The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence presents its report on prewar intelligence regarding Iraq, which contains numerous documents from various U.S. intelligence agencies regarding possible weapons of mass destruction, and other issues relating to Iraq.

S. Rept. 108-301. Unclassified edition. Together With Additional Views. Provides the Senate and the American public with a substantial record of the facts underlying the conclusions of the Committee regarding the intelligence community's prewar assessments of Iraq's programs for weapons of mass destruction and its ties to terrorism. Some text is blacked out. 108th Congress, 2d Session. Jacket 94-712 PDF.

Assesses ¿whether public statements and reports and testimony regarding Iraq by U.S. Gov¿t. officials made between the Gulf War period and the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom were substantiated by intelligence info.¿ The Committee reviewed 5 major policy speeches by Admin. officials regarding: the threats posed by Iraq, Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs, Iraqi ties to terrorist groups, and possible consequences of a U.S. invasion of Iraq. The Committee selected particular statements that pertained to 8 categories: nuclear weapons, biological weapons, chemical weapons, weapons of mass destruction (generally), methods of delivery, links to terrorism, regime intent, and assessments about the post-war situation in Iraq.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence presents its report on prewar intelligence regarding Iraq, which contains numerous documents from various U.S. intelligence agencies regarding possible weapons of mass destruction, and other issues relating to Iraq.

Presents the findings of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, which was formed in 2006 to examine the situation in Iraq and offer suggestions for the American military's future involvement in the region.

This publication sets out the report of the inquiry by the five-member committee, chaired by Lord Butler, established in February 2004 to examine the quality of intelligence used as justification for UK military participation in the war against Iraq in March 2003. The inquirys remit was: i) to investigate discrepancies in the gathering, evaluation and use of intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) (including the September 2002 intelligence dossier which alleged Iraq was capable of deploying WMDs within 45 minutes), given the subsequent failure by the Iraq Survey Group to find WMDs in Iraq; and ii) to make recommendations for future practice, in the light of the difficulties of operating in countries of concern. The report focuses on structures, systems and processes rather than on the actions of individuals. Issues discussed include: the nature and use of intelligence; countries of concern other than Iraq and global trade; international terrorism and intelligence responses; counter-proliferation machinery; Iraqs WMD programmes since 1990 and intelligence assessments; the role of intelligence in assessing the legality of the war; validation of human intelligence sources; the links between Al Qaida and the Iraqi regime; the intelligence machinery including the work of the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), and the machinery of government.

The goal of this case study is to outline how the United States chose to go to war in Iraq, how its decision making process functioned, and what can be done to improve that process.