The euro crisis has been an existential crisis for Europe and for its stateless currency. It substantially impacted the institutional evolution of Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), making EMU’s rules-based logic tumble and triggering an institutional capacitybuilding. The euro crisis period should therefore be regarded as the most constitutionally relevant post-Maastricht European integration moment. This dissertation claims that the euro crisis management, because it involved the adoption of an array of significant fiscal rules, instruments, mechanisms and bodies, has resulted in the institutionalization of a distinctive fiscal authority in Europe. The convoluted process through which this authority has emerged was characterised by a tension between countervailing forces of centralization and fragmentation. This dissertation hence conceptualizes, documents and interprets the logic of a singular institutionalization process in which new fiscal powers became concomitantly centralized, fragmented and delegated to a series of ad hoc bodies operating in the shadow of newly empowered EMU executive institutions. The centrifugal delegation pattern at play is intriguing because it runs against the classic, pre-Maastricht delegation trend that entrusted the European Commission with newly centralized tasks. The new fiscal centre is instead fundamentally fragmented among three key actors: the Eurogroup, the European Central Bank and the Commission. Indeed, the dissertation has found that despite the emergence of a fiscal centre, the European Union still does not dispose of a formalized and settled fiscal power structure. The main puzzle uncovered by this examination is that while a fiscal authority has been institutionalized, no political EU actor has been able to formally embody and exclusively claim this authority. Going forward, formalizing such a political authority would require some form of constitutional settlement to clarify who is Europe’s fiscal primus inter pares.

The objective of this publication is to offer an answer to the question whether the European Union and, in particular, the full-fledged members of the Economic and Monetary Union, have the ability to develop common solutions leading to the process of further integration. It is a valid question in the context of visible differences in views expressed by ordinary citizens and EU politicians. On the one hand, countries in financial distress expect support from other member states claiming that it is an obligation of the community as a whole (referring to the idea of integration); on the other hand, they state that meeting specific requirements in return for financial aid undermines their state sovereignty. The work presents an analysis of the hitherto activities in the area of EU fiscal consolidation and describes the theoretical format and scope of fiscal union, the possible functions of common bonds, the effects of the issue of bonds (in the context of spreading risk among issuers and the impact on fiscal discipline), and, finally, the role of disintegration processes in the context of public finance issues.

With the introduction of a single currency in 1999 and the negotiations for the fifth enlargement in 2000, the European Union is at a major crossroads in its history. While the adoption of EMU and the entrance of new member states hold the promise of creating an 'ever close union', they must take place in a rather turbulent environment. Exogenous shocks such as the Asian financial crisis, the Russian upheaval, and new Balkan problems threaten to derail advances in monetary affairs and common foreign and security policy. Endogenous resistance to further European policy reform in areas such as the budget, CAP, and structural funds has strengthened, as suggested by the meagre advances in the Amsterdam Treaty. Indeed, domestic developments, including changes in the political composition of leading governments and growing unemployment, pose further challenges to EU reforms. With contributions from leading scholars, the book examines the European Union in a theoretically informed, empirically-grounded manner. The book begins by exploring the evolving nature of the European polity and its capacity for change. The second section on monetary union examines the conditions under which EMU will challenge integration, the viability of the European Central Bank, as well as the ability of European citizens to adjust to the single currency. The third section investigates why member states agreed to the Eastern enlargement and what internal and external challenges face the Union as a result. The fourth section highlights the institutional upheavals underway in the major European institutions, as well as Europeans support of and identify with the European polity. The final section of the book highlights the extent to which the European Union is able to govern in key policy areas–trade, environment, common foreign and security policy, and development–given the state of the European Union today. This is the fifth volume in the biannual series State of the European Union produced under the auspices of the American European Community Studies Association (ECSA)

The euro crisis made Europe’s stateless currency falter. This book retraces and interprets the ways in which the crisis impacted the unique institutional set-up of Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). It argues that the crisis propelled the European continent towards the institutionalization of an unprecedented form of centralized authority: Europe’s New Fiscal Union. Diving into the central functions of fiscal surveillance, financial assistance, lending of last resort and banking resolution, the book reveals how a covert and convoluted mutualisation process occurred in the shadow of the euro crisis management. Based on 62 interviews conducted by the author with senior policy-makers in Brussels, Frankfurt, Helsinki and Rome, the book claims that Europe’s New Fiscal Union is largely unsettled and still unstable. It therefore engages with the challenges arising from the patchwork of newly adopted rules, instruments and bodies, suggesting crucial reform steps to make EMU sustainable.

Does the European Union need closer fiscal integration, and in particular a stronger fiscal centre, to become more resilient to economic shocks? This book looks at the experience of 13 federal states to help inform the heated debate on this issue. It analyses in detail their practices in devolving responsibilities from the subnational to the central level, compares them to those of the European Union, and draws lessons for a possible future fiscal union in Europe. More specifically, this book tries to answer three sets of questions: What is the role of centralized fiscal policies in federations, and hence the size, features and functions of the central budget? What institutional arrangements are used to coordinate fiscal policy between the federal and subnational levels? What are the links between federal and subnational debt, and how have subnational financing crises been handled, when they occurred? These policy questions are critical in many federations, and central to the current discussions about future paths for the European Union. This book brings to the table new, practical insights through a systematic and comprehensive comparison of the EU fiscal framework with that of federal states. It also departs from the decentralization perspective that has been prominent in the literature by focusing on the role of the centre (which responsibilities are centralized at the federal level and how they are handled, rather than which functions belong to the local level). Such an approach is particularly relevant for the European Union, where a fiscal union would imply granting new powers to the centre.

In today’s Europe, deep cracks are showing in the system of political cooperation that was designed to prevent the geopolitical catastrophes that ravaged the continent in the first half of the twentieth century. Europeans are haunted, once again, by the specters of nationalism, fascism, and economic protectionism. Instead of sounding the alarm, many conservatives have become cheerleaders for the demise of the European Union (EU). This compelling book represents the first systematic attempt to justify the European project from a free-market, conservative viewpoint. Although many of their criticisms are justified, Dalibor Rohac contends that Euroskeptics are playing a dangerous game. Their rejection of European integration places them in the unsavory company of nationalists, left-wing radicals, and Putin apologists. Their defense of the nation-state against Brussels, furthermore, is ahistorical. He convincingly shows that the flourishing of democracy and free markets in Europe has gone hand in hand with the integration project. Europe’s pre-EU past, in contrast, was marked by a series of geopolitical calamities. When British voters make their decision in June, they should remember that while Brexit would not be a political or economic disaster for the United Kingdom, it would not solve any of the problems that the “Leavers” associate with EU membership. Worse yet, its departure from the European Union would strengthen the centrifugal forces that are already undermining Europe's ability to solve the multitude of political, economic, and security challenges plaguing the continent today. Instead of advocating for the end of the EU, Rohac argues that conservatives must come to the rescue of the integration project by helping to reduce the EU’s democratic deficit and turning it into an engine of economic dynamism and prosperity. For the author’s video on Brexit, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cFReUnO05Fo