One of the questions in the fight against terrorism is whether the United States needs a counterterrorism domestic intelligence agency separate from law enforcement. Drawing on an analysis of current counterterrorism efforts, an examination the domestic intelligence agencies in six other democracies, and interviews with intelligence and law enforcement experts, this volume lays out the relevant considerations for creating such an agency.

With terrorism still prominent on the U.S. national agenda, whether the country's prevention efforts match the threat it faces continues to be central in policy debate. One element of this debate is questioning whether the United States, like some other countries, needs a dedicated domestic intelligence agency. To examine this question, Congress directed that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis perform "an independent study on the feasibility of creating a counter terrorism intelligence agency" (U.S. Congress, 2006). The results of this study are presented in three volumes: This volume contains case studies of other nations' domestic intelligence organizations and activities. An additional volume, published separately, "The Challenge of Domestic Intelligence in a Free Society: A Multidisciplinary Look at the Creation of a U.S. Domestic Counterterrorism Intelligence Agency" (Jackson, 2009), presents a series of papers examining the U.S. context for domestic intelligence, current activities, and varied approaches for assessing options. The overarching policy results of the assessment, including a discussion of the pros and cons of creating a new intelligence organization, are included in a companion volume to this work: "Reorganizing U.S. Domestic Intelligence: Assessing the Options" (Treverton, 2008). This volume should be of interest to homeland security policy makers, state and local governments, law enforcement organizations, civil rights and civil liberties organizations, and private-sector organizations with interests in homeland security. This study is part of a larger body of RAND research related to homeland security, intelligence, and terrorism.

The author reveals the dangerous weaknesses undermining domestic intelligence in the United States and tells why a new national security service should not be part of the FBI. He explains the need for a new domestic intelligence agency, modeled on the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and lodged in the Department of Homeland Security.

Whether U.S. terrorism-prevention efforts match the threat continues to be central in policy debate. Part of this debate is whether the United States needs a dedicated domestic counterterrorism intelligence agency. To inform future policy decisionmaking, this book examines, from a variety of perspectives, the policy proposal that such an agency be created. These include its possible capabilities, comparing its potential effectiveness with that of current efforts, and its acceptability to the public, as well as various balances and trade-offs involved in creating such an agency. Reflecting the limits in the data available and the significant uncertainty associated with this policy area, if there is a unifying message from the study, it is one of caution and deliberation. In an area in which direct assessment and analysis are limited, there is a need to carefully consider the implications and potential outcomes of such significant policy changes. In doing so, examination from different perspectives and through different approaches -- to ideally capture a sufficient picture of the complexity to see not just the benefits we hope to gain from policy change but the layers of effects and interactions that could either help or hurt the chances of those benefits appearing -- is a critical ingredient of policy deliberation and design.

"A thorough, often provocative, assessment of the US domestic intelligence enterprise since 9/11"--

Much has been written about U.S. intelligence operations. However, intelligence, as it is conducted in the U.S. domestic environment, has usually been treated in a fractured and sensationalistic manner. This book dispassionately assesses the U.S. domestically oriented intelligence enterprise by first examining its individual components and then sho

This new book from Richard Posner brings the story up to date. He argues that the emerging structure of that reformed intelligence system-heavily influenced by the report of another commission on the intelligence failure related to Saddam Hussein's abandonment of weapons of mass destruction-is excessively centralized and will not be effective. Posner brings light to the issues at hand and offers solutions.