Most current talk of forgiveness and reconciliation in the aftermath of collective violence proceeds from an assumption that forgiveness is always superior to resentment and refusal to forgive. Victims who demonstrate a willingness to forgive are often celebrated as virtuous moral models, while those who refuse to forgive are frequently seen as suffering from a pathology. Resentment is viewed as a negative state, held by victims who are not "ready" or "capable" of forgiving and healing. Resentment's Virtue offers a new, more nuanced view. Building on the writings of Holocaust survivor Jean Améry and the work of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Thomas Brudholm argues that the preservation of resentment can be the reflex of a moral protest that might be as permissible, humane or honorable as the willingness to forgive. Taking into account the experiences of victims, the findings of truth commissions, and studies of mass atrocities, Brudholm seeks to enrich the philosophical understanding of resentment.

In a pluralistic society such as ours, tolerance is a virtue—but it doesn't always seem so. Some suspect that it entangles us in unacceptable moral compromises and inequalities of power, while others dismiss it as mere political correctness or doubt that it can safeguard the moral and political relationships we value. Tolerance among the Virtues provides a vigorous defense of tolerance against its many critics and shows why the virtue of tolerance involves exercising judgment across a variety of different circumstances and relationships—not simply applying a prescribed set of rules. Drawing inspiration from St. Paul, Aquinas, and Wittgenstein, John Bowlin offers a nuanced inquiry into tolerance as a virtue. He explains why the advocates and debunkers of toleration have reached an impasse, and he suggests a new way forward by distinguishing the virtue of tolerance from its false look-alikes, and from its sibling, forbearance. Some acts of toleration are right and good, while others amount to indifference, complicity, or condescension. Some persons are able to draw these distinctions well and to act in accord with their better judgment. When we praise them as tolerant, we are commending them as virtuous. Bowlin explores what that commendation means. Tolerance among the Virtues offers invaluable insights into how to live amid differences we cannot endorse—beliefs we consider false, actions we think are unjust, institutional arrangements we consider cruel or corrupt, and persons who embody what we oppose.

Is your Christian life the abundant life Jesus promised us in Jn.10:10? If there is uncertainty, this cross-denominational study of virtue shows the way to the life Christ promised.

In analyzing the various principles of Alcoholics Anonymous we now come to one which has come up for more discussion, and which is at the bottom of more difficulties than any of all the ones listed. This principle is: “THE DANGER OF RESENTMENT—SELF PITY” In the alcoholic, “frustration begot resentment, resentment begot self-pity, self-pity begot drinking, and drinking begot frustration, and frustration begot resentment, and resentment begot self-pity,” and on and on and on—in an unending cycle, until faced with the three-pronged choice: sobriety or insanity or death. And then we chose sobriety in A.A. And we learned the principle that: If the alcoholic repeated any PART of the cycle, the ENTIRE cycle would repeat ITSELF, “in toto.” We learned through the above principle that to the alcoholic, resentment and self-pity would always remain his number one twin-enemy—no matter how long sober. And this means that, if he permits himself to indulge in resentment or self-pity too frequently or for too prolonged periods of time, he will automatically set off the compulsion to drink. In short: AN ALCOHOLIC CANNOT TOLERATE RESENTMENT. If he does, there automatically will begin the old pattern: “stinking-thinking; drinking-thinking; drinking.” And so also will it be with any part of the cycle above: If the alcoholic takes a drink, he will automatically and ultimately become full of resentments, etc. etc. We do not know why this happens, but we do know from long, long experience that it does happen.

Innovative theory surrounding the liberal demand for sympathetic resentment, which entails a recognition of the political equality of victims of injustice.

Virtue ethics in its contemporary manifestation is dominated by neo Aristotelian virtue ethics primarily developed by Rosalind Hursthouse. This version of eudaimonistic virtue ethics was ground breaking, but has been subject to considerable critical attention. Christine Swanton shows that the time is ripe for new developments and alternatives. The target centred virtue ethics proposed by Swanton is opposed to orthodox virtue ethics in two major ways. First, it rejects the 'natural goodness' metaphysics of Neo Aristotelian virtue ethics owed to Philippa Foot in favour of a 'hermeneutic ontology' of ethics inspired by the Continental tradition and McDowell. Second, it rejects the well -known 'qualified agent' account of right action made famous by Hursthouse in favour of a target centred framework for assessing rightness of acts. Swanton develops the target centred view with discussions of Dancy's particularism, default reasons and thick concepts, codifiability, and its relation to the Doctrine of the mean. Target Centred Virtue Ethics retains the pluralism of Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View (2003) but develops it further in relation to a pluralistic account of practical reason. This study develops other substantive positions including the view that target centred virtue ethics is developmental, suitably embedded in an environmental ethics of dwelling; and incorporates a concept of differentiated virtue to allow for roles, narrativity, cultural and historical location, and stage of life.