The Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) resulted from the decisions of the Secretary of Defense' Bottom Up Review (BUR). Each service has a demonstrated need for advanced technology aircraft to meet future contingencies, but it was determined that costs for development and production of these several different aircraft could not be met due to budgetary constraints. The BUR found that there were not enough resources available to support all these programs in future years. The decision was made to continue with the Air Force F-22 fighter aircraft, and the F/A-18E/F aircraft for the Navy, but to cancel the A/F-X and the MRF. The decision on ASTOL was to continue that research, but to secure specific commitment of resources by at least two of the three Services before building a flying prototype. The BUR also confirmed the continuing needs that were to be met by the A/F-X and MRF programs. This led to the establishment of the Joint Advanced Strike Technology Program in July 1993.

Aerial refueling capabilities are an essential enabler of U.S. power projection and other critic at national missions. OPERATIONS ENDURING and IRAQI FREEDOM (OEF and OIF) could not have happened without these aerial refueling capabilities. Aerial refueling makes possible rapid deployment of forces to contingencies and the elective employment of those forces in the contingencies. In OIF there were over 8500 aerial refueling sorties flown and about 450 million pounds of fuel off loaded. In addition, aerial refueling remains a critical element in supporting the bomber leg of U.S. nuclear forces and other special national security missions. The task force was charged to evaluate current aerial refueling capability and to identify and evaluate alternative means of meeting future aerial refueling requirements.

Hearing on the DoD's tactical aircraft programs, primarily the F-22, the F/A-18E/F, and the joint strike fighter. Desert Storm showed that an effective tactical air power component of the military is fundamental for our national military strategy. In the past, billions of dollars were spent developing aircraft we didn't procure or an aircraft we procured in quantities too little to justify the developmental costs. DoD faces an annual procurement shortfall of $20 billion and a projected increase in infrastructure costs of $26 billion between 1997 and 2001. Testimony from: DoD; Joint Chiefs of Staff; CBO, and the GAO. Includes schedules, and cost charts for aircraft.