Since the Cold War, peace operations have become the core focus of many Western armed forces. In these operations, the division between civil and military responsibilities often rapidly blurs. Among policy makers and in military circles, a debate has erupted regarding the scope of the military in stabilizing and reconstructing war torn societies. Should soldiers, who primarily prepare for combat duties, observe a strict segregation between the "military sphere" and the "civilian sphere" or become involved in "nation building"? Should soldiers be allowed to venture into the murky arena of public security, civil administration, humanitarian relief, and political and social reconstruction? In Soldiers and Civil Power, Thijs Brocades Zaalberg draws on military records and in-depth interviews with key players to examine international operations in the 1990's in Cambodia, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Focusing his historical analysis on the experiences of various battalions in the field, he reveals large gaps between this tactical level of operations, political-strategic decision making and military doctrine. By comparing peace operations to examples of counterinsurgency operations in the colonial era and military governance in World War II, he exposes the controversial, but inescapable role of the Western military in supporting and even substituting civil authorities during military interventions. At a time when US forces and its allies struggle to restore order in Iraq and Afghanistan, Brocades Zaalberg’s in-depth study is an invaluable resource not only for military historians, but anyone interested in the evolving global mission of armed forces in the twenty-first century.

In the continuing effort to maintain a ready force and honor the United States commitments throughout the world, in 1993 the Chief of Staff of the Army directed a test of the use of Reserve Component forces for the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) peacekeeping mission in the Sinai. A battalion composed of 80% RC individual volunteers and 20% Active Component soldiers was activated, trained and deployed as the 28th MFO rotation to the Sinai (Jan-Jul 95). ARI conducted an assessment of personnel and training issues using performance, interview and survey data. The four research questions and their findings are as follows. (1) Personnel: Who volunteered and why? What, if any, changes should be made to the volunteer screening process? (2) Family Support: How well did the family support system work? What was the impact of Sinai service on the family and civilian lives of volunteers? (3) Training/Performance: What are the unique and minimal training requirements? Did the training process produce a cohesive unit that could perform the mission? (4) Impact on the 29th ID(L): What is the impact on the ARYG units that sent volunteers, both during the deployment and post-deployment? Recommendations for future deployments are discussed in the text. ARI will continue to assess the impact of the deployment and post-redeployment re-entry on National Guard soldier commitment/retention, marital stability and financial well-being through October 1997. Cost analyses are not included in the ARI portion of the MFO assessment.

One of the most vexing issues that has faced the international community since the end of the Cold War has been the use of force by the United Nations peacekeeping forces. UN intervention in civil wars, as in Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Rwanda, has thrown into stark relief the difficulty of peacekeepers operating in situations where consent to their presence and activities is fragile or incomplete and where there is little peace to keep. Complex questions arise in these circumstances. When and how should peacekeepers use force to protect themselves, to protect their mission, or, most troublingly, to ensure compliance by recalcitrant parties with peace accords? Is a peace enforcement role for peacekeepers possible or is this simply war by another name? Is there a grey zone between peacekeeping and peace enforcement? Trevor Findlay reveals the history of the use of force by UN peacekeepers from Sinai in the 1950s to Haiti in the 1990s. He untangles the arguments about the use of force in peace operations and sets these within the broader context of military doctrine and practice. Drawing on these insights the author examines proposals for future conduct of UN operations, including the formulation of UN peacekeeping doctrine and the establishment of a UN rapid reaction force.