s) the United States or any other government faces is the subject of a never-ending debate. For several years U.S. policymakers, officials, and writers on defense have employed the terms "asymmetric" or "asymmetry" to characterize everything from the nature of the threats we face to the nature of war and beyond. This monograph challenges the utility of using those terms to characterize the threats we face, one element of the broader debate over the nature of war, U.S. strategy, and the threats confronting us. As a work of critique, it aims to make an important contribution to the threat debate.

A new security concept emerged on the American defense-planning scene several years ago. Asymmetric warfare was worked into the 1997 National Security Strategy. Analysts and major defense documents have since described the more vexing and menacing security challenges as asymmetric. The term is used in connection with threats, strategies, and warfare. Asymmetry typically describes an enemy that thinks or acts differently from America, especially when faced with conventionally superior U.S. forces. Asymmetric threats are most often associated with nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and unfamiliar capabilities such as those displayed in the attacks of September 11, 2001. Such weapons leverage vulnerabilities we either overlook or tolerate. And these asymmetric approaches can generate dramatic outcomes for a weaker power. Yet this concept has lost its usefulness in part because it means different things to different people. Moreover, when joined with warfare or threats, the term asymmetric adds little to the strategic thinking of ages past. Observations that weak and clever enemies can bring a stronger power to its knees by exploiting vulnerabilities or can brazenly challenge muscle-bound modern militaries with a surprise use of frightening weapons or unfamiliar maneuvering simply restate the obvious: strategy matters. So what does the concept of asymmetry add to an understanding of warfare and the threat? Is it a useful defense planning or policy analysis tool in this post-Cold War, post-9/11 world?

CONTENTS Foreword Introduction What is Asymmetric Warfare? Defining Asymmetry -- Characteristics: Disparity of Interest -- Targeting the Will of the Opponent -- Attaining Strategic Effect on All Levels of War -- The Importance of Effectiveness -- The Threat-Response Dynamic -- A Final Example: The Gulf Tanker War -- Conclusions A Typology of Asymmetry: What, Who, and When? The What: The Range of Potential Asymmetric Threats -- The Who: Regional, Rogue, and Nonstate Actors -- The When: Likelihood During Phases of a Crisis --Conclusions Looking in the Mirror: Where Are Our Asymmetric Vulnerabilities? Measuring Conventional Military Superiority --Examining the Homeland --Quantifying the Homeland: What Are the Targets? --Examining Potential Vulnerabilities Categorizing the Threats What Are the Ten Asymmetric Threats? --Conclusions An Option of Difficulties --Countering Asymmetric Threats Current Initiatives: The State of Play Today -- Summarizing Current Initiatives -- Doing Better: Beginning with Three Ideas -- Policy Recommendations -- An Option of Difficulties? Conclusions: The Uneasy Athenians Endnotes

The purpose of this report is to evaluate whether the concept of asymmetry has analytical utility and to characterize the threat environment facing the United States in 2002.

The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) evaluated future U.S. strategy and force structure. It paid particular attention to a set of threats referred to as asymmetric challenges or asymmetric means. This documented briefing provides a brief description of the asymmetric strategies that employ these challenges. Today, U.S. forces appear capable of defeating the normally postulated military threats, including those associated with major theater wars. But many of these postulated threats are relatively symmetric in character, directly seeking to combat U.S. strengths. Future adversaries appear more likely to attack U.S. vulnerabilities and to do so using largely asymmetric means, in part because they cannot afford military forces and capabilities comparable to those of the United States.