This book challenges the traditional view that meaningful analogies cannot be drawn between domestic and international politics. Alexandru V. Grigorescu shows that there are important parallels to be drawn across these two realms, if political interactions among states over the past two centuries are compared to those within states going back about a thousand years. He focuses specifically on the evolution of institutions that restrain concentrated power, such as courts, assemblies, and bureaucracies. Restraining Power through Institutions begins by developing a set of theoretical arguments about the emergence, change, and consolidation of institutional restraints on power. These are primarily derived from literature focusing on domestic politics going back to events such as those surrounding the signing of the Magna Carta and the emergence and evolution of the Curia Regis in England, or of the Estates General and Parlements in France. It then assesses the relevance of such arguments for the evolution of numerous international institutions: international courts, such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration, International Court of Justice, and International Criminal Court; international assemblies and parliaments, such as the Assembly of the League of Nations, UN General Assembly; and European Parliament; and international secretariats, such as those of the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine, League of Nations, UN, and World Bank. The similarities between developments in the domestic and international realms lead to a number of important conclusions about future expectations for international institutions and for world politics more broadly. In particular, the book argues that complementing the traditional focus on efforts to acquire power with the "Lockean" focus on restraining power offers a more complete depiction of international politics. This novel perspective consequently shifts the focus from the interests and actions of a handful of powerful states to those of virtually all states and groups of states, regardless of how powerful they are.

At the end of the Cold War, the United States emerged as the world's most powerful state, and then used that power to initiate wars against smaller countries in the Middle East and South Asia. According to balance-of-power theory--the bedrock of realism in international relations--other states should have joined together militarily to counterbalance the United States' rising power. Yet they did not. Nor have they united to oppose Chinese aggression in the South China Sea or Russian offensives along its western border. This does not mean balance-of-power politics is dead, argues renowned international relations scholar T. V. Paul; instead it has taken a different form. Rather than employ familiar strategies such as active military alliances and arms buildups, leading powers have engaged in "soft balancing," which seeks to restrain threatening powers through the use of international institutions, informal alignments, and economic sanctions. Paul places the evolution of balancing behavior in historical perspective, from the post-Napoleonic era to today's globalized world. This book offers an illuminating examination of how subtler forms of balance-of-power politics can help states achieve their goals against aggressive powers without wars or arms races.

The end of the Cold War was a "big bang" reminiscent of earlier moments after major wars, such as the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 and the end of the world wars in 1919 and 1945. But what do states that win wars do with their newfound power, and how do they use it to build order? In After Victory, John Ikenberry examines postwar settlements in modern history, arguing that powerful countries do seek to build stable and cooperative relations, but the type of order that emerges hinges on their ability to make commitments and restrain power. He explains that only with the spread of democracy in the twentieth century and the innovative use of international institutions—both linked to the emergence of the United States as a world power—has order been created that goes beyond balance of power politics to exhibit "constitutional" characteristics. Blending comparative politics with international relations, and history with theory, After Victory will be of interest to anyone concerned with the organization of world order, the role of institutions in world politics, and the lessons of past postwar settlements for today.

This text states that democratic governments must be accountable to the electorate; but they must also be subject to restraint and oversight by other public agencies. The state must control itself. This text explores how new democracies can achieve this goal.

Comprehensive examination of restraint in international politics, considered across a range of contexts as a political process, device, and strategy.

Honorable Mention, 2024 T.V. Paul Best Book in Global International Relations, Global International Relations Section, International Studies Association Conventional wisdom holds that China’s rise is disrupting the global balance of power in unpredictable ways. However, China has often deferred to the consensus of smaller neighboring countries on regional security rather than running roughshod over them. Why and when does China exercise restraint—and how does this aspect of Chinese statecraft challenge the assumptions of international relations theory? In Power and Restraint in China’s Rise, Chin-Hao Huang argues that a rising power’s aspirations for acceptance provide a key rationale for refraining from coercive measures. He analyzes Chinese foreign policy conduct in the South China Sea, showing how complying with regional norms and accepting constraints improves external perceptions of China and advances other states’ recognition of China as a legitimate power. Huang details how member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations have taken a collective approach to defusing tension in maritime disputes, incentivizing China to support regional security initiatives that it had previously resisted. Drawing on this empirical analysis, Huang develops new theoretical perspectives on why great powers eschew coercion in favor of restraint when they seek legitimacy. His framework explains why a dominant state with rising ambitions takes the views and interests of small states into account, as well as how collective action can induce change in a major power’s behavior. Offering new insight into the causes and consequences of change in recent Chinese foreign policy, this book has significant implications for the future of engagement with China.

At the end of the nineteenth century, the United States emerged as an economic colossus in command of a new empire. Yet for the next forty years the United States eschewed the kind of aggressive grand strategy that had marked other rising imperial powers in favor of a policy of moderation. In Power and Restraint, Jeffrey W. Meiser explores why the United States—counter to widely accepted wisdom in international relations theory—chose the course it did. Using thirty-four carefully researched historical cases, Meiser asserts that domestic political institutions and culture played a decisive role in preventing the mobilization of resources necessary to implement an expansionist grand strategy. These factors included traditional congressional opposition to executive branch ambitions, voter resistance to European-style imperialism, and the personal antipathy to expansionism felt by presidents like Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt. The web of resilient and redundant political restraints halted or limited expansionist ambitions and shaped the United States into an historical anomaly, a rising great power characterized by prudence and limited international ambitions.